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ABSTRACT

“Self Defense and Sea Power: The Provincial Navies of the British Atlantic World, 16891763,” explores the ways in which Anglo-American colonial governments in North America and
the West Indies managed naval defense during imperial and border conflicts between the late
seventeenth and mid-eighteenth centuries. With limited military assistance from the imperial
government in London, provincial leaders built their own semi-permanent and temporary navies
to protect commerce from Franco-Spanish privateers, pirates, and Native American naval forces.
Provincial governments also utilized these fleets to spearhead sieges of enemy ports, support
infantry operations on land, and to transport troops and supplies to warzones.
By the mid-1740s, administrative changes within the British Admiralty along with
increased Parliamentary oversight of colonial military campaigns led metropolitan authorities to
massively increase the Royal Navy’s presence throughout the Western Atlantic world. By the
1750s, the Crown’s ‘Royalization’ of coastal defense made the existence of numerous local
American navies unnecessary. While increased imperial support for colonial military operations
should have pleased Anglo-American officials, tensions between provincial authorities and
Royal Navy officers over the impressment of American sailors and prize distribution soured this
defensive partnership. When the Crown began to use the Royal Navy to enforce unpopular trade
and tax policies in the 1760s, the legacy of a century of provincial naval defense played an
important role in shaping the ways American dissidents resisted British authority at sea in the
years leading up to the American Revolution.
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GLOSSARY OF NAVAL TERMINOLOGY
Note: The following glossary relies on modern scholarly descriptions of vessels from the period,
c. 1680-1770. Period sources frequently diverged in how they classified various vessels. Most of
the vessels listed below were primarily trading ships, and only became warships when impressed
or hired out by colonial governments. Vessels were often classified by their ‘rig,’ or the ways in
which the sails were arranged. For instance, a ‘fore-and-aft’ rigged vessel has a sail pointing
towards the front (fore) of the vessel to the back (aft). The term “ship” usually referred to a
“ship-rigged” vessel with three large masts with square sails. See image below for an example.

Diagram of Masts on a Tall Ship, by author. Photograph of La Gloria, a modern Spanish Navy tall ship, taken by
the author in Charleston, S.C. at the beginning of his dissertation research, Summer 2018.

Brigantine: Brigantines were typically small vessels under 100-tons. They had two masts. The
foremast was square-rigged while the mainmast had a fore-and-aft rig. This differed slightly
from a Brig, which was a two masted vessel that typically had square-sail rigs on both of its
masts.1 After sloops, brigantines may have been the most common merchant vessel employed in
provincial fleets.
Frigate: A large, ship-rigged warship usually belonging to the Royal Navy, and in very rare
cases, provincial navies. Typically, Royal Navy frigates sent to America were among the
smallest “rated” warships. While first or second-rate warships with nearly one hundred guns
would be reserved for European service, smaller fifth or sixth-rate frigates that carried between
twenty and forty guns would serve in the New World.2

1

William Avery Baker, “Vessel Types of Colonial Massachusetts” in Collections of the Colonial Society of
Massachusetts, Vol. 52: Sea Faring in Colonial Massachusetts (March 1980), pp. 18-20. Colonial Society of
Massachusetts https://www.colonialsociety.org/node/1973#fore, and John Robinson, George Francis Dow, The
Sailing Ships of New England, 1607-1907 (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2007), pp. 28-29. Retrieved from
Google Books
2
David Wilson “Protecting Trade by Suppressing Pirates: British Colonial and Metropolitan Responses to
Atlantic Piracy, 1716-1726,” in The Golden Age of Piracy: The Rise, Fall, and Enduring Popularity of Pirates, ed.
David Head. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2018), p. 91. Google Play eBook edition.
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Galley: The term ‘galley’ has been used to describe light-drafted rowing vessels since Classical
Antiquity. In the British Atlantic world, the term had various meanings. Occasionally, a vessel
named “X Galley” would simply be a regular trading vessel that had a hull specifically shaped
for swifter sailing. On the other hand, some colonial governments particularly in the Southeast
built light-draft “galleys” which relied on oars as their primary source of propulsion.3 See
Chapter I and Chapter III for varying uses of galleys in New England’s and South Carolina’s
provincial naval establishments.
Ketch: A very small ocean-going trading or fishing vessel with a main mast and mizzen mast,
but no foremast. In New England, these vessels were typically under 70-tons.4 See Chapter I for
the use of ketches in New England’s early provincial navy.
Periagua/Periauger/Piragua: Inspired by Native American dug-out canoes, periaguas (spelled
and pronounced in myriad ways) were small, swift vessels similar to galleys in that they were
primarily powered by oars and occasionally by sails. These vessels were particularly common in
the Southern colonies and the West Indies and were the main vessels of the South Carolina Scout
Boat navy.5
Schooner: Vessel with two masts that are rigged in a fore-and-aft pattern. Square sails could be
added on top of the masts to make them topsail schooners. They were somewhat similar in
appearance to brigantines but had narrower hulls, and their masts were more slanted.6 See
Chapter III for examples of schooners used for provincial service in the War of Jenkin’s Ear.
Shallop: typically, a very small, open-decked coastal work boat. Larger vessels often times
carried shallops onboard to serve as auxiliaries when needed.7
Sloop: The most common vessel in provincial navies, and perhaps the most commonly employed
vessel in the British Atlantic world. In the North American (and provincial navy) context, a sloop
usually describes a single-masted trading vessel with a fore-and-aft rig that could involve any
number of sail types. These smaller vessels were typically under 100-tons and could operate in
shallow waters off the coasts or on ocean-going missions.8
Snow: A vessel extremely similar to a brig except for vessel with its rear mast (known as the
‘trysail-mast’ due to its prominent fore-and-aft trysail that jutted out of the rear of the vessel)

3

Baker, “Vessel Types,” p. 22 and Benerson Little, Pirate Hunting: The Fight Against Pirates, Privateers,
and Sea Raiders from Antiquity to the Present (Washington: Potomac Books, 2010), p. 147. Google Play eBook
Edition
4
P.C. Coker, Charleston's Maritime Heritage, 1670-1865: An Illustrated History (Coker Craft, 1987), pp.
xii-xiv and Baker, “Vessel Types,” pp. 12-13.
5
Little, Pirate Hunting, pp. 140-141 and Larry Ivers, This Torrent of Indians: War on the Southern
Frontier, 1715-1728 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2016), pp. 104-105. Kindle eBook edition.
6
Coker, Charleston’s Maritime Heritage, pp. xii-xiv.
7
Baker, “Vessel Types,” pp. 13-15.
8
Baker, “Vessel Types,” pp. 18-19, Coker, Charleston’s Maritime Heritage, pp. xii-xiv. Confusingly, the
Royal Navy also used the term ‘sloop-of-war’ to describe a wide array of small-warships in this era. See Ian
McLaughlan, The Sloop of War, 1650-1763 (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2014) for more information on Royal
Navy sloops.
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close to its mainmast. The Massachusetts province snow Prince of Orange in Chapter III is a
prime example.9
Whale Boat: Whaleboats were extremely common small-craft employed primarily by New
England mariners for whale-hunting but were also used throughout the colonies for various
military missions. They were particularly useful for troop transport and could be powered by
oars or sails.10

9

Waldo Lincoln, The Province Snow “Prince of Orange” (Worcester: Press of Charles Hamilton, 1901), p.

4
10

Ivers, This Torrent, pp. 106-107.
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Source: Public Domain Image. The Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Division of Art, Prints and Photographs: Print
Collection, The New York Public Library. “A view of Charles Town the Capital of South Carolina” New York
Public Library Digital Collections. https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47da-2d13-a3d9-e040e00a18064a99.

This eighteenth century depiction of Charles Town, South Carolina’s waterfront includes many
of the vessels that were common in provincial navies. On the far left is a typical single-masted
trading sloop. Just behind the sailors in the foreground is a very small coastal sailing vessel,
similar in structure to the periagua sailing canoes of the South Carolina provincial navy. In the
center is a fully rigged ship, similar to British Royal Navy frigates. The two-masted vessel to the
right of the ship is likely a coastal trading schooner.
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1747 MAP OF NORTH AMERICA AND WEST INDIES

Source: A zoomed-in section of Bowen, E., “A complete system of geography. Being a description of all the
countries, islands, cities, chief towns, harbours, lakes, and rivers, mountains, mines, &c. of the known world …,
1747 edition.” While most of the regions consulted in this study are visible in this map, Halifax, Nova Scotia is not
depicted as it would not be established until 1749. The full map is part of the Public Domain, and was retrieved at
Wikimedia Commons,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1747_Bowen_Map_of_North_America_and_South_America_(_Western_
Hemisphere)_-_Geographicus_-_America-bowen-1747.jpg
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INTRODUCTION

Philadelphia was in danger. It was the autumn of 1747—the eighth year of the third
global imperial war Britain had fought against its Franco-Spanish enemies in half a century—and
French and Spanish privateers prowled for local commerce off the Pennsylvania coast. While the
hundreds of thousands of Anglo-American colonists between Newfoundland and Barbados faced
occasional terrestrial threats from hostile French, Spanish, and Native American armies, the
largely coastal British American colonies and their ocean-bound commerce suffered even more
so from Franco-Spanish commerce raiding. In the face of this imminent threat, the Pennsylvania
legislature struggled to find a solution to protect vulnerable local merchant ships.
While debates over coastal defense measures were common in every British province, the
Quaker-dominated proprietary colony of Pennsylvania was unique. On the one hand proprietary
colonies were essentially American fiefdoms that were privately owned by absentee landlords
living in England, and thus were never guaranteed Royal military protection that colonies
directly under the auspices of the Crown enjoyed.11 On the other hand, Pennsylvania’s governors
struggled to convince the pacifistic and tight-fisted Quakers that dominated the Pennsylvania
Assembly to expand the colony’s naval defenses.12
What military measures could a colony without Royal Navy protection take to combat
enemy privateers? The colony’s government could fund and direct the construction of a local
provincial navy. As early as 1634, the infant Massachusetts government had fitted out a guard

11
David Wilson “Protecting Trade by Suppressing Pirates: British Colonial and Metropolitan Responses to
Atlantic Piracy, 1716-1726,” in The Golden Age of Piracy: The Rise, Fall, and Enduring Popularity of Pirates, ed.
David Head. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2018), pp.98-99.
12
Carl E. Swanson, Predators and Prizes: American Privateering And Imperial Warfare, 1739-1748
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), pp. 160-161.
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ship with local resources and men.13 With Royal Navy involvement in North America and the
West Indies limited before the second decade of the eighteenth century, Anglo-American
governments frequently used local funds and sailors to build regional defense fleets to protect
ports and commerce from enemy navies and pirates.14 On occasion, these provincial fleets could
also be deployed in offensive campaigns against enemy port cities. While the American
precedent for provincial navies extended back to the beginning of the seventeenth century,
colonial governments found even more reason to build these local fleets when naval threats
amplified during four global conflicts between Britain and its imperial/ Native foes: King
William’s War (1689-1698), Queen Anne’s War (1702-1713), The War of Jenkin’s Ear/King
George’s War (1739-1748), and the Seven Years War (1754-1763). With each ensuing conflict,
the North American and West Indian provinces were drawn more and more into deadly battles
for maritime hegemony in the New World.
Early twentieth century historian Howard Chapin once remarked that “The American
Navy did not spring forth full-fledged at the outbreak of the Revolution, like Pallas Athene from
the head of Zeus. Its roots go back to the Colonial privateersmen and the naval expeditions
against the French and Spanish.”15 And so it is in Philadelphia in 1747 where we find the 41year-old printer and politician, Benjamin Franklin—a future founder of the United States and
Continental Navy—arguing for Philadelphians to support a local warship to hunt down FrancoSpanish privateers. In a pamphlet entitled Plain Truth, Franklin warned that the “Absence of
[Royal Navy] Ships of War, during the greatest Part of the Year, from both Virginia and New-

13
Charles O. Paullin, Colonial Army and Navy, Unpublished Manuscript. Charles Oscar Paullin papers,
1931. MSS53033, Library of Congress, p. 45.
14
N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815 (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 2004), p. 232.
15
Howard Chapin, “New England Vessels in the Expedition against Louisbourg, 1745,” in The New
England Historical and Genealogical Register, Vol. LXXVI (January, 1922), pp. 59-60.
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York” left the port city vulnerable to maritime assaults. To secure their coast, Philadelphians
should work together to bear the “Expence of a Vessel to guard our Trade.”16
Similar debates occurred throughout much of the British Atlantic when enemy privateers
lurked off the coast, when pirates captured local merchant ships, or when the Crown called on
colonial governments to initiate assaults on enemy port cities. Constructing and financing a local
navy was no small task for colonial governments, and the manner in which provincial navies
were created and funded varied from colony to colony. When provincial governments resorted to
unpopular measures such as impressment of vessels and sailors, or when they instituted
burdensome taxes to fund local defense measures, they risked igniting the potentially violent
anger of the populace. Even when colonial governments successfully established a temporary or
semi-permanent defense fleet, the associated costs often times aggravated already-potent internal
sociopolitical tensions throughout the American colonies.
If the organization of provincial navies elevated tensions within Anglo-American
colonies themselves, they also raised larger questions over the provincial-Royal relationship.
Was the Crown or the colonies responsible for coastal security? Who would pay for provincial
ships? Were American provincial ships equal to British warships, or subordinates? Who would
man Royal Navy frigates in American waters? What could colonial governments do if Royal
captains did not actively patrol for enemy vessels? These questions were never adequately
answered in the pre-Revolutionary era, and numbered among the myriad cracks in the
relationship between periphery and center that would shatter in the imperial crisis of the 1760s
and 1770s.

16

Benjamin Franklin, “Plain Truth, 17 November 1747,” Founders Online, National Archives,.
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-03-02-0091. [Original source: The Papers of Benjamin
Franklin, vol. 3, January 1, 1745, through June 30, 1750, ed. Leonard W. Labaree ( New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1961), pp. 180–204]
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This dissertation makes the case that between the 1680s and 1740s, Royal military
neglect led Anglo-Americans throughout the British Atlantic world to build and utilize their own
provincial navies against French, Spanish, Native, and piratical maritime threats. For the better
part of a century, these provincial fleets secured Britain’s weak grasp on its American coastlines.
Even when metropolitan authorities finally expanded the Royal Navy’s presence in its American
colonies between the 1740s and 1750s, their piecemeal attempts to ‘royalize’ coastal defense
were hampered by violent tensions between the Royal Navy and provincial authorities and
sailors. When imperial authorities used the Royal Navy to enforce unpopular trade policies in the
1760s, long-held anger at Royal Navy excesses coupled with a long legacy of local naval defense
helped to shape the ways American Patriots resisted British authorities in the imperial crisis.
Making a Historical and Historiographical Case for the Study of Provincial Navies

In his 2012 monograph American Naval History, 1607-1865, renowned American naval
historian Jonathan R. Dull argued that Anglo-Americans undertook “little independent naval
activity.” While admitting that colonists frequently employed privateers—“privately built,
owned, and manned but government-sanctioned armed vessel used chiefly to capture enemy
merchant ships”—he still concluded that the “colonies did not have permanent armies or navies,
and there was not even a maritime equivalent to the rudimentary military training provided by
colonial militias.”17 I argue that this latter assertion overlooks the difference between local
government-controlled war fleets—provincial navies—and private commerce raiders. I also
contend this testifies to the increasingly problematic nature of the term “privateering” in colonial

17

John R. Dull, American Naval History, 1607-1865: Overcoming the Colonial Legacy (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 2012), pp. 2-10.

5

maritime scholarship. What was a vague and controversial term in the era covered by this
dissertation continues to plague maritime military scholarship to this day.
Part of the historical and historiographical confusion over the differences between
provincial navies and privateers can be traced back to the multitudinous forms of naval warfare
in the late medieval and Renaissance eras. Historian N.A.M. Rodger, who has done more than
any other recent scholar to examine the origins of privateering and modern naval warfare, has
argued that before the seventeenth century, there were several types of naval organization in
European kingdoms. These included Royal impressment or hiring of vessels in times of war –
“Requisitioning” and “Chartering”—feudal or territorial customs that required certain regions or
fiefdoms to build ships for a lord or king—“Feudal navies” and “Ship Musters, “local navies”
built by regional governments, and “private” naval warfare (i.e. commercial vessels that took
part in various types of combat with or without governmental permission). Rodger argues that
when the Spanish Crown forbade any other European powers from accessing the riches or trade
of the New World in the sixteenth century, England and other Northern European kingdoms
encouraged private commercial warfare against the Spanish throughout the Atlantic world. This
meant that irregular private naval warfare was “artificially preserved [in the Americas] long after
it had disappeared from European waters.”18
It was from ‘private naval warfare’ that Rodger contends that the seventeenth century
term “privateer” originated. Up to the seventeenth century, private merchant ships often armed
themselves and fought defensive actions against enemy raiders, took part in occasional pirate
raids, or sought out permission for “reprisals” from their monarchs to retrieve stolen property. By

18

Rodger, “The New Atlantic: Naval Warfare in the Sixteenth Century,” in John B. Hattendorf and Richard
W. Unger, eds. War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (London: Boydell & Brewer, 2003), pp. 238247. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt81rtx
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the sixteenth century, various European monarchs—plagued by constant religious warfare and
their own lack of warships—began to license private warships to raid enemy commerce for
profit. Despite these early cases of government-sanctioned commerce raiding, it took the English
Crown until the late seventeenth century to fully codify the state’s role in private naval warfare,
and more specifically to use the term “privateer” to describe private commerce raiders.19 While
Rodger contends that northern European-style private naval warfare continued into the Americas,
this dissertation also holds that older medieval traditions such as the impressment of local vessels
and “local navies” also persisted in the Anglo-American colonies of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.
In my own research, I have found Roger’s lament that “generations of scholars have
made difficulties for themselves and their readers by using vague, anachronistic and
contradictory language about private naval warfare” to ring true.20 In particular, I have found that
the definition of the word “privateer” has only grown more expansive and vaguer throughout the
centuries. In a 1720 dictionary, privateering was simply defined as “a Vessel fitted out by one or
more private Persons, with a Licence from the Prince or State, to prey upon the Enemy; also the
Commander or Captain of such a Ship.” A few decades later, the famous British writer Samuel
Johnson defined a privateer as a “a ship fitted out by private men to plunder enemies. He is at no
charge for a fleet, further than providing privateers, wherewith his subjects carry on a pyratical

19
N.A.M. Rodger, “The Law and Language of Private Naval Warfare,” The Mariner's Mirror, Issue 100,
No. 1 (2014), pp. 5-13. Also see Shinsuke Satsuma, Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth
Century: Silver, Seapower and the Atlantic (London: Boydell & Brewer, 2013), pp. 9-10.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt31nj7r.6.
20
Rodger, “The Law and Language,” p. 5.
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war at their own expence.”21 In both definitions from the period this dissertation covers,
privateering was seen as an independently controlled activity, with tacit government acceptance.
For the most part, I have found that provincial governments in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries followed the aforementioned definitions, using the term “privateer” or
“private men of war” to describe privately licensed commerce raiders. When describing war
vessels fitted out by colonial governments, they typically used terms like “sloop of war,”
“province sloop,” “vessel fitted out at the expense of the government,” etc. This was not always
the case, and I have certainly found many cases where provincial authorities built warships and
called them “privateers.” Nevertheless, Anglo-American insistence that tax-funded provincial
fleets were something more than privateers seems to have grown over time as these fleets grew
in complexity. As will be seen in Chapter III, the battle over what made a vessel a “privateer” or
a “warship” led to a transatlantic legal battle between provincial and Royal Navy captains in the
1740s.
If privateering was an ill-defined term in the colonial era, later historians have done
nothing to narrow its categorical grasp. As early as the mid-1920s, historian Howard Chapin
argued that privateer ships were “privately owned armed-vessels, which sailed under the flag and
commission of some recognized government.” Chapin also maintains that by the 1700s,
privateers included both sailors who mainly chose to attack enemy shipping with legal
permission (privateers), and merchants who occasionally exercised the right as a sort of side job

21

Edward Phillips, The New World of Words: Or Universal English Dictionary (London: King's Arms,
1720), no page number given. Google Books eBook. Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language: A
Digital Edition of the 1755 Classic (1755, Reprint., Johnson Dictionary Online, 2012), p. 1573.
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(letter-of-marque ships). Chapin includes in this ‘privateering’ category colonial governmentowned ships, and even ships impressed for emergency reasons.22
Despite Chapin’s inclusion of these government-directed naval activities within the scope
of “privateering,” one begins to wonder how “private” a government-directed expedition could
be. The vagueness of Chapin’s handling of “privateering” becomes especially apparent when he
calls New England Governor Edmund Andros’s privateering fleet the “beginnings of a colonial
navy.”23
Historian Charles O. Paullin complicated the definition of “colonial navies” in the next
decade. Where Chapin groups government-sponsored naval expeditions in with privateering,
Paullin separates the two with great nuance. In his unpublished 1930s manuscript, Colonial Army
and Navy, Paullin argues that “The war vessels of the American colonies were of two general
classes: (1) vessels under the control of the state, and (2) privateers. The former were of three
classes: (1) vessels owned by the state, (2) vessels hired by the state, and (3) vessels freely
loaned to the state.” For Paullin, privateers were sailors given private commissions to pursue
enemy commerce, while colonies maintained their own “war vessels.” Unlike Chapin, Paullin
extends his examination of Anglo-American fleets well into the Seven Years War, and notes
increasing complexity and naval organization in some cases throughout various colonies.
Despite his nuanced handling of the different Anglo-American naval forces throughout
the pre-Revolutionary era, Paullin’s unpublished account seems to be a mere rough draft, and
concludes on a very questionable claim. While admitting that colonial fleets could barely be
called proper “navies” at all, and while admitting that Massachusetts had something of a

22

Howard Chapin, Privateer Ships and Sailors: The First Century of American Colonial Privateering,
1625-1725 (Martino Fine Books, 2017 Repr. 1926), pp. 7-8.
23
Chapin, Privateer Ships, p. 96.
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“rudimentary navy” in the mid-18th-century, Paullin concludes that Anglo-Americans were
“practically without a naval defense, except such as could be extemporized in emergencies.”
Nevertheless, Paullin contends that from 1690 “they had the protection afforded by a few ships
of the Royal Navy; and potentially of course, they, being a part of the British empire, were
defended by the whole British Navy.”24 As I will discuss in this dissertation, the Royal Navy was
anything but a reliable ally before the mid-18th-century.
Later in the twentieth century, colonial military and naval historians such as W.A.B.
Douglas, Larry Ivers and Carl Swanson used terms such as “sea militias,” “coast guards” and
“provincial navies” to differentiate between provincial government-funded warships and
commerce raiders with letters of marque.25 Nevertheless, more recent scholars seem to
increasingly ignore the distinctions these twentieth century historians made between privateers
and provincial navies. For instance, in a 2011 historiographical article, Starkey grouped
merchantmen commissioned by governments to attack enemy vessels on a regular trading
mission, “private men-of-war” dedicated to attacking enemy vessels and shipping lanes, and
even government-managed private fleets in which “states collaborated with the private sector in
a guerre de course” under the broad category of privateering.26 As the definition of privateering
has widened in this way, it has become possible for scholars such as Jonathan Dull to ignore the

24

Paullin, “Colonial Army and Navy,” p. 71. This also contrasts with N.A.M. Rodger’s recent argument
that the Royal Navy rarely even patrolled American waters before 1713. See Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A
Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. 232.
25
W.A.B. Douglas, “The Sea Militia of Nova Scotia, 1749-1755: A Comment on Naval Policy,” The
Canadian Historian Review, Volume 47, Number 1, March 1966, pp. 22-37, Larry E. Ivers, British Drums On the
Southern Frontier: The Military Colonization of Georgia, 1733-1749 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1974), p. 165. and Carl E. Swanson, Predators and Prizes: American Privateering and Imperial Warfare,
1739-1748 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), p. 50
26
David J. Starkey, “Voluntaries and Sea Robbers: A Review of the Academic Literature on Privateering,
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fact that Anglo-Americans had semi-permanent, state-funded naval forces in the century
preceding the American Revolution.
All in all, with few exceptions, historians over the last century have largely only
mentioned provincial navies in passing, or have allowed them to become assimilated into the
ever-growing and murky category of privateering. While admitting the blurred lines between
colonial navies and privateers—which I define as private commerce raiders operating
independently with letters of marque—with this dissertation I propose to resurrect elements of
Chapin’s and Paullin’s early twentieth century categorizations of provincial navies. In this study,
I define a provincial navy (or provincial navy vessel) as a war vessel or group of war vessels
directly funded by colonial American governments and crewed by Anglo-American sailors.
These vessels could be guard ships used to protect commerce, temporarily impressed flotillas in
emergencies—emergency fleets—or hastily assembled invasion fleets that colonial authorities
armed to attack enemy ports. In most cases, these vessels were primarily small merchant vessels
that were taken into service rather than purpose-built warships.
Admittedly, even the term “provincial navy” has its limitations. While one could make
the case that colonial transport and supply vessels should be included in this definition, I have
decided to limit its scope in this definition to vessels that colonial governments specifically
designated for combat missions. Additionally, there were times when colonial governments hired
or impressed privateer ships into direct state service during emergencies. During situations in
which independent privateers came under direct government control or command, I consider
these vessels and their crews to be part of provincial navies.
Ultimately, no comprehensive study has been completed up to this point about colonial
British America’s provincial navies. While various studies about “privateering” writ large have
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broached the topic of state-funded navies in colonial America, the vagueness of this category has
limited their ability to fully analyze the ways in which provincial American governments built
their own unique fleets.
Historiographical Context of this Dissertation

At its broadest level, Self Defense and Sea Power is a study of how Anglo-Americans
managed coastal defense in the century preceding the American Revolution. Over all, this
dissertation’s focus on how Anglo-American efforts to construct their own navies fits within
larger historiographical discussions of the military relationship between periphery and center in
the British Atlantic world, and contributes to a growing body of scholarship on the broader
intersection between naval warfare and society in early America.
A common debate throughout Atlantic world historiography throughout the last half
century has been “To what extent did the English (and later British) Crown exert military
authority over its American colonies in the century preceding the Revolutionary War?”
Ultimately, two schools of thought have arisen to answer this question. On the one hand, a
minority viewpoint is advanced by Stephen Saunders Webb. In the 1979 book GovernorsGeneral, Webb contests the early 20th-century historian Charles M. Andrew’s view that
mercantilism guided Britain’s colonial policy in America. Instead, Webb contends that English
colonization efforts were largely driven by military concerns, and that military governors used
force to advance the Royal prerogative in their colonies. Webb maintains this style of military
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government continued into the 1720s, and—after a short period of imperial military neglect—
reappeared during the War of Jenkin’s Ear in 1739.27
Webb’s theory has been largely panned by Atlantic world historians throughout the last
five decades. Historian Owen Stanwood has summarized scholarly opposition to Webb’s theory
best by stating that most early American scholars operating under “Atlantic and continental
approaches, [have] tended to argue for the diffuseness and weakness of empires.”28 One
representative example of a Webb critic is Jack Sosin. In his monograph English America and
the Restoration Monarchy of Charles II, Sosin makes the case that in the 1680s Charles II
abandoned an attempt to rule Jamaica by Royal prerogative when he realized the impossibility of
funding a major Royal garrison to enforce his will there.29 Regarding Webb’s contention that the
Crown ruled through military might in the Atlantic world, Sosin has argued that Royal officials
“hardly demonstrated an intention, much less an ability, to dominate [their American subjects]
by [military] force,” and that Anglo-American assemblies grew increasingly more autonomous
over time.30
While critics have panned Webb’s contention that the Crown ruled colonial America via
military might, they have largely come to accept a vision of the British Empire wherein Royal
power and plans were limited by provincial political customs. This viewpoint has been most
clearly advanced by Jack Greene, who has made the case that “pronouncements from the centers
of early modern extended polities like the British Empire acquired constitutional legitimacy for
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the whole only through implicit or explicit ratification by the peripheries.”31 In essence,
throughout much of the era covered in this study, Royal authority was only moderately enforced
in the American colonies.
While historians who disagree with Webb’s ‘garrison government’ theory of Royal
military rule point to the weakness of Royal executive authority throughout the colonies, they do
not entirely discount that the metropole did ultimately expand its military and legislative reach. It
would take time, however. Jack Greene has made the case that by the late 1740s, the Crown
began to slowly retreat from its former laissez-faire attitude toward American governance, and
began to intervene in colonial affairs more forcefully—i.e. giving colonial governors more
specific instructions on how to run their provinces.32 In other words, Webb’s contention that the
British government wanted to more directly rule its colonies is accurate, but was several decades
premature.
If historians have noticed a stronger authoritarian legal shift in London by the mideighteenth century, they have also noticed a growing use of Royal military power to enforce
metropolitan goals during this era. Scholars have largely agreed that prior to the War of Jenkin’s
Ear (c. 1739-1748), the British Royal Navy’s presence was minimal in the New World.33 While
the Admiralty slowly increased the Royal fleet’s footprint in the Western Atlantic world
(particularly in the West Indies), it would not be until the mid-century when Admiralty reformers
would make the Royal Navy a dominant fighting force in the New World.
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Historians have taken note of Britain’s mid-century use of military power to support
metropolitan aims in different ways. For instance, in his study on the evolution of British
colonial military policy in the Americas, historian Kurt Nagel makes the case that by the 1730s
London had come to realize the value of the American colonies to its imperial vision and became
more willing to dispatch Royal troops to assist in military campaigns. Nagel contends that
American colonial leaders were oblivious to the fact that greater Royal military involvement
meant decreased provincial autonomy as imperial officials began to manage American military
affairs more and more after the 1740s.34
While Nagel’s focus was primarily on the involvement of British soldiers, other
historians have seen the mid-eighteenth century as a period when the British government used
the Royal Navy to enforce its vision of a centralized empire. Scholars who see the Royal Navy as
an important tool of British imperial might in the second half of the eighteenth century generally
follow Daniel Baugh’s conceptualization of Britain's ‘Blue-water’ strategy, in which Parliament
came to support Britain’s military expansion vis-a-vis Royal Naval military power rather than
through land warfare on the continent.35 For instance, Eliga Gould has argued that Prime
Minister William Pitt adopted a Blue-water strategy that emphasized the usage of British sea
power to help seize French possession in the Americas rather than in continental Europe.
Britain’s successful shift to maritime war in the Americas ultimately inspired Parliament’s
postwar attempt to subject the American colonies to greater metropolitan jurisdiction.36
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Ultimately, scholars throughout the last several decades have made the case that while Britain’s
military might was less pronounced in America prior to the mid-eighteenth century, the
metropole did attempt to subject autonomous colonial governments to Parliamentary jurisdiction
via a stronger Royal military presence after the Seven Years War.
Where in this well-trod field of scholarly discussion about Britain’s military and political
influence over its American colonies does this dissertation fit? Self Defense and Sea Power aims
to examine the nearly century-long period (c. 1689-1754) in which the Royal Navy’s influence
on American coastal defense was minimal. This dissertation ultimately revisits a frequently
discussed topic (the level of British military intervention and metropolitan power projection in
the colonies) within the scope of a widely ignored context (Anglo-American naval defense). I
argue that Anglo-American governments were forced to defend their own coasts because of
Royal military neglect and that they played a fundamental role in securing Britain’s fragile hold
on its maritime frontiers in the New World. Even as Royal guard ships started to appear in North
American and West Indian waters with greater frequency after Queen Anne’s War, Royal
captains constantly depended on provincial navy vessels to support their missions throughout the
Atlantic world. When the metropolitan government attempted to use the Royal Navy to enforce
unpopular policies during the imperial crisis of the 1760s-70s, the long legacy of independent
American naval defense (coupled with an equally long legacy of resentment at Royal Navy
inaction and impressment policies) helped to shape the ways in which American Patriots
protested British authority.
While this dissertation revisits Britain’s imperial military weakness in America from a
new perspective, it also joins a growing scholarly discussion about the ways in which naval
warfare transformed the course of the First British Empire in America (c. 1607-1783). Of course,
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studies about the intersection between maritime history and British America’s political
development are not new. Take for example Robert C. Ritchie's 1986 monograph Captain Kidd
and the War against the Pirates, which examines the ways in which shifts in party politics in
London in the 1690s transformed how the British Empire dealt with pirates throughout the
Atlantic world and beyond.37 Nevertheless, scholars throughout the last decade in particular have
shown a renewed interest in the intersections between matters of naval defense and colonial
development.
Much of this increased interest has come from historians of the Golden Age of Piracy. A
prime example is Mark Hanna’s 2015 book Pirate Nests and the Rise of the British Empire,
1570-1740. Hanna argues that the rise and gradual fall of Anglo-American support for Atlantic
piracy throughout the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries points to larger trends in the
relationship between the imperial center and colonial peripheries at the time. While colonial
support for pirates was rife in the late seventeenth century and at the turn of the eighteenth
century, various changing economic factors and imperial attempts to include colonial forces in
the larger War on Pirates helped to unite Anglo-American opinion against the sea rovers. By the
War of Jenkin's Ear (c. 1739-1748), a “sense of shared imperial goals and economic advantage
united both English and American sailors and soldiers in defense of commercial predations
against the Spanish.”38 In essence, initial support and the later rejection of Atlantic piracy
testified to larger centralizing trends within the British Empire in America. On a similar note,
this dissertation makes the case that American colonies consistently fitted out provincial navies
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on a wide scale until the Royal Navy expanded its presence in the New World after the War of
Jenkin’s Ear.
This examination of Britain’s early American empire from a naval lens has not been
limited to studies of the Golden Age of Piracy. For instance, in his 2019 book Storm of the Sea:
Indians and Empires in the Atlantic's Age of Sail, Matthew Bahar argues that between the
seventeenth and mid-eighteenth centuries, the nations within the Wabanaki confederacy in New
England and Canada defended their sovereignty from Anglo-American colonization by utilizing
naval warfare and raids against their enemies.39 While the history of naval combat in colonial
America has largely only focused on European combatants, Bahar reminds us that Native
Americans not only utilized sea power, but could shape the course of colonization with naval
warfare.
It must be noted here that while this dissertation focuses on naval warfare, it is not a
traditional military history account of battles and tactics. Additionally, while this dissertation
considers social factors when discussing the plight of common sailors, it is not a work of
maritime social history in the vein of historians such as Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh.
Because no historians have yet fully examined colonial defense policies of Anglo-American
governments, this dissertation aims to fill that ship-sized hole in the historiography of early
America.
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Sources and Chapter Layout

Considering that this dissertation is more or less an institutional history of early
American navies (and the broader impact the operations of these fleets had on the provincialRoyal relationship), I have largely relied on primary sources from provincial and Royal
governmental records. Some of the best sources for the origins and financing of provincial navies
come from the minutes and transcriptions of colonial legislative sessions. In other cases, I have
relied on Admiralty trial records, particularly where provincial sailors and officers took part in
court battles over prize money. More than any other source, these judicial proceedings give us an
idea of the concerns provincial sailors had for their economic welfare, and the larger societal
ramifications of local naval service.
While American provincial records have been fairly accessible on digital databases,
limited access on this side of the Atlantic to British (and Caribbean) government records
necessitated archival research in the United Kingdom itself. At The National Archives in Kew, I
examined Royal Navy ship logs, captains’ letters, and other naval records that mentioned serving
alongside provincial navies. While few Royal Navy sources were particularly verbose regarding
Anglo-American provincial navies, there are some sections within these naval records where
Royal officers’ opinions on their provincial compatriots is especially clear.
This dissertation unfolds over the course of four chapters. Chapter One traces the role
provincial navies played in the first two imperial conflicts of this era: King William’s War
(1689-1698) and Queen Anne’s War (1702-1713). It was in these early imperial conflicts where
American governors and legislatures developed the prototypes of provincial fleets that they
would draw on for every future colonial conflict. While Anglo-American officials demonstrated
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the utility of temporary and semi-permanent local navies during these conflicts, they also came
to realize the economic and social costs that came with maintaining these forces.
In Chapter Two, I examine how provincial governments on British America’s
borderlands (Nova Scotia, New England, South Carolina, and the West Indies) continued to
employ provincial navies even during a time of tacit imperial peace (c. 1713-1739). While
Britain, France, and Spain largely avoided lengthy imperial wars during this era, AngloAmerican governments were still forced to defend their coasts and commerce from Native
American and piratical threats, as well as from Spanish guarda costas. These provincial fleets
not only secured Britain’s marginal grasp on its American maritime frontiers during fierce border
conflicts, but they did so largely unassisted by imperial forces.
Chapter Three in many ways is the most pivotal chapter of the dissertation and explores
the increasing divide between imperial center and colonial peripheries over the proper course of
naval defense during the War of Jenkin’s Ear (1739-1748). While Britain agreed to establish a
North American Royal Navy station for the first time (and even to bankroll some provincial
navies), numerous difficulties arose that limited the effectiveness of this ‘Royalization’ of coastal
defense. Royal Navy captains did not always cooperate with their provincial counterparts, Royal
Navy impressment policies infuriated Americans, and inconsistent Parliamentary legislation
regarding prizes all limited the potential of the provincial-Royal Navy defense partnership.
In Chapter Four, I explore how the expanded Royal Navy presence in North America
during the Seven Years War (1754-1763) made extensive provincial navies unnecessary. As will
be seen in the concluding chapter, even though overextended provincial governments should
have welcomed the Royal Navy’s complete assumption of coastal defense with open arms, many
of the issues from the last war—namely over impressment of American sailors—remained
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unresolved and complicated provincial relations with the metropole. To add insult to injury,
Britain’s use of the Royal Navy to enforce unpopular trade policies during the imperial crisis
aroused the ire of Anglo-Americans from Massachusetts down to Georgia. As Patriot legislators
and seamen took to the streets and seas to protest British authority, the long legacy of provincial
naval warfare would help to shape the ways in which Anglo-Americans responded to
centralization attempts by the metropole.
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Chapter I: The Rise of Provincial Navies in the First Imperial Wars, 1689-1713

In 1688, English rebels dethroned the unpopular Catholic and absolutist King James II
and installed the Dutch Protestant William of Orange and English Mary as the empire’s new
monarchs. Shortly thereafter, Anglo-Americans initiated similar uprisings against the former
king’s officials throughout several colonies. This religious and political revolution on both sides
of the Atlantic not only transformed England’s Atlantic political make-up but triggered nearly
two and a half decades of imperial conflict with France.1 Anglo-American provincial leaders
from Canada to Barbados had previous military experience, but were woefully unprepared for
the global conflicts with England’s imperial enemies known as the King William’s War (16891698) and Queen Anne’s War (1702-1713).
Historians have long recognized that these lengthy and expensive conflicts forced
colonial governors to repeatedly rely on long standing civilian militias in lieu of red-coated
Royal troops.2 In a 1987 historiographical synthesis of recent scholarly works regarding early
American military defenses, Don Higginbotham observed that scholars had largely come to the
conclusion that provincial militaries “had advanced from seventeenth-century militia
to...eighteenth-century semiprofessional forces” in the decades preceding the American
Revolution.3
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Arguably, a similar ‘military evolution’ is evident in colonial Anglo-American maritime
defenses during the imperial clashes of 1689-1713 as well. This, however, can only be
understood in light of Britain’s growing imperial naval commitments in North America. William
R. Miles has argued that this period saw an increasing deployment of Royal Navy guard ships in
the Anglo-American colonies alongside a colonial tendency to deploy “private warships, either
carrying letters of marque (privateers) or ships owned, hired, commandeered or volunteered for
duty at the behest of local government.”4 I make a distinction between privateers and
government-controlled warships here, the latter being able to be broken down between regular
standing ‘provincial navies’ and temporary ‘emergency fleets.’ Provincial leaders commissioned
privateers and provincial fleets at various points, and the categorical difference between the two
methods of provincial naval defense (especially during Queen Anne’s War) were not always
clear. While scholars have long recognized that independent privateering expanded from King
William’s War to Queen Anne’s War, I will make the case that provincial governments from
New England to Barbados also expanded their capacity to create standing and temporary
provincial navies during these two conflicts.5
Some provincial authorities (particularly in New England) had limited experience
building their own fleets in previous conflicts. However, the widespread adoption of either
standing or temporary provincial navies throughout the English Atlantic world in the long period
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of war with the French and Spanish (c. 1689-1713) ensured that local naval expeditions—
ranging from the commissioning of provincial guard ships to provincial naval assaults on
cities—would be a fundamental part of future Anglo-American military planning. Despite the
utility of provincial navies, the financial and social costs of fitting them out often exacerbated
long-standing tensions within Anglo-American communities and highlighted larger weaknesses
in the imperial-provincial military relationship.6

Function of Provincial Navies in the Atlantic World

The New England colonies were among the first mainland provinces to outfit provincial
naval forces in this era. Naval historian Oscar Paullin once remarked, Massachusetts “spent more
upon ships of war than any other colony” and had provincial naval defense vessels as early as
1634.7 Nevertheless, colonies throughout the Atlantic world began to follow their example
during the long imperial conflicts between 1689 and 1713. During the first two imperial wars,
provincial governments from Massachusetts to Barbados fitted out semi-permanent and
temporary provincial warships to guard commerce, defend coastal cities in emergencies, support
infantry campaigns, and to spearhead assaults on enemy ports. These functions would go
essentially unchanged for the rest of the period covered by this study.
Before any examination of provincial guardships is possible, one must understand the
role of English metropolitan military intervention in the Atlantic world in the late seventeenth
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century. In this period, Royal Navy visitation to the North American continent (which as yet had
no Royal Navy bases) before 1713 was largely limited to individual station ships and small
fleets. Prior to the latter years of the War of the Spanish Succession, the English government
devoted more military and financial resources to European battlefields than American
campaigns. Imperial authorities typically only sent extensive Royal military assistance if AngloAmericans or their agents could create cost-effective plans for joint expeditions. All told, Crown
officials typically expected Anglo-Americans to facilitate their own local defenses.8
Even though Westminster occasionally sent Royal squadrons to strike enemy targets in
North America and West Indies during wartime, most Royal Navy vessels in the New World
were assigned to convoy duty or acting as regional “station ships.” Royal ships escorting
merchant fleets or guarding specific ports were typically smaller warships than those utilized for
larger fleet operations in Europe. These smaller frigates included fourth rate frigates that had
more than fifty guns, fifth rates that had between 30 and 48 guns, and sixth rates that had
between 10 and 30 cannon guns aboard. On occasion, larger third rate warships that carried
between 60 and 80 guns were sent on missions to the Caribbean, but they were a rare site in
North America.9
In fact, the Royal Navy presence was always larger in the West Indies than in North
America—a trend that would continue throughout much of the next century. 1701, while there
were only a few Royal Navy station ships on the North American coastline, there were nine
Royal Navy ships at Jamaica in addition to a Royal force of twenty-two vessels led by Admiral
Benbow. The reasons for this uneven military distribution were many, including the colder
conditions in mainland North America, the higher revenue of the plantation islands, the necessity
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of threatening Spanish pretensions in the heart of its New World empire, and the British
government’s yearning for control over the Spanish bullion trade in the Caribbean.10 As Queen
Anne’s War progressed, Royal Naval involvement in the West Indian theatre also increased.
Various factors led to the deployment of more Royal ships and the construction of more
permanent victualling facilities in the Caribbean, including Royal interest in safeguarding everexpanding British commerce, a larger metropolitan desire to expand British control over the
slave and bullion trade with the Spanish empire.11 While the seeds of greater Royal Naval
involvement were being sown by the early 1700s in the Caribbean, the full ‘royalization’ of
naval warfare in America would take more than half a century.
Even with the presence of a Royal ship in port, tranquility and coastal security was never
guaranteed. This was the case in 1686, when Admiralty authorities sent Captain John George
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with the small frigate H.M.S. Rose to guard Boston in 1686 after King James II’s establishment
of the Dominion of New England. With enterprising administrators such as Edward Randolph
and Governor-General Andros at the helm of the Dominion, James II hoped to consolidate royal
power by combining the administrations of every colony between Massachusetts and New
Jersey.12 Despite being a Royal Navy station ship captain in Boston, George allegedly used his
position for profiteering, served as a yes-man to Edmund Andros and Massachusetts official
Joseph Dudley, and did little to secure the region’s frontiers, or to pursue pirates.13
During the late seventeenth century, Royal Navy recalcitrance in pirate hunting coincided
with widespread provincial support for piracy against Spanish trade. As early as the 1670s when
rulers in West Indian colonies such as Jamaica and Barbados began to shun pirates that had made
sport of peacetime raids on Spanish targets, enterprising Anglo-American pirates sought out new
markets in North American ports. These pirates found willing customers among proprietary and
charter colonies with looser royal Royal governance, including Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Carolina. Royal centralizers such as Edward Randolph began to associate support for piracy in
traditional charter colonies such as Massachusetts with a worrisome provincial desire for
political autonomy.14
New Englanders welcomed pirates primarily for economic reasons. Spanish coinage was
especially welcome in Boston during the postwar economic depression that followed the
destructive King Philip’s War of the mid-1670s. During this conflict, Massachusetts authorities
even employed a few former West Indian buccaneers familiar with guerilla combat as Indian-
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hunters on a few land-based missions. The region’s flirtation with piracy would soon come to an
end, however. With increasing Spanish pressure on James II by the late 1680s, the king ordered
Edmund Andros and his ally, the administrator Edward Randolph, to crack down on piracy.
Ultimately, the king's proclamation lacked the legal specifics on how the officials were to
proceed against pirates.15 Nevertheless, Andros remained determined to use the Royal frigate
H.M.S. Rose and the temporary station ship H.M.S. Kingfisher to crack down on pirates, and
English merchants violating the Navigation Acts. These Acts required Anglo-Americans to use
English intermediaries to trade with other European empires.16
Dominion authorities also hoped to bolster the Royal Navy’s patrols with provincial
naval forces. This utilization of provincial warships to supplement Royal Navy patrols and
cruises would ultimately become commonplace throughout the English Atlantic world. On 25
May 1687, Randolph suggested that “itt is necessary a Small vessell be provided for his
Majesties Service On the Coasts…”17 Randolph’s suggestion ultimately led to the government’s
purchase of the Speedwell ketch.18 Throughout the next several years, provincial authorities used
the Speedwell for many tasks that would become routine for Massachusetts provincial navy
vessels for years to come: transporting soldiers, supplies, and even high ranking officials to the
contested Maine borderlands and Canada.19 While provincial governments could occasionally
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hire privateers to conduct such missions, military vessels under their immediate control and
supervision would prove to be more reliable for immediate strategic needs.
By early 1688, Anglo-American tensions with the French and Native Americans on the
Maine borderlands convinced Andros to increase the English military presence in that sector.20
Part of Andros’s military preparations included expanding the provincial fleet. In 1690, Andros
reported that throughout 1688-9, “The severall Vessells Imployed for the security of the Coast
and fishery of that time were His Maties Sloope Mary21 John Alden Comandr,” the sloop Sarah,
the Brigantine Samuel, and “His Maties New Sloope Speedwell John Cooke Comandr finished
and ready to take in stores and provisions for the Eastward.”22 It is worth noting that Andros
neglected to mention at least one other provincial vessel that was in service, the sloop
Resolution. Sloops were typically small, swift, single-masted merchant vessels.23 Andros’s navy,
then, was largely built with lightly armed and quick vessels for coastal patrols and
reconnaissance rather than large naval battles.
In essence then, Andros’s sizable provincial navy served as a variegated general coastal
defense force that could juggle multiple tasks alongside Royal Navy station ships. Despite its
utility, however, international and local political controversies would soon end the operations of
this fleet. Puritan New Englanders had begun to grow weary of Andros’s strict military discipline
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on the Maine frontier as war broke out with hostile Native forces, and fumed over rumors that
the Catholic King James II had a new child and heir.24 Additionally, many New Englanders had
grown disillusioned with Andros’s widespread eradication of provincial legal autonomy and his
Anglicanism. With news that the Dutch Protestant William of Orange had landed in England and
dethroned King James II, Protestant rebels led bloodless revolts against James II's officials
throughout many of the American colonies. In April, provincial authorities led over 2,000
militiamen in a coup against Andros, and imprisoned him and other Dominion officials before
sending them to England in early 1690.25
The Royal Navy frigate H.M.S. Rose and Andros’s provincial navy both attracted the ire
of the rioters that imprisoned Andros and his allies. Deserters from the Rose reported that the
unpopular Captain George (with a Catholic lieutenant under him) planned to attack Boston with
Andros and hand Boston over to the French. Deserters from the Royal frigate and Boston rebels
dismasted the ship during the chaos of the April uprising.26 The rebels also seem to have
disbanded the majority of Andros’s small provincial navy of a half-dozen provincial warships,
and one shipbuilder even complained that they took the sails off an unnamed sloop that he had
built for the Andros regime.27 While this sloop’s name was never mentioned, it is possible that
this vessel was the Mary. With widespread contemporary rumors that one of Andros’s soldiers
(unsurprisingly a Roman Catholic) planned to seize the Mary, it seems that New England
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authorities had equal reason to fear that their “Papist” enemies would use Royal vessels and their
own provincial ships against them.28
Whatever the political motives of the New England rebels, the revolutionary government
in Boston—with Simon Bradstreet as its new governor—would soon have its hands full with
fallout from this uprising, an outbreak of piracy, and the beginning of an imperial war with
France and its Native allies. While they disbanded the Rose and Andros’s provincial navy,
Massachusetts authorities quickly reemployed some of the colony’s sloops to meet these threats.
The new regime’s willingness to employ provincial vessels for naval defense highlights the fact
that New Englanders were more than willing to employ provincial navies, but they did not want
their political and religious enemies to have control over their local warships.
Massachusetts officials continued Andros’s policy of depending on provincial vessels to
guard the coasts after the Glorious Revolution, and even expanded on it. This was particularly
evident in the mid-1690s, when the provincial government—concerned that Royal Navy ships
would be useless in shallow shoal waters off the coast—commissioned the Province Galley. The
Province Galley was a two-masted, ten-gun, warship that had oars to propel it through shallow
waters and to pursue enemy craft. New England authorities designed the craft when Royal Navy
frigates proved too large to pursue enemy craft in shoal waters off the coast. As it would happen,
there would be two such Province Galleys throughout the rest of King William’s War and Queen
Anne’s War.29
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One contemporary critic complained that the initial Province Galley (which would later
be replaced with a vessel of the same name) was a “small vessell about 70 Tuns...she carrys no
Gunns close and to wit not be able to make any considerable Defence if [a number] should board
for she may do sirvice upon some small priviters but is not compariable” to a prize vessel that
the Royal Navy had captured the year before and that had been in the service of the province.30
Despite this criticism, the Province Galley would prove to be a major addition to Massachusetts’
defense capabilities. By the end of King William’s War, Massachusetts Governor Stoughton was
able to brag that the Province Galley’s Captain Cyprian Southack and his crew were “constantly
employed to cruise about the Capes and convoy vessels from Virginia, Pennsylvania,
Connecticut, etc. between Massachusetts, Martha's Vineyard and Rhode Island. She has been of
great service and the Commander has acquitted himself with great care and diligence, none of the
vessels under his charge having miscarried.” The Province Galley not only served as a provincial
guard ship for Massachusetts, but as a regional guardian for English commerce throughout the
northern Atlantic.31
Massachusetts was not alone in its commissioning of provincial warships during the first
two imperial wars in the Americas, as West Indian governments frequently fitted out local
defense fleets. Early twentieth historian Ruth Bourne argued that Anglo-American governments
in the Caribbean during the Queen Anne’s War were “helpless and open to the enemy, unwilling
and almost unable to cooperate with each other.” For Bourne, neither “local sloops,
merchantmen, privateers, nor convoys adequately reenforced the few naval cruisers” in the West
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Indies.32 Despite this broad assertion, both primary evidence and subsequent scholars have
emphasized the importance of provincial naval vessels in the West Indian theatre during King
William’s and Queen Anne’s Wars.33 The importance of these vessels was heightened by the fact
that the region’s Royal Navy forces struggled with tropical disease and a haphazard provisioning
system.34 Depletion of Royal Navy manpower and supplies meant fewer Royal Navy warships
could defend the island colonies. Fewer Royal guard ships necessitated the presence of more
provincial guard vessels.
With hostile French or Spanish forces often only a few islands away, West Indian
officials frequently went to great expense to shore up coastal defenses while waiting for muchdesired Royal Navy assistance. In a 1689 letter to the Lords of the Committee for Trade and
Foreign Plantations (later known as the Board of Trade), the Leeward Islands’ Governor
Christopher Codrington lamented that his government was forced to levy a heavy “Tax of one
million of Sugar” to supply infantry units and provincial naval vessels, but also bragged that a
“Privateer and my own two Sloopes are arrived here with a French Briganteen and two French
Sloopes....”35 Codrington’s letter reveals not only one common source of funding for provincial
guardships—local commerce taxes—but also the vague distinction between provincial warships
and “privateers.” The malleability of terms describing government commissioned warships
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became so vague by Queen Anne’s War, that one of Codrington’s successors—Governor Daniel
Parke—would refer to a government-commissioned private raider as a “publick privateer.”36
While categorical haziness between “privateers” and “provincial navies” would persist
throughout much of the next century, most provincial officials seemed to draw a distinction
between government-operated naval forces and privately-commissioned warships. One of the
most dramatic instances of this distinction came at the beginning of Queen Anne’s War in 1702,
when Barbadian authorities complained about the “inconveniences of granting Commissions to
privateers at this time, for that the vessels taken up for the service of this Island and defending
our coasts do want sailors,” and decided to prevent privateer ships from sailing while officials
fitted out provincial “vessels of war.”37 While privateers were useful for raiding enemy
commerce, local governments often preferred to have at least some vessels under their immediate
command during emergencies and sustained military expeditions.
While colonies throughout the English Atlantic built provincial navies to guard their
commerce from enemy raiders whether or not Royal Navy forces were nearby, they also used
provincial warships to spearhead expeditions against enemy ports and to support infantry
operations on land. One clear example of provincial naval support of infantry operations
occurred in the spring of 1703/4, when Massachusetts Governor Joseph Dudley expanded his
colony’s militia and naval forces, and ordered the famous colonial ranger Colonel Benjamin
Church to assault French-aligned Wabanakis on the Maine borderlands.
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Dudley and his partners in the provincial assembly cooperated to establish a provincial
naval pay scale entitled an “Establishmt of the Pay for Vessels Taken up for War & Transports &
Officers & Mariners Pay.” Aside from the Province Galley itself and a couple of Royal Navy
frigates, the Massachusetts government’s financial establishment allowed the colony to fit out
over twenty-five provincial warships and troop transports, and thirty-nine smaller whaleboats.38
During the expedition, Church himself convinced the Royal Navy captains on his expedition that
it was “very expedient and serviceable to the crown, that Captain Southack in the [Province
Galley] should accompany them [on a patrol], which they did readily acquiesce with him in.”39
Far from resenting the presence of provincial vessels on campaigns, Royal Navy officers came to
depend on them for vital assistance.
While provincial warships were useful for offensive naval patrols and offensive
campaigns, colonial governments also used them for diplomacy with various coastal Native
nations. For instance, in the spring of 1701 as war seemed more and more likely with France and
Spain, the Massachusetts governor and council made various military preparations including
reinforcing Castle William in Boston Harbor and the Province Galley. The Province Galley was
to then escort government commissioners to “Casco bay, there to meet with and discourse the
Eastern Indians; and to endeavour to hold them Steady to his Matys Interests and That the value
of One hundred Pounds be sent by them for Presents.”40 While provincial naval power could be
used for “soft power” expeditions such as this diplomatic voyage, New England’s provincial
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naval forces were also used for military strikes on the colony’s Indigenous enemies. For instance,
in May of 1705, the Boston Newsletter newspaper reported that Governor Dudley sent the
Province Galley and another local vessel to pursue “5 or 6 Canoo's of Indians” that had attacked
an English fishing shallop near Winter Harbor, Maine.41 In essence, provincial navies were both
useful for diplomatic missions and punitive expeditions with New England’s Native American
partners and opponents.
It is important to note that provincial naval protection of the coasts and support for
offensive military expeditions did not occur in vacuums. In fact, even as Dudley’s administration
planned a major offensive against the Wabanaki, the Massachusetts government outfitted small
sloops to guard merchant vessels between late 1703 and early 1704, and commissioned
provincial warships to hunt down infamous privateer-turned-pirate John Quelch.42
Massachusetts’ ability to wage three different provincial naval campaigns and patrols within the
space of a few months points to a growing provincial commitment to naval warfare as long
imperial wars dragged on. Yet this did not come without economic and political costs. For
instance, in July of 1704 Dudley bragged that the General Court had “very frankly granted
[£23,000]” to the fitting out of Church's naval and land expedition, but neighboring colonies
were slow to help. He worried that citizens within Massachusetts were “oppressed with hard
marches and great taxes” while its neighbors did not share the burden.43 As will be discussed
below, concerns over taxes and insufficient naval assistance from other colonies were among the
many larger sociopolitical and economic costs of provincial naval warfare.
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While colonial governments constantly employed provincial navies to facilitate
diplomacy, to hunt down enemy raiders and to assist military expeditions (often simultaneously),
the most consequential and controversial deployment of provincial navies during these first two
imperial wars would be naval assaults on enemy port cities. In victory or defeat, provincial naval
and land assaults on cities like French Quebec or Spanish St. Augustine were always costly in
terms of money, shipping, munitions, and most importantly manpower. The Massachusetts
government’s painless capture of the French Nova Scotian base at Port Royal (later Annapolis
Royal) in early 1690 was uncharacteristic as far as colonial sieges went. In the late spring of
1690, Sir William Phips led a force of more than 700 men on five vessels (including the
provincial navy vessels Six Friends, Porcupine, and sloop Mary) to capture the French port.
After the force arrived on 9 May, the small French garrison surrendered the town and ramshackle
fort without firing a single shot. Phips's men sacked the town and enjoyed the simple victory.44
While Port Royal had been relatively easy to capture, the subsequent New England
assault on Quebec later that summer would be an utter failure. Without Royal Navy ships at their
disposal, colonial officials from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York planned a joint land
assault on Montreal and Massachusetts-led naval assault on Quebec.45 This autonomous military
alliance was more of a necessity than a preference for local military expenditure and command.
In fact, from the very moment William and Mary took the throne, both New York and
Massachusetts had made constant appeals for Royal military supplies.46 New Englanders in
particular desired assistance from the Royal Navy as well. For instance, as early as March 1690,
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Bostonian Elisha Hutchinson argued that “If his maj:tie would please Speedily to furnish us with
two ffrigatts and Amunition” the taking of French Canada would be possible.47
Despite the absence of Royal Navy ships, the expedition proceeded as planned. It is
interesting that the editor of the first issue of the first newspaper ever published in English North
America, the short-lived Publick Occurrences of Boston, boasted that that Massachusetts native
Sir William Phips commanded a “Navy of two and thirty Sail; which went from hence the
beginning of the last August” against Quebec.48 Phips’s massive colonial navy was largely made
up of impressed vessels, was bankrolled by a large loan from Boston merchants, and involved as
many as 2,300 soldiers and sailors.49 Unfortunately for the Anglo-Americans, the land assault on
Montreal never fully materialized, and the sea attack on Quebec failed due to late-Autumn
storms, a lack of supplies, and over 400 casualties due to disease and shipwrecks.50
Authorities in Boston were distraught, and were quickly overwhelmed by angry mariners
and soldiers, and a hefty expedition-related debt. Connecticut issued the first major taxes since
Edmund Andros's rule, and the colony of Plymouth (which was soon to be subsumed by
Massachusetts) raised taxes so high that they equaled nearly 10% of all taxed properties in the
colony. Massachusetts' debt was compounded by the fact that its provincial authorities had
borrowed so much from merchants, and some estimates placed its total debt at nearly £40,000. In
response, the government in Boston took the controversial step of issuing paper bills of credit to
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stimulate the shattered economy.51 One merchant, worried over the fervor of unpaid sailors and
soldiers from the expedition, claimed “...we have found a way to stop ye mouths & aswage ye
passion of ye: soldiers & seamen by a new mint raised here of paper money...there are not many
yt take it & they yt have it scarce know now what to do with it.”52 Despite these criticisms,
scholars have long recognized that Massachusetts's novel adoption of paper money—partly
inspired by provincial naval costs—set a standard for many other colonies to adopt paper
currency to pay for immediate war-time measures throughout King William’s War and Queen
Anne’s War.53
Not every provincial naval assault on enemy ports occurred without imperial assistance.
In 1707, Massachusetts and Royal Navy forces attempted to capture French Port Royal (which
had reverted back to French control in the previous conflict). After the expedition’s defeat, a
Scottish merchant and adventurer named Samuel Vetch campaigned for imperial officials to
spearhead a major invasion of Louis XIV’s Canadian strongholds.54 Despite having largely
ignored the Anglo-American war effort in the New World from 1702 to 1707, Whig authorities
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in London took Vetch's proposals seriously due to an increasing war of attrition on the
battlefields of Europe and thanks to pressure from various interested merchant groups.55
By 1709, imperial officials approved Vetch’s plans to drive the French from Montreal
and Quebec and expected provincial naval forces to play a major role. Queen Anne herself
ordered Vetch to ensure that forces from New York, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania build “six or
more large Boats” and contract with the Iroquois to build canoes to help transport soldiers.
Additionally, Queen Anne requested that New England build various flat-bottomed transport
vessels, and that provincial authorities provide “able Pilots, whereof Capt Southweek [sic] to be
one, & to go in his own Galley…”56
That Queen Anne (or one of her Royal officials acting in her name) knew Southack by
name is unsurprising considering the queen’s predecessor, King William, had personally
rewarded Southack for effective privateering against the French in early 1693/4.57 What is
striking, however, is her outright support of and dependence on provincial and Native naval
resources throughout the northern colonies to support the proposed expedition against French
Canada. Unfortunately for Vetch and his colonial partners, imperial authorities cancelled the
1709 joint expedition without warning when peace talks seemed likely with Louis XIV that
summer.58 Vetch protested that preparations had been costly, and that “our transports, flattbottom'd boats, whale-boats, as well as our troops being all ready att 12 hours warning; and
because the fleet is so long a coming that the lateness of the Expedition may endanger some of
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the ships in their return to be blown off the coast…”59 Anglo-American and Iroquois diplomats
traveled to London and convinced a new Tory administration in 1710 to recommit to Vetch’s
plan.60 Royal officials sent two frigates and a bomb vessel from England to assist provincial
forces take Port Royal, and three station frigates from New York and Boston joined the attack in
early 1710.61
For the first time on the North American continent, significant provincial and Royal Navy
forces assaulted a major target together. The fact that provincial naval forces would defer to
Royal Navy command is evident when Dudley and his Council advised that the Province Galley
be “Disposed in the fleet at the Direction of the Commadore so Soon as they Shall be ready to
proceed.”62 Royal Navy officials themselves asked for specific provincial naval support. For
example, the captain of the H.M.S. Dragon asked the Massachusetts council for a local sloop to
act as a “tender” to the Royal Navy vessels on the expedition.63 All told, over thirty provincial
transports with 3,500 troops from New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and
Massachusetts joined Royal Navy vessels and the Province Galley in the successful capture of
Port Royal in the autumn of 1710.64
While provincial and imperial authorities alike rejoiced over the successful campaign,
victories were not always guaranteed for even the largest joint expeditions. The following year,
another Anglo-American campaign against Quebec failed after a major storm destroyed much of
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the Royal and provincial fleet.65 Even before the storm, the disastrous operation was rife with
desertion, and internecine disputes between Royal and provincial military officials over supplies
and perceived dedication to the expedition.66 In particular, Royal military officials accused New
Englanders of not providing sufficient naval support for the expedition—a barb more often fired
by provincial authorities at the Royal Navy than the reverse.67
While all the discussions of provincial naval warfare thus far have involved planned
naval expeditions, Anglo-Americans often relied on impromptu and temporary impressment or
hiring of vessels—emergency fleets—to ward off immediate threats. One of the clearest cases of
this phenomenon occurred in Charles Town, South Carolina in the summer of 1706. A FrancoSpanish invasion force—emboldened by news that a yellow fever epidemic had weakened
Charles Town’s defenders—launched a major assault on the seaport.68 It is uncertain what level
of resistance the Franco-Spanish invaders expected, but they were likely aware that the colony
was a proprietary English colony without a Royal Navy guard ship.69
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With an advanced warning from a New York privateer in the area, Governor Nathaniel
Johnson organized a council of war, readied militia forces on land, and the “Vessels that lay in
harbour were ordered to be fitted (viz) three ships one Briganteen & two Sloops + a fire ship…”
The fact that Johnson “ordered” these vessels to defend the colony implies they were impressed
on the spot. Johnson commissioned Rhett as a Vice Admiral of this emergency fleet, and Rhett
“hoisted ye Union Flag on board ye Crown Galley.”70 Rhett’s usage of that flag is particularly
noteworthy considering its legal and political implications. Under English law, only Royal Navy
vessels could fly the Union Jack. Merchant vessels were limited to flying a similar banner with a
“white escutcheon” in the center.71 By flying the “Union Flag,” Rhett flouted imperial law, but
perhaps intended to represent his makeshift fleet as the legitimate substitute for distant English
forces.
Ultimately, Rhett’s makeshift fleet of impressed merchant ships was successful. Upon
seeing Rhett’s hasty armada, the Franco-Spanish fleet retreated “in great hast + Confusion…”
without any resistance. Soon thereafter, Rhett took command of both the New York privateer
ship and a local sloop to chase off scattered Spanish vessels. Even with the impressment of the
aforementioned merchant ships, more volunteers joined Rhett in this final assault. One
contemporary bragged of the “severall Gentlemen and others who were willing to share in the
Danger and [honor] of that design…” Rhett’s naval forces were so successful that another
observer boasted that with the “Providence of Almighty God,” the colony’s foes “like a Second
Spanish Armada” met with destruction before the “flourishing colony.”72 While not every
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emergency fleet in colonial America stopped enemy invaders with such ease, Rhett’s
straightforward success against a joint European invasion with mere merchant vessels and militia
forces attests to the utility of makeshift provincial naval defenses throughout the first two
imperial wars.
Ultimately, as two long imperial conflicts raged between 1689 and 1713, the traditional
New England habit of fitting out local defense vessels became an Atlantic world phenomenon.
Colonists from New Hampshire to Barbados built semi-permanent guard vessels and impressed
emergency fleets to conduct diplomacy, hunt pirates, assist the Royal Navy, besiege enemy
settlements, support offensive operations, and to defend ports from imminent attack. While these
provincial navies were useful for military purposes, these expensive fleets would also amplify
internal colonial controversies and challenge the fragile relationship between periphery and
center in the nascent British Empire.

The Social and Economic Costs of Provincial Navies

Provincial navies often had social, political, and economic costs beyond what any
colonial government had anticipated or expected. Although provincial governments built local
fleets with the ostensible goal of defending their coastlines, the expenses and stresses associated
with naval warfare amplified internal disputes over taxation, religion, race, and class. On a larger
scale, provincial reliance on local naval defense and the Royal Navy’s inadequate protection of
Britain’s possessions in the New World highlighted larger weaknesses in the imperial-provincial
military relationship.
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Perhaps fewer historical examples better highlight the wider sociopolitical ramifications
of provincial naval defense than the dramatic fate of Edmund Andros’s provincial navy after the
Glorious Revolution of 1689, and the even more eventful story of his provincial sloop Mary. In
June 1689, not long after New England rebels deposed Andros and dispersed his military forces,
pirates began to attack local commerce. Provisional Governor Bradstreet and other officials
ordered that “one Suitable Vessel be forthwith fitted out to Clear our Coast of Pyrats, which may
be after Improved to transport Souldiers, Ammunition, and provisions for the Eastern
Expedition, and from thence to Range the Coasts of Arcadia to Secure our fishing Vessels.”73
Because Boston authorities refused to restore the local Royal Navy guard ship (due to its
captain’s alleged Jacobitical and pro-Andros sentiments), they decided to use Andros’s
remaining provincial vessels to hunt pirates.74
In August, provincial officials decided to send Captain Joseph Thaxter with the
provincial sloop Resolution to go hunting for a pirate named Thomas Pound who had captured
two vessels off the coast.75 Intriguingly, Pound was the former captain of the provincial sloop
Mary and had even served as a pilot for the now-deposed Royal Navy Captain George. It is
worth noting here that provincial authorities rotated captains and officers of provincial ships on a
frequent basis. After an initially unsuccessful hunt, in late September provincial authorities sent
Captain Samuel Pease with the sloop Mary to search for the same vessel’s former-captain-

73

“Massachusetts Documents, 1689-1692,” ed. Robert Moody, p.100
https://www.colonialsociety.org/node/1776
74
John Henry Edmonds, Captain Thomas Pound, (Cambridge: John Wilson and Son, 1918), pp. 31-32.
Ironically, the same anti-Catholic anxieties and prejudices that led New Englanders to overthrow Andros also led
them to limit their naval defenses to small provincial sloops. For the connection between anti-popery and the
Glorious Revolution and King William’s War, see Stanwood, The Empire Reformed
75
The sloop Resolution was used by provincial forces early on, but in Captain Thomas Pound, John Henry
Edmonds claims that “somehow or other [it] had got [sic] into private hands” (p. 34). In Privateer Ships and Sailors
(p. 96), Howard Chapin claims that the Resolution was sold by 1693.

45

turned-pirate.76 Pound’s forces, confident of their prowess, sent word to Boston via one of their
victims that they would slaughter the entire crew of any “government sloop” sent out against
them.77
By early October, Pease and the crew of the Mary discovered and overpowered Pound's
pirates near Martha's Vineyard, but Captain Pease lost his life in the battle. Ultimately, the
Boston court only executed the pirate responsible for killing Pease, and spared Pound and the
rest of his men.78 New England divine Increase Mather praised that “small Vessel of Brisk
Bostoneers, who in Their Majesties Name and under Their Colours, maintained a Bloody Fight
with the Rogues and took them…” but alleged that Captain George of the H.M.S. Rose supplied
the pirates with ammunition. It is not clear if this accusation is true, but some contemporaries
including one of the accused pirates substantiated this claim.79
At the start of the new decade, New England agents defended their political revolution
against Andros before the new king in London (William III), and also traded barbs with their
former provincial overlord over his handling of the region’s coastal defense. In an undated letter
from Bradstreet to the king, the aged governor detailed his plans to send Andros back to
England, asked for the restoration of Massachusetts’ original charter, and briefly noted that he
had been “necessitated to grant Commissions to suppress, bring in and secure” Pound and other
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pirates.80 In contrast to Bradstreet’s promise that he was doing all that he could to hunt pirates,
Andros blamed the new Massachusetts government for coastal insecurity. He took responsibility
for the initial creation of the colony’s provincial navy, including the Mary and Speedwell)
alongside two private vessels before the “subversion” of his regime. Andros complained that the
rebels dispersed his forces, which led to Franco-Indigenous incursions that endangered the lives
of Anglo-American colonists on the northern borderlands, the fisheries, and even the New
England forests that helped supply raw materials for the Royal Navy. Without King William's
intervention, Franco-Indigenous forces would destroy colonies that lacked “Provisions...Ships,
Vessells, Seamen, and other Necessarys in New England Capable to supply or Transport any
force…”81
Massachusetts’s agents in London contested Andros’s criticisms, and insisted that Andros
himself had mismanaged provincial naval forces during his controversial reign. They alleged that
one of Andros’s Catholic military officers “had [been] suspected to be in a Plott for deserting and
runing [sic] over with the Sloop Mary to the French.” They further accused Andros of
mismanaging the provincial navy, namely having impressed private vessels for inane tasks
without planning to use these forces for extensive coastal defense. Finally, they argued that
Andros never paid his sailors, which added to the myriad internal issues in the colony. These
accusations highlighted Massachusettsans’ growing anxiety over a suspected Franco-Catholic
conspiracy to destroy their godly commonwealth.82
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While Massachusetts's agents resented what they believed were Andros’s lies, they would
soon face a much more material challenge connected to the revolt of 1689. New York’s newly
appointed governor, Henry Sloughter, insisted that one of the Boston government’s two publicly
funded sloops (likely referring to the Mary and Speedwell) should be given to his colony since
Andros had commissioned them under the guise of the Dominion of New England—the mega
colony which New York had just recently been a part of. Based on the advice of the Lords of the
Committee for Trade and Foreign Plantations (the future Board of Trade that would handle
colonial affairs), in April 1690 King William ordered that one of the publicly funded sloops be
sent to Sloughter.83
What ensued was a lengthy transatlantic argument over who owned the first provincial
navy that Andros employed in 1688, whether they were publicly funded by taxpayers or not, and
which vessels were in service by the time King William intervened in these disputes in early
1690. The sources are often too contradictory or clear enough to make sense of.84 Perhaps this is
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unsurprising considering the sociopolitical chaos that has followed political revolutions
throughout history. Nevertheless, by 1691, Governor Sloughter’s successor in New York had at
least considered sending one of the Royal Navy’s hired sloops, the Archangel, to go and seize the
sole remaining sloop from Andros’s fleet—the Mary.85 While it appears that this seizure never
happened, it is worth noting that extended debates over small provincial warships not only
complicated the fallout from Massachusetts’ experience during the Glorious Revolution, but
nearly led to bloodshed between New Englanders and Royal Naval forces from New York.
If Massachusetts authorities thought their legal troubles with the sloop Mary were over,
they were sadly mistaken. While the Mary’s former captain Thomas Pound had turned to piracy,
its new skipper John Alden faced charges of witchcraft in the Salem witchcraft trials of 1692. In
the years leading up to the witchcraft crisis, provincial authorities entrusted John Alden with
various missions on the northern borderlands, including helping to free captives from FrancoIndigenous forces. Critics claimed that Alden had done little to help captives, and only wished to
trade with New England's enemies. This became especially apparent when Alden fled with
ransom money for captives held by French authorities in 1691, and when he attacked a French
vessel despite being granted safe passage by French negotiators. Alden's selfishness led to the
continued captivity of various provincial officials, including his own son (John Alden, Jr.). It is
possible that this corrupt behavior, coupled with accusations that Alden was responsible for an
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Indigenous attack on York, Maine (and other miscellaneous charges including the fact that he
had Indigenous lovers) inspired girls in Salem to accuse him of having a leading role in satanic
rituals alongside accused-warlock and former minister George Burroughs.86
While misdeeds on the northern borderlands may have inspired some of the accusations
against Alden, historians have long seen the accusations against Alden within the context of
larger provincial fears of incompetence or malevolence among the region’s leaders during the
turbulent early years of King William’s War. Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum have made
the case that accusations against Alden, who was one of the “best-known men in New England,”
came at a time when the girls in Salem were starting to accuse sundry provincial leaders of
sorcery.87 Mary Beth Norton has made the case that many of the accusers at Salem were
childhood survivors of massacres in King Philip's War, and “saw Alden's collusion with the
Wabanakis, devil worshippers who had devastated their families, as an indication of his fidelity
to Satan.”88 Louise A. Breen contends that Alden’s misdeeds while entrusted with his very real
position of military authority coupled with his alleged role as an officer in a spectral legion of
evil spoke to a growing “elite fear of pacts with Satan that could endanger the civil state” of New
England.89 All told, Alden’s abuse of his position of authority within the colony’s provincial
navy led to fears that the region’s coastal and spiritual security were both compromised. This
fear was evident even before the 1692 witch craze, when the provincial government decided to
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impose restrictions on his voyages with the Mary including forbidding him to transport trade
goods or extra ammunition that might be given to the enemy, etc.90
During the trial, Alden put up a fiery resistance to both the judges and his accusers—
some of whom were young girls and women descended from victims of Indigenous raids. When
the accusers claimed that he made them fall to the ground by looking at them, Alden boldly
asked the judge Bartholomew Gedney why he did not face a similar fate when he looked at him.
Despite his initial plan to resist the witchcraft charges in the court room, Alden made the wise
choice of escaping from confinement, weathered out the trials, and lived to be eighty years old.91
Despite Alden’s ultimately happy fate, mistakes made during his provincial naval service
contributed to the dramatic and lethal climate surrounding the infamous trials. Ultimately, from
1689 to 1692, Massachusetts's small provincial navy played an oversized role in amplifying
colonial disputes surrounding the Glorious Revolution, battles with pirates, intercolonial
rivalries, and even the Salem witchcraft trials. These examples showed the widespread impact
provincial navies played in the first major imperial contests of this era.
If the sociopolitical ramifications of provincial naval warfare were high, so were the
economic costs. In fact, the upkeep of a provincial warship could be just as expensive as the
costs of paying a provincial militia unit. For instance, on 3 October 1704, Governor Joseph
Dudley and his council ordered the colony’s treasurer to pay £191 to Captain Nathaniel Jarvis
and the crew of the brigantine John & Abiel—a private vessel that had been hired as a “Vessel of
War, in the late Expedition into the Bay of Fundey.” This accounted for 113 days of crew wages
and vessel hire costs between April and August of 1703. The sum was reduced to £167 to
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account for supplies taken from the commissary. That same day, Dudley’s council ordered the
treasurer to pay a militia company £90 for a month of wages between June and July of 1703.92
While it is true that the government paid the infantry company more money for a shorter
service period, one must also consider that the colony had to pay for the constant upkeep and
repair of its provincial warships as well. For instance, on 4 September 1702, Dudley and his
council ordered the treasurer to pay Captain Cyprian Southack and various Boston businessmen
£294 for “materials as cables, Sails, a new Boat...for his Maty Ship the Province Gally...and for
workmanship of Carpenters and others in fitting said Ship...and Provisions for victualling the
same.”93 Ultimately, the construction, hiring, upkeep, and provisioning of provincial naval
vessels could rival if not exceed the costs of maintaining provincial regiments on land.
The Barbadian government’s troubled attempt to keep a flotilla of guardships in 1702 and
1703 highlighted the economic and social woes a large provincial navy could bring even in the
wealthiest of England’s sugar colonies. In August of 1702, the Barbadian assembly resolved
“that a levy of 6d. a head on negroes, be raised for a fund for setting out ships of war, and also
that 6d. per tun on every ship arriving to this island shall be levied…” The next day the Barbados
Council and Assembly together agreed to pass an act to encourage privateers, and to impress
guns and men “for fitting out two vessels of war,” and believed it was “lawful and justifiable, it
being” for Her Majesty, Queen Anne's service.94 Provincial officials proceeded to compile an
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impressive fleet of four galleys, sloops, and brigantines.95 By early September, even as both
legislative houses of the Barbadian government contemplated impressing men from privateer
vessels because of manpower shortages, the Assembly paid for another vessel—the brigantine
Larke. Around that same time, provincial officials fired Captain John Smith from his role as
skipper of the provincial sloop Constant Jane. His sailors complained that he had beaten them
during an attempt to impress them into provincial service.96
With rising costs, dismissals of officers, and complaints from sailors, it was becoming
apparent that this provincial navy brought more woes for the Barbadian government than it was
worth. As if insufficient manpower and the abuse of sailors were not problematic enough, a week
later the Barbadian Council and Assembly learned that the Constant Jane sloop had
shipwrecked. Some in the government came to suspect that it was “wilfully run on shore by
Thomas Driffield, Lt. of the vessel, and others” and initiated an investigation.97 To add insult to
injury for the provincial government, by the end of September the crew of the brigantine
Madeira mutinied and ran away with the ship.98 Nevertheless, despite these setbacks, the
provincial government pushed on with matters of defense. Various assemblymen volunteered
personal funds to repair a provincial vessel, and one official volunteered his own sloop to carry a
warning about French privateers to a Royal Navy ship cruising with one of the island’s
brigantines. Civic volunteerism could be costly, however, and the Assembly filed a petition to
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London to consider the “growing charge of fitting out vessels of war to [Her Majesty’s]
service…”99
Despite the fact that provincial navies amplified sociopolitical and economic crises
within the British colonies, the Royal Navy’s meek presence in the New World continued to
force colonial governments to rely on provincial naval defense. Throughout King William’s War
and much of Queen Anne’s War, Royal military assistance to the colonies (particularly outside
of the West Indies) had been extremely limited. Nevertheless, as seen above, even those few
Royal Navy guardships in colonial seaports during this era did not guarantee coastal security.
Disputes between provincial authorities and Royal Navy captains could break out over several
issues, including traditional battles over the chain of command, the business ventures of Royal
Navy officers outside the parameters of their military duties, and the ever-controversial issue of
impressment.100
Arguments over Royal Navy impressment policies in particular would remain a major
cause of provincial-Royal Navy tensions for decades even after Parliament’s passage of the
‘America Act of 1708,’ (a.k.a. The ‘Sixth of Anne’). With pressure from Caribbean merchant
captains who lost untold numbers of sailors to Royal Navy press gangs, Parliament decided to act
and limit Royal Navy impressment lest it damage lucrative Caribbean commerce. The Royal
Navy was forbidden from impressing merchant sailors and privateersmen in the New World.
While the legislation may have been intended to ease provincial tensions with Royal
Navy commanders, the Sixth of Anne created more problems than solutions for Royal Navy
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manpower. On the one hand, the law essentially limited Royal Navy commanders to the initial
crews they left England with. On the other hand, the law did not specify whether or not
provincial governors had the right to impress men for provincial naval service or for Royal Navy
ships when requested. In response to numerous provincial queries over whether or not colonial
governors had the right to initiate impressment, the Board of Trade gave inconsistent and vague
answers. Westminster’s silence over the full extent of the ban encouraged the Admiralty to
ignore the prohibition and to continue allowing its officers to impress at will by the 1720s.101
While the Royal Navy’s leadership took until the 1720s to reinstate its impressment policies,
provincial governments had never truly stopped the impressment of men and vessels into
colonial service.
Aside from disagreements over impressment, personality conflicts between provincial
governors and Royal Navy officers often exacerbated an already bad working relationship
between colonial and Royal military officials. Once again, a dramatic encounter involving the
provincial sloop Mary serves as an illustrative example of growing tensions between provincial
and Royal military leaders in this era. When King William appointed Sir William Phips—the
veteran general of the 1690 Quebec expedition—as Massachusetts’s new governor in 1692, he
gave him two Royal Navy ships—the H.M.S. Conception Prize (captained by Robert Fairfax)
and the H.M.S. Nonsuch (captained by Richard Short). The captains and the governor disputed
over joint failed business ventures, locations for coastal patrols, and over the provincial
government's material support for the Royal ships. The breaking point in this strained
relationship came when Phips asked Short to send Royal Navy sailors to serve on the provincial
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sloop Mary, and Short refused to help crew the provincial vessel. A physical altercation broke
out between the two men on 4 January 1692/3 that would ultimately lead to Short’s
imprisonment by provincial authorities and the Royal government’s eventual dismissal of Phips
from his office.102
Despite consistent tension over other matters with the Royal Navy, it was Phips’ forceful
command to the Royal Navy to provide four sailors for the ever-unlucky sloop Mary that served
as the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. Provincial naval officers proved their loyalty
to Phips in subsequent legal proceedings. The sloop Mary's current Captain Nathaniel Hatch and
a fellow officer deposed in court that Governor Phips struck Captain Short only after the latter
used “Impertinent reflecting words” and leaned very close to the governor's face.103 On the same
token, Phips had replaced Short with his gunner, Thomas Dobbs. Historians have suggested that
he was a “favorite” of Phips, and it is unsurprising that Phips not only gave him the command of
the Nonsuch, but also of the Province Galley by early 1694. It was in this latter capacity that
Dobbs also testified on behalf of Phips.104 Ultimately, Governor Phips’ jealous battle for naval
command with his Royal Navy station captains led to a near-riot on the Boston harbor front. This
violent encounter and the participation of provincial naval officers in the legal proceedings
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thereafter foreshadowed similar altercations that would occur between Anglo-American and
Royal Navy officials throughout the Atlantic world in subsequent years.
While disputes between provincial and Royal Navy officers damaged the military
partnership between periphery and center on a microlevel, inconsistent messages from London
regarding future Royal military intervention would foster confusion on a macro level. While the
Crown did slowly increase Royal military intervention in some sectors by Queen Anne’s War, it
never abandoned its “insistence on colonial military self sufficiency.” 105 This ethos, along with
the still-limited nature of Royal military assistance encouraged Anglo-Americans to continue to
rely on their own provincial navies.
Ultimately, throughout King William’s War and Queen Anne’s War, Anglo-Americans
came to depend more and more on temporary and semi-permanent provincial navies to secure
their coasts and to wage offensive campaigns against enemy ports. While these forces were
useful for immediate defense needs, their social and economic costs often outweighed their
military utility. Despite these setbacks, continued imperial insistence on Anglo-American self
defense coupled with poor relations with Royal Navy guard ships forced provincial authorities
to continue to depend on these provincial navies throughout the first two imperial wars and
beyond.
Beginning with the Glorious Revolution in 1689, Anglo-Americans from New England to
the West Indies continuously improvised flexible systems of provincial naval defense. Spurred
on by a largely inactive Royal Navy, governors, councils, and legislatures impressed, hired, and
built provincial naval vessels to attack enemy ports, and to defend local shipping. While these
acts were often done out of necessity, the creation of provincial navies frequently amplified
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already existing imperial, religious, political, and social tensions between colonists, and between
Anglo-American governments and the Royal Navy. Despite these drawbacks, Anglo-Americans
frequently created provincial navies and emergency fleets outside the realm of better-studied
privateers for immediate security and long-term gain.
While Anglo-Americans always preferred the protection of the Royal Navy, they came to
find that during emergencies without immediate Royal help, they had no other resources to turn
to but their own. At least in New England and Caribbean, even when large Royal Navy
squadrons appeared in colonial ports, provincial governments still supplied vessels to supplement
those vessels. By Queen Anne’s War, Royal knowledge of provincial naval strengths had
expanded so much that Queen Anne herself personally requested that various late-war
expeditions be accompanied by Anglo-American naval officers like Cyprian Southack. After
Queen Anne’s War ended in 1713, imperial warfare technically ended between Britain and its
enemies for twenty-six years. Nevertheless, the already troubled partnership between provincial
navies and Royal military officials would be put to the test again when faced with dangerous and
irregular maritime threats in this interwar period.
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Chapter II. Provincial Navies and Irregular Warfare, 1713-1739

When Great Britain and its foes signed the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht that ended the War of
the Spanish Succession, there were plenty of reasons why imperial officials hoped to avoid
future wars with the French and Spanish. With the British South Sea Company’s newly acquired
rights to trade slaves to Spanish colonies coupled with the profitability of illicit trade with
Spanish colonists, imperial planners in London discouraged aggression against the Spanish in the
Americas to protect these fragile new trade avenues.1 Additionally, even though Queen Anne’s
government had expanded its financial borrowing and taxation powers during the war, Britain's
coffers were drained by the enormous costs of the conflict. Even though Britain possessed a total
standing fleet of nearly sixty serviceable ships in the navy by 1714, it would not be in any
position to wage a major war for some time.2
Despite post war weariness, various tensions—particularly over trade—throughout the
Americas would constantly threaten this fragile period of imperial ‘peace’ from 1713 to 1739.
Even with Spain’s grant of the asiento to Britain along with the right to trade one shipment of
goods to Spanish colonies per year, myriad English smugglers continued to trade with SpanishAmerican colonists in excess of this rule. Spanish colonial authorities allowed coast guard
vessels known as guarda costas to seize English vessels with suspected Spanish trade goods on
board. The potential for these seizures to boil into warfare emerged when Lord Archibald
Hamilton--the governor of Jamaica—encouraged some extralegal reprisals against the Spanish
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with his own privateers. Far from merely enforcing trade laws within Spanish territories, guarda
costas frequently employed violence against English traders throughout the Americas. Guarda
costa violence ranged from raiding English shipping within English territorial waters, to
particularly barbaric attacks—including the noteworthy incident in which Spanish sailors cut off
the left ear of the merchant Captain Robert Jenkins.3 While some of these guarda costas had
legitimate commissions from Spanish provincial officials, Anglo-Americans suspected that many
of the Spanish captains feigned official support in order to justify outright piracy.4
Spanish authorities themselves faced many of the problems with coastal defense as their
British opponents. The Spanish Crown was rarely willing to dispatch warships from the Spanish
Armada (the Spanish Navy) to defend its West Indian possessions, and even those few large
warships that did make it to the Caribbean were often ineffective in pursuing quick smuggler
vessels.5 By the 1680s, Spanish authorities in the West Indies began to create local fleets of
small boats and vessels to defend their ports against attacks by buccaneers and to patrol against
foreigners illegally harvesting logwood. These sort of Spanish provincial navies were deployed
sporadically for the next forty years, but by the 1720s, Spanish authorities privatized the guarda
costa fleets to save money—essentially making them privateers that thrived on seizing suspected
foreign smugglers.6
Spanish coast guard violence against English sailors was accompanied by a major
scourge of piracy in the second and third decades of the century. Without military employment
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after 1713, thousands of English sailors found work in Newfoundland fisheries or in log cutting
in Belize. Scores of Anglo-American sailors also began independent and largely profitable
campaigns against Spanish shipping. With rising opposition to illegal swashbuckling in formerly
welcoming colonial ports, Anglo-American pirates also began to attack their own countrymen to
fund their ‘trade.’7 From 1715 to 1725, in what historians have come to call the ‘Golden Age of
Piracy,’ thousands of these renegade English sailors and mariners from other nations would use
the weakly-governed Bahamas to pillage and plunder throughout the Atlantic world. 8
Aside from constant raids by guarda costas and pirates in the West Indies, imperial and
provincial officials also faced terrestrial and maritime threats from powerful Native American
nations within the borderlands of Britain’s continental empire. For nearly a decade after their
former French allies ceded their Acadian lands to the English, Wabanaki mariners waged their
own naval war against Anglo-American colonists well into the late 1720’s.9 Around the same
time, Anglo-American officials in South Carolina faced terrestrial and maritime attacks by
aggrieved Yamasee warriors after years of Carolinian trade corruption and enslavement of their
Native American neighbors.10
Even as Anglo-American and imperial officials faced ongoing piratical and Native
threats, they worried over the constant specter of the return of imperial conflict. On occasion
during this epoch of ‘imperial peace,’ Great Britain and Spain engaged in limited open warfare
with one another (from 1718 to 1721, and from 1726 to 1729). Because standard European
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dynastic tensions were the official causes of these short conflicts, the British Empire made no
significant initiatives in the Western Hemisphere.11 Ironically, it would be during a time of tacit
peace in the early 1730s when Britain made its most successful move against Spain: the creation
of the Georgia colony.
This tense era also highlighted the continued pitfalls of Royal Navy intervention in the
Americas. To be certain, the Royal Navy did make a number of important advances following
the Treaty of Utrecht. Historian N.A.M. Rodger contends that during Robert Walpole's
premiership in the 1720's and 30's, the “British Admiralty...achieved...the stability which had so
long eluded it.” Advances during this period included various financial innovations, the presence
of naval experts within the First Lords of the Admiralty, the growth of naval yards throughout
the empire (including at Jamaica and Antigua), and more organized supply procurement.12
Additionally, from 1721 to 1722, the Royal Navy expanded its fleet of agile sloops in the West
Indies to counter threats from pirates and guarda costas.13
Notwithstanding its many administrative advances, internal political controversies within
Britain and the wide array of irregular threats throughout the Atlantic world limited the Royal
Navy’s effectiveness in the interwar period. At home, opposition to the Walpole administration
grew after his lackluster and non-aggressive utilization of the Royal Navy during the late 1720s
conflict with the Spanish. Historian Sarah Kinkel questions the notion that the Royal Navy was
stronger than the French or Spanish navies in the 1720s and 1730s.14 Along with these
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administrative limitations, several historians have also highlighted Britain’s inability to curb the
multitude of military threats during this period. Historian Eliga Gould makes that case that while
the British Empire was effective in curbing maritime piracy in the 1720s, its fights with guarda
costas and Natives on the continent “underscored the limits on Britain’s ability to enforce its
agreements with other European governments, one along the inland reaches of North America,
the other in the coastal waters and shipping lanes of the Caribbean and the Western Atlantic.”15
Additionally, historian Jeffers Lennox has recently challenged Ian K. Steele's description of the
Atlantic as a “highway that was crossed with increasing safety and regularity over the
seventeenth and eighteenth century…” Jeffers contends that even if the British did develop
mastery of “The Atlantic highway,” Native maritime power and weak British naval defenses
challenged imperial control over “local coasts and rivers” in the interwar period.16
For all these reasons, British imperial officials still required provincial naval support—
particularly when it came to the war on piracy. Historian Mark Hanna describes the disruption of
the Anglo-American ‘Golden Age of Piracy' as a result of “one of the first unified imperial
projects.” For Hanna, this war on pirates pitted both the Royal Navy and “colonial captains”
against pirates.17 More recently, David Wilson has made the case that pirate-hunting was not a
unified military effort. For Wilson, private “colonial expeditions were small-scale-and
reactionary...necessitated by the failures of metropolitan measures to curb piracy” and were
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“pragmatic responses by colonial governments…” Nonetheless, he contends, they often “proved
much more effective in suppressing pirates than measures coordinated from the metropole.”18
While Hanna and Wilson disagree as to the level of coordination between metropolitan and
provincial authorities in the war against piracy, they both highlight a growing scholarly
awareness of the continued importance of provincial navies during the interwar period.
A note must be made here about the fluidity of the names of various maritime actors in
this period. As has been previously mentioned, British authorities often accused Spanish coast
guards of outright piracy and some scholars have recently demonstrated how New England
officials called Wabanaki mariners “pirates” to delegitimize their foes as mere criminals.19 Other
historians have also categorized 18th-century piracy as one choice along a “continuum” of legal
and illegal maritime activity.20 Such categorical fluidity was present amongst provincial naval
forces as well, particularly in the West Indies. As during the previous two imperial wars, colonial
officials referred to provincial naval operations with language varying from “private men of war”
to “guard sloops” to “privateers” to “publick privateers.” With the onset of Spanish guarda
costas after Queen Anne’s War, some colonial officials even called their own provincial guard
vessels by derivations of that title.
With strict definitions of privateering and piracy still very much up for debate in this
period, it is unsurprising that Anglo-Americans continued to use many different names for their
maritime defense options. As in the previous chapter, I argue there was a “provincial naval
continuum” that ranged from state-funded and controlled warships to privateers with letters of
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marque. While the argument over what made one a “privateer” versus a provincial “warship”
was of minor importance during the interwar period, this debate would cause major legal
tensions between imperial periphery and center in the future War of Jenkin’s Ear.21
Between 1713 and 1739, Anglo-Americans fought a series of irregular conflicts with
Native Americans, pirates, and Spanish guarda costas on the contested borderlands in Canada,
Maine, South Carolina, and the West Indies. Spurred on by continued insufficient naval
assistance from the parsimonious Royal government, provincial leaders relied on provincial
navies to secure their coasts and Britain’s still tenuous hold on its American maritime frontiers.

Provincial Navies and Imperial Borderlands: New England and Nova Scotia, 1715-1728

In the wake of Queen Anne’s War, violent clashes with Native Americans on the South
Carolina and Acadian/New England borderlands forced Anglo-American officials on opposite
ends of the mainland colonies to utilize provincial naval forces in similar ways. These border
wars coincided with the ongoing Golden Age of Anglo-American piracy, and it was not
uncommon for officials in both regions to have to navigate a complex of Native, piratical, and
traditional imperial threats all at the same time.
While Anglo-American officials in both regions continued to prefer elusive Royal
military assistance, imperial authorities did little to ensure adequate Royal Navy protection for its
many North American ports in the years following Queen Anne’s War.22 New England’s (and by
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extension Nova Scotia’s) maritime expeditions against Native and piratical foes during this
epoch demonstrated growing provincial naval self-reliance in the wake of inadequate Royal
protection. This is not to say that provincial officials eschewed Royal assistance en total. For
instance, when a pirate vessel was spotted off the coast during the spring of 1717,
Massachusetts's governor dispatched “Capt. Cayley of His Majesty's Ship Rose, and Capt. Coffin
in a Sloop well Arm'd and Man'd with 90 Men to go out in quest of the said Pirate.”23 Not long
thereafter, however, the colony’s House of Representatives voted to continue the sloop “in the
Service for the Defence of the Coast” until the next Royal Navy ship was to arrive.24 The
Massachusetts legislature was willing to pay for a provincial sloop, but hoped to delegate the
responsibility of naval defense on a Royal Navy frigate if possible.
Notwithstanding the preference for Royal Navy assistance, Anglo-Americans from Nova
Scotia to Massachusetts found themselves largely alone in their borderland conflicts with the
Wabanakis. After the English capture of Port Royal (later Annapolis Royal), Nova Scotia, in
1710, imperial officials for the first time had to face how to exercise control over French
colonists (Acadians), and various Wabanaki tribes (including the Mi'kmaq, Abenaki, and
Maliseets), all the while still dealing with military threats from French authorities.25 When
French officials deeded much of their former Acadian colony to the English at Utrecht in 1713,
angry Wabanaki leaders initiated a decade-long maritime war against their Anglo-American
neighbors throughout the coastline stretching from Newfoundland to Maine. Historian Matthew

major difference when it came to anti-pirate expeditions and their political ramifications. See Wilson, “Protecting
Trade,” pp. 98-99.
23
Boston News-Letter (Boston, Massachusetts), 27 May 1717: [2]. Readex: America's Historical
Newspapers.
24
Legislature Minutes, Massachusetts, 4 June 1717, in Journals of the House of Representatives of
Massachusetts, 1715-1717 (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1919), pp. 186-187. Hathi Trust
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015062907996&view=1up&seq=7
25
John Grenier, The Far Reaches of Empire: War in Nova Scotia, 1710-1760 (Norman: University of
Oklahoma, 2008), pp. 12-15.

66

Bahar contends that while the Wabanaki raided English vessels in order to preserve their regional
hegemony, English officials considered Indigenous assaults on English shipping in the region to
be outright ‘piracy.’26
The Wabanaki confederacy had nearly two centuries of experience in operating European
vessels. As early as the sixteenth century, Wabanaki fishermen and mariners captured small
sailboats called shallops that had been abandoned by European explorers. Throughout the
following centuries, Wabanaki mariners stole or purchased similar small craft, and employed
them in raiding or in trade missions. Interestingly, by the mid-seventeenth century, some
Wabanaki naval officers even started to don European gentlemen’s clothing to assert their social
status as leaders of naval crews.27
By appearance, these raids mimicked the ongoing pirate scourge in the Caribbean in that
Wabanaki mariners used light craft ranging from canoes to better armed shallops and sloops to
swiftly move on their English prey.28 While shallops and other small craft were the preferred
craft of Native naval forces, their colonial pursuers in New England’s provincial naval forces
often had the same sort of craft. Historian Matthew Bahar’s description of Massachusetts’s
“hulking, heavily armed, and consequently slow warships...[which] failed in their pursuit of
more agile Indian mariners” over emphasizes the differences between both sides’ vessels.29 For
instance, in 1723, a militia leader named Captain Heath led several men in whaleboats to ambush
Wabanaki mariners in canoes. While many of the Natives escaped, the militiamen captured one
“Canoo, one Gun, their Ammunition, and other stuff: the Canoo was shot through where the

26

Bahar, Storm of the Sea, pp. 160-162.
Andrew Lipman, The Saltwater Frontier : Indians and the Contest for the American Coast. (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), pp. 80-82
http://search.ebscohost.com.nuncio.cofc.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e900xww&AN=1088922&site=ehostlive&scope=site
28
Bahar, Storm of the Sea, pp. 171-172.
29
Bahar, Storm of the Sea, p. 127.
27

67

Indians sat…”30 At the end of the day, both Wabanaki mariners and their provincial naval
opponents relied on the same sorts of small sail-and-oared vessels to pursue their prey.
While independent Wabanaki raids could be devastating, tacit Franco-Acadian support
of these raids amplified Anglo-American anxieties for their coastal security. Thanks to territorial
vagueness in the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, both Anglo-American and French officials claimed to
own the island fisheries between the main peninsula of modern Nova Scotia and Cape Breton
Island. In the treaty, the French had agreed to surrender ‘Acadia’—a region that they believed
only included mainland Nova Scotia. Interwar disagreements over the status of the Canso Island
fishery just off mainland Nova Scotia led to a state of near war between French and AngloAmerican authorities.
After Massachusetts dispatched a Royal Navy guard ship to destroy the French fishery at
Canso in 1716, Governor Saint-Ovide of Île Royale on Cape Breton Island—with French Royal
support—encouraged Mi'kmaq forces to attack New England vessels in return.31 One dramatic
episode in 1720 highlighted the dual threat posed by Franco-Indigenous raiders on the northern
borderlands. An English report from Canso in the late summer detailed an attack by a “Company
of Indians with some French assisting them.” The raiders surprised the English residents in their
beds, stole their valuables, and transported the goods on French vessels. Even though the French
governor at Cape Breton promised to prosecute any of his countrymen involved, the English
correspondent believed that there was a “plain Confederacy between the French and Indians, to
ruin the people and fishery here.” Subsequent interviews with French prisoners revealed that
many of the Franco-Acadian sailors involved in the raid were fishermen angry over the loss of
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the French fishery at Canso.32 By 1722, violent borderland tensions such as these would help fuel
a four-year conflict with French-aligned Natives in the area known as ‘Father Rale's War’
(named for a renegade French priest) or ‘Dummer’s War’ (so called for the governor of
Massachusetts after 1723).
During the conflict, provincial naval forces would be vital to securing Britain’s feeble
hold on its northern borderland. In August of 1720, Nova Scotia Governor Richard Philipps was
confident that he could save the British government significant money by hiring a sloop to guard
the coast against Anglo-American smugglers attempting to covertly trade with the French.33 Not
long thereafter, he forwarded a petition from various colonists which described a merchant being
forced to fit “out two small vessells in pursuit” of Franco-Indigenous robbers. The colonists had
begged for “men, arms and ammunition to enable them to defend the “rights of the Crowne of
England,” and claimed that Native captains confessed to acting on official orders from the
French-Canadian Governor Doucet. Alongside this account of provincial naval struggles with
enemy raiders, Philipps sent a standard plea for Royal Navy assistance.34 Interestingly, Philipps
both asserted that Anglo-Americans could defend their shores independently, but reiterated their
desire for outside aid.
Nova Scotians’ ability to defend their own shores was not lost on imperial officials. In
December of 1720, the Board of Trade suggested that Nova Scotia Governor Richard Phillipps
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should “be allow'd according to his own proposal to hire a sloop for the defence of that coast and
the preventing of illegal trade there.” 35 Despite grumbling over delivery times from Boston
shipmakers, Governor Philipps did note that the “obtaining thereof [was] cheifly oweing to your
Lordshipps.”36 Even if the Board of Trade was influential in Philipps obtaining a military vessel
(the William Augustus), differing imperial and provincial expectations for that vessel would
cause transatlantic disagreements. Much of this is evident in Phillips’ petition to the Board of
Trade begging for financial compensation for the guard vessel’s operating costs. According to
Philipps, the Board of Trade asked Boston’s Royal Navy post captain, Thomas Durell, to survey
coasts around Nova Scotia and Placentia. Durell said that such a thing was “impracticable with
[His] Majesty's ship under his command and advised that a small vessel might be built at Boston.
This the Governor [Philipps] was instructed to do, and gave a letter of credit to Capt. Durell, who
contracted for it at Boston.”37
Even though the Lords of the Treasury were of the “opinion that the Governor Col.
Philips's charges should be reimbursed by the Navy,” the Lords of the Admiralty argued in 1724
that the Navy was not responsible for the sloop’s costs. Describing what would be imperial
policy for the next two decades, the Lords declared that they would not assist Nova Scotia with
its provincial navy project because “when vessels have been fitted out by the Governors of his
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Majesty's Islands or Plantations abroad, the inhabitants have [always] borne the charge thereof.”
They did, however, make the meek promise that when Royal vessels were sent to guard the
Newfoundland fishery that one of them would be “appointed to attend on Placentia and Nova
Scotia” in winter months when it was too icy to operate in Newfoundland.38 The Lords of the
Admiralty made it known that Anglo-American authorities were allowed to fit out their own
provincial navies, but that they were to fund and operate them on their own. This vague
statement would reflect the Royal policy towards provincial navies for the next two decades.
It is important to note that the Royal Navy did not leave Nova Scotia entirely undefended
during the troubles with the Wabanakis. W.A.B. Douglas writes that while the William Augustus
and various governmentally hired privateers were vital for Canso’s survival, the Royal Navy’s
occasional presence during the period also “played an important part in resolving the AngloFrench confrontation at Canso.” To illustrate this point, he describes one case from late 1725 in
which the new lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia—Lawrence Armstrong—created a squadron
of whaleboats to defend the Canso fishery. The diverse crews of these armed whaleboats
included hired Native mariners from New England, Royal Navy sailors, and some of
Armstrong’s own forces.39 Other scholars have also recognized provincial naval forces’ and
privateers’ contributions to the Canso fishery’s survival. Historian Jeffers Lennox has recently
made the case that even though imperial authorities wanted the William Augustus to be used for
survey purposes, imperial expectations clashed with provincial needs to fit out the vessel to
protect undefended shipping routes. For Lennox, provincial and imperial disagreements over the
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William Augustus highlighted the lack of firm control that the British government had over North
American waterways.40 Anglo-Americans did use the opportunity, however, to “fill in the gap”
and defend their own coasts in this case. Historian John Grenier has argued that the “funds that
Philipps devoted to [the] William Augustus proved money well spent.” Captain Cyprian
Southack, previous captain of Massachusetts' Province Galley and subsequent captain of the
William Augustus, defended the fishery from “Indian attacks and [kept] open a line of
communication between Canso and Annapolis Royal.”41 Not for the first time, provincial
authorities supported British imperial aims without Royal funds and with limited Royal Navy
assistance.
Nova Scotia’s southern neighbors in New England also harnessed their own provincial
naval power to simultaneously fight Wabanaki mariners throughout Dummer’s War and the
ongoing scourge of Anglo-American pirates. Contemporary observers critiqued the New
England colonies’ naval response to this complex array of threats. For example, in June of 1722,
James Franklin, a newspaper printer and older brother of the future founding father Benjamin
Franklin, was arrested by Massachusetts authorities for mocking the colony's many delays in
fitting out a vessel to hunt the pirate Edward Low.42
More recently, Matthew Bahar has written that it was only “exceptional colonists who
gathered enough fortitude and firepower to hunt Indians at sea” but that they quickly “became
the hunted.” He cites a case where Governor Dummer commissioned a small provincial sloop
and fishing shallop to pursue an Indigenous schooner, only for both vessels to return empty
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handed and heavily damaged. 43 While colonial forces did make numerous tactical blunders in
the war of 1722-1726, Anglo-American authorities throughout the New England colonies
succeeded in mustering several make-shift fleets to simultaneously fight both Wabanaki and
Anglo-American piratical enemies with limited Royal Navy assistance. Massachusetts’ naval
expansion at the beginning of the conflict in the summer of 1722 illustrates the region’s ability to
harness multiple naval resources to combat disparate threats on a whim.
On 6 June 1722, Massachusetts Governor Samuel Shute and his council discussed news
from Rhode Island about a “Pyrate Vessel on the Coast” which had captured a vessel from
Charlestown, Massachusetts. They ordered Royal Navy Captain Thomas Durrel to take the
H.M.S. Seahorse on a cruise to hunt for the “said Pyrate Vessel, and to guard and to Protect this
Coast.”44 By that point, Rhode Island’s government had already sent two provincial sloops after
the pirate.45 On 7 and 8 June, a committee from both of Massachusetts’s legislative houses
decided to expand the hunt against the pirate and voted to impress a sloop, and appointed
Captain Peter Papillion to lead the expedition. Aside from guaranteeing a month’s worth of
provisions and funding for one hundred men, the committee promised a fair share of the “Goods,
Wares & Merchandizes...that Shall be found on Board...So far as is Consistent with the Acts of,
Parliament...And for Further Encouragement; That they be paid out of the publick Treasury” £10
for every pirate killed or captured, as well as insurance for possible injuries.46 The colony’s
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ability to raise a sloop and raise a crew with such speed while also funding expeditions against
Natives was only possible because of its continued circulation of paper money.47
This growth of the web of maritime operations is evident in a 20 June letter from
Archibald Cumings, a Boston custom officer, to William Popple, the Secretary of the Board of
Trade. Cumings reported the “government of Rhode Island, fitted out two Sloops, in quest of”
two pirate vessels while “this government fitted out a Ship, to go after them, the man of war
being gone to Canso, to protect the fishery.” In a postscript, Cumings remarked that
Massachusetts had deployed “200 Men at ye Eastward and are Sending an 100 more as an
Additional force” to fight Wabanaki mariners, and that the pirates continued to take prizes off the
New England coast.48 Cumings’s letter hints at the multifaceted New England naval war against
Anglo-American pirates and Wabanaki sailors.
Massachusetts’ naval involvement and cooperation with the Royal Navy only grew from
there. Within a week of Cuming’s letter, on 27 June, a committee from both legislative houses
met to discuss the specifics of the campaign. Among the naval recommendations of the
committee were that “Ten Whale Boats with very good Oars be provided, and sent to the Forces,
for Enabling them to manage a sufficient Scout” and that a “Sloop be taken into the Province Pay
for Transporting Men and Provisions…” Over the next few days, the governor and assembly
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also extended Captain Papillion’s pirate hunt for a month and ordered Captain Durell to patrol as
well with the H.M.S. Seahorse.49 By late July, Massachusetts authorities decided to dispatch two
sloops as far north as Nova Scotia to search for Wabanaki mariners that had kidnapped New
England fishermen.50 The following month, Captain Durell, who had previously suggested Nova
Scotians utilize provincial forces to defend their coasts, offered to man small provincial vessels
with Royal Navy sailors to hunt down the same foes.51 Durell likely realized his own warship
was too large to pursue the swift Abenaki light craft, and tapped into provincial naval resources
to supplement his own mission to defend the coast.
Not all maritime campaigning that summer originated with the Massachusetts
government or the Royal Navy. On 27 June 1722, two civilians named Christian Newton and
Margarett Blin [also spelled Blyn] informed the House of Representatives that they had fitted
out a sloop and crew to recapture loved ones taken by Wabanaki forces and requested arms from
the provincial government for their crew. The next day, a committee from both houses agreed
that thirty soldiers “under a proper Officer (whom His Excellency [Samuel Shute] be desired to
Commissionate) with Provisions, Arms and Ammunition to be put on Board the Sloop offered by
Margaret Blin...to repair as soon as may be to Passmaquada, and there to use their best
Endeavours to recover [captives] from the Indians…” They also suggested that the militiamen

49

Legislature Minutes, Massachusetts, 28 June 1722, in Journals of the House of Representatives of
Massachusetts, Vol. IV, 1722-1723 (Boston Massachusetts Historical Society, 1923), pp. 54-58. and Council
Minutes, Massachusetts, 29 June 1722, in “Minutes of Council of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay 2 Mar - 20
Aug 1722” (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/794 1722/03/02-1722/08/20).
http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_794_004
50
Council Minutes, Massachusetts, 25 July 1722, in “Minutes of Council of the Province of the
Massachusetts Bay 2 Mar - 20 Aug 1722” (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/794 1722/03/021722/08/20). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_794_004
51
“Vote for Fitting out Two Shallops Against the Indians,” 18 August 1722, in The Acts and Resolves,
Public and Private of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, Volume X, Resolves, Etc., 1720-1726, p. 217.

75

capture Indigenous captives if they could not liberate the New England captives.52 The rescue
mission never commenced as Margarett’s husband—the sloop captain James Blin—and the other
captives made a successful escape.53
Throughout the rest of the summer, Wabanaki sailors captured scores of English vessels
and kidnapped large numbers of Anglo-American colonists. This was only the beginning of what
would be a four-year onslaught that would see Native chiefs leading formidable fleets—
including flotillas of a half dozen sloops and schooners—against New England and Nova Scotia
mariners. In some cases, Wabanaki mariners found a willing market for English vessels at the
French fortress of Louisbourg. For French authorities, Wabanaki raids on English shipping
damaged their imperial competitors without requiring overt French involvement.
Such widespread Wabanaki raiding with tacit French support inspired an expansion of
New England’s provincial naval capabilities. Not long after Blin was rescued by a naval force
from Boston, Governor Shute and his council impressed Captain Blin along with another ship
captain to take militiamen and sailors to “Proceed...to [Chebucto, Nova Scotia], or Such harbour
as they may hear the Vessels are in” to regain some ships and captives.54 The Boston Newsletter
of 3 September 1722 reported that Blin succeeded in ransoming upwards of a dozen English
crews. When Wabanaki mariners sought to execute some English prisoners in retaliation for
recent English killings of their own people, Blin threatened to hang his own Native prisoners if
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they did so—the threat of which convinced the Wabanakis to release their own prisoners.55 With
Margaret Blin’s organization of a naval rescue mission for her husband, and James Blin’s own
naval service on behalf of Governor Shute, records of the Blin family’s experiences give
historians a rare glimpse into the impact provincial naval warfare had on families.
It is important to note that provincial navies throughout the New England colonies often
met their match when fighting relentless Wabanaki crews. For instance, militia officer Samuel
Penhallow reported that after New Hampshire authorities dispatched two shallop crews to hunt
down successful Wabanaki mariners in the summer of 1724, “through cowardice and folly were
afraid to engage them.” A physician from Kittery, Maine led a smaller crew in pursuit of the
same raiders, but the “enemy had two great guns and four pateraroes [swivel guns], which cut
their shrouds and hindered [the English] pursuit for some time…” The Maine crew was forced
back by Native reinforcements and severe casualties.56 Another contemporary observer noticed
that provincial schooner crews had a hard time recruiting in Marblehead, Massachusetts as “so
many of [the town peoples’] freinds and relations being now in the hands of the Indians are very
backward to goe against them in a Hostile manner.”57 For residents in New England port cities,
the naval war disrupted their economic and social networks to the core.
While provincial naval forces and detached militia “marines” onboard local vessels were
able to score some important victories by the end of 1722, including securing the Canso fishery
from Native warriors, the Wabanaki confederacy continued a devastating offensive by land and
sea on the northeastern borderlands for years to come. Even after New England forces
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assassinated the Wabanaki’s Acadian ringleader, Father Rale, in 1724, Maliseet warriors levelled
many Anglo-American homesteads on the Maine frontier.
By 1725, however, Nova Scotia and Massachusetts emissaries made diplomatic headway
when they threatened French officials at Montreal and Louisbourg with a general assault on
Franco-Acadian shipping and settlements if they did not cease their support of the Wabanaki war
effort. The threat of a new European conflict in the region coupled with growing dissension
within the Wabanaki ranks forced the French officials’ hand on the matter. By 1726, war-weary
Anglo-American officials and their Native enemies had agreed to separate ceasefires in Nova
Scotia and New England. Father Rale’s War was over, yet without any real victor. Historian John
Grenier suggests that far from having a major victory, Massachusettsans and Nova Scotians had
“merely survived the war and had grown as tired of it as the Indians had…”58 That survival, in a
large part, depended on various New England authorities’ consistent deployment of transport
sloops, guard vessels, whale boats, along with occasional cooperation with Royal Navy Captain
Durell to pursue Anglo-American pirates—a threat that had never truly dissipated, even as the
Massachusetts government directed most of its military attention to the fight against the
Wabanaki.59
The Massachusetts provincial navy’s typically amiable interwar relationship with the
Royal Navy would sour in 1726 with new post captain James Cornwall. On 28 June 1726, after
denying a request by Royal Navy Captain John St. Lo of the H.M.S. Ludlow Castle to impress
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men to serve on his beleaguered vessel, Governor Dummer and his council discussed the
activities of the pirate William Fly off the coast, and ordered that “a good Sailing Sloop or other
Suitable Vessel be taken up for his Majties Service agst the Sd Pirate…” The council appointed
William Atkinson (himself a victim of the pirate) as the captain and established a pay table of £8
a month for the captain, his officers in “proportion,” £4 for sailors, a twenty shilling bounty for
volunteering for service, and the usual promises of insurance for the wounded.60 The lieutenantgovernor would later boast about the “cheerful and ready appearance of [forty] voluntiers upon
the bounty offer'd for that service” within six hours of the commencement of the recruitment
drive.61 The sloop, Loyal Heart, was ready to sail.
The next day, Dummer and the council dismissed Atkinson due to suspicions he had
associated with the pirates and replaced him with Captain Thomas Little. They also discussed
“threatening” letters that Lt. Governor Dummer had gotten from Captain St. Lo regarding the
attempts to outfit a pirate-hunting sloop. They were shocked to find that Captain Cornwall had
stopped the Loyal Heart with the H.M.S. Sheerness in the middle of Boston Harbor.62
According to a subsequent complaint by the Massachusetts governor to the king, Cornwall had
demanded to know their business and threatened to fire on them. When Captain Little told them
that they had a provincial commission to hunt pirates and tried to continue his voyage, Cornwall
ordered his sailors to fire on the little provincial sloop. According to the lieutenant governor and
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council, Cornwall could not have been ignorant of their mission as Massachusetts authorities had
already denied his own request to impress sailors to hunt pirates the day before. Dummer and his
council argued this was “very far from answering your Majesties gracious intentions” in
providing Royal Navy protection and complained that Cornwall had done little to actively defend
the coast for the last two years. They asked for a new captain, and that governors have control
over future Royal Navy guard vessel officers.63
Cornwall’s narrative of the events was notably different. In the Sheerness’s logbook entry
for 1 July 1726, Cornwall wrote that that a “Sloop hauld of [sic] from ye Wharfe...Arm'd wth 6
Guns & 4 Patterreroes, & as near as I could Guess about 40 hands, So unexpected a Sight could
not but be Very Surprizing to me having not ye Least Infirmation…” Cornwall claimed that the
sloop’s master [Little] promised he was going no farther than Castle William, ignored calls to
board the Sheerness, and proceeded to sail anyway. This prompted Cornwall, who believed them
to be “going a Pyrating,” to fire four times on the sloop, which anchored near the safety of Castle
William with only limited damage to its sails. The drama was far from over, however. On 22
July, Cornwall recorded that the “Sloop Said to be fitt'd out at ye Expence of this Goemt Arriv'd
here & this Morning...hoisted a King Jack…” As will be recalled, this flag was solely reserved
for Royal Navy vessels, but provincial warships frequently flouted this rule during operations.
When Cornwall sent his men to forcibly take the King’s Jack down, a minor brawl occurred, and
thirty provincial sailors with pistols and swords forced the Royal Navy men back.64
While one might conclude that Cornwall’s belligerence would substantially sour
provincial opinions of the Royal Navy itself, this was far from the case. In their complaint to an
aging King George I, Lt. Governor Dummer and his council asked for a new post captain and
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greater provincial control over station ships. Furthermore, in the wider scope of provincial-Royal
Navy relations in New England, the scuffle between the sailors of the Loyal Heart and the
Sheerness was a departure from the mutually cooperative norm. When discussing an earlier
dispute between New Englanders and a Royal Navy captain, historian Douglas Edward Leach
wrote that such disputes “may not typify the behavior of royal naval officers in America, but
they do illustrate the kind of self-assured arrogance that naval authority seemed to generate and
that was so offensive to many colonists.”65 This resentful attitude was certainly evident in late
August 1726, when the governor’s council and the colony’s legislature both commended Captain
Little for “having handsomely Asserted and Defended the Honour of this His Majesty's
Government of this Province, and of the Commission he had born...notwithstanding the Violent
Opposition given him by Capt. James Cornwall...”66
In the minds of New England and Nova Scotia officials, their provincial navies had
secured their coastlines from Native and piratical threats for the “Honour of this His Majesty’s
Government” even when the Royal Navy had stood in the way or neglected their defense.
Despite occasional help from a limited number of Royal guard ships, provincially funded and
designed navies from New England and Nova Scotia made greater efforts to protect British
commerce and Canadian fisheries than imperial forces.
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Provincial Navies and Imperial Borderlands: South Carolina, 1715-1727

Even before Massachusetts and Nova Scotia authorities waged war against pirates and
Native American naval forces on the northern borderlands, similar borderland maritime violence
erupted to the south and southwest of Charles Town, South Carolina in 1715. Native nations
such as the Yamasee began to resent the South Carolina government’s expansive goals, rumored
plans of conquest, and abusive traders that threatened to enslave debtors.67 By April of 1715,
disaffected Yamasee officials killed two South Carolina traders and fired the proverbial first
shots of the bloody Yamasee War. While the naval theatre of the war that will be considered
below primarily pitted South Carolinians against their Yamassee foes south of Charles Town, the
colony also warred against other disaffected Native groups on land such as the Creeks and
Choctaws.68
While disputes between Southern colonists and their Indigenous neighbors were not as
tied to maritime matters as those in the northeast, both South Carolinians and the Yamasee had
strong ties to the sea. Natives living on the South Carolina coast had long engaged in maritime
endeavors and were particularly skilled in crafting periagua canoes for trade. Yamasee mariners
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had even helped to man South Carolina’s scout boat navy until the 1715 war.69 Long before their
conflict with the Carolinians, the Yamasee also frequently employed canoes to transport war
parties to capture slaves from enemy tribes in the Florida hinterlands.70
In yet another challenge to the prevailing notion that Indian wars were limited to land, the
Yamasee nation and their Carolinian foes fought many of their battles on the coastal waters and
streams near modern day Beaufort and Port Royal, South Carolina. Both the Yamasee and their
South Carolina opponents preferred small craft like their contemporaries in the northeast, and
typically fought from periaguas and small whale boats. After Governor Charles Craven led
infantry forces to make a land-based stand against Yamasee onslaught south of Charles Town in
mid-April of 1715, he directed the experienced frontiersmen Alexander Mackay and John
Barnwell to lead a naval assault against the Yamasee village of Pocotaligo. By the end of April,
Barnwell and Mackay led militiamen on small craft to seize Pocotaligo, and then seized a welldefended Yamasee fort after scaling its walls amidst a hail of musketry.71
By September, South Carolina scout boat crews had conducted several successful
ambushes against Yamasee warriors on canoes, including actions that involved coordinated landbased ambushes and musket/swivel gun fire from provincial vessels. The colony’s scout boat
navy was essentially purpose built for these campaigns on the colony’s tidal borderlands. In
historian Larry Ivers’ view, the scout boat mariners had evolved from mere scouts in the Queen
Anne’s War to “marine commandos” by the end of 1715.72 While this modern analysis may
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sound overly boastful of the provincial navy’s progress, at least one contemporary South
Carolina parson bragged in October of 1715 that the worst of the crisis was over because “[as
soon as a] party of Indians appear our Scouts give notice and they are beaten back.”73
South Carolina’s swift deployment of scout boats and militiamen on canoes was effective
in stemming the initial Native onslaught, but these victories belied the large extent to which
South Carolina depended on outside assistance from neighboring governments and imperial
forces throughout the conflict. For instance, in May of 1715, Governor Craven’s administration
begged Governor Spotswood of Virginia for reinforcements, while also asking Captain Samuel
Mead of the HMS Success—a passing Royal Navy warship—for supplies and to request direct
help from London. While Mead refused both requests, he did agree to facilitate the purchase of
weapons from Governor Joseph Dudley of Massachusetts.74 Dudley agreed to the arms sale
despite his own ongoing fights with Wabanaki mariners. Ironically, only a month after sending
the South Carolinians arms as they waged a naval and land war against the Yamasees, Dudley
himself deployed “two sloops...with 30 men, each well arm'd…” to hunt down Wabanaki
mariners that had captured New England fishermen.75 Even as New Englanders struggled against
their own Native foes on the northern borderlands, they extended military aid to their
compatriots facing similar issues on the Southern borderlands.
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Despite outside assistance and some tactical success against the Yamasees by late 1715,
South Carolina’s military situation was still dire. No account better describes the chaos than
Captain Mead’s December 1715 letter to the Lords of the Admiralty. Upon a subsequent trip to
Charles Town, Mead reported that he was shocked to find the city bereft of defenders, with “the
[governor] gone to the Army, and a great many to [dive at] the Spanish Wreck off Cape Florida.”
With rumors that African slaves planned to use the chaos to stage their own uprising, the
lieutenant governor implored Meade to “send on Shore every night Twenty five, or thirty Men
with Arms” to guard the city's powder magazine. The previously reticent Mead agreed to this
plea.76
Mead’s alarming description of the chaos in the proprietary capital would have been one
of many flooding imperial offices in London in 1715 and 1716. Many South Carolinians
themselves were beginning to resent the alleged military neglect of the colony’s Lords
Proprietors and their expectations that the colonists should orchestrate their own defense. In
response, many provincial leaders began to campaign for direct Royal governance and military
aid. Historian Steven Oatis makes the case that when the Board of Trade conducted a formal
inquiry into the supposed neglect in the summer of 1715, the Lords Proprietors demonstrated a
financial unwillingness to assist their colonists coupled with an outright ignorance of the
colony’s dire straits.77 This ignorance and neglect was especially apparent when it came to the
proprietary opinion regarding South Carolina’s naval capabilities. In response to the Board of
Trade’s query as to whether the Lords Proprietors would provide shipping to carry British troops
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to the colony, they responded that “we do not doubt but the Governmt. of Carolina will send
ships and provisions for their transportation.”78
The Lords Proprietors’ rosy view of South Carolina’s ability to transport British regulars
across the Atlantic clashed with the growing human and economic costs of the conflict. Because
the Yamasees had found refuge with sympathetic Spanish authorities in St. Augustine, Florida,
they continued to harass South Carolinians, and even successfully ambushed one of the colony's
scout boat crews near Port Royal in the summer of 1716.79 By 1716, South Carolina officials
convinced the Cherokee—the traditional foes of the Yamassee nation’s own Creek allies—to
join the war effort. This alliance with one of the strongest Southern Indigenous nations inspired
several smaller neighboring tribes to join the English cause, and played a signal role in the
colony’s pyrrhic victory over the Yamasee and Creek in 1717. Victory for the Carolinians came
at a high cost, indeed; wartime losses included the deaths of over seven hundred colonists, food
shortages, and nearly £116,000 sterling in war debt.80 Among the many expensive war measures
that elevated this debt was South Carolina’s continuous deployment of “two scout boats of 10
men each” beyond the conflict’s end.81 Growing military costs would also play a signal role in
the colony’s decision to revolt against the Lords Proprietors in 1719.
While the fight with the Yamasee nearly brought the colony to ruin, it would soon face an
equally daunting threat: pirates. While Anglo-American pirates did little to cripple South
Carolina’s economy during the height of the Golden Age of Piracy, local anxiety over pirate
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attacks was much more profound. The political ramifications of piracy for Charles Town were
most colorfully illustrated by Captain Edward ‘Blackbeard’ Teach’s June 1718 blockade of the
unguarded port city and subsequent attacks by Teach’s associate Charles Vane.82 Without any
Royal Navy vessels nearby, Governor Robert Johnson “thô very unable both for want of men and
money,” decided to commission militia officer Colonel William Rhett as a temporary Vice
Admiral, and authorized him to assemble an emergency fleet of pirate hunters. Johnson recorded
that “two sloops [the Henry and Sea Nymph], one commanded by Capt. [John] Masters and the
other by Capt. [Fayrer] Hall with about, 130 men were gott ready wth. all the dispatch wee
cou'd.”83 Even though the Royal Navy was far away from Charles Town at the time, Johnson
clearly wanted Rhett’s provincial fleet to carry the trappings of a Royal Navy squadron when he
ordered Rhett to fly “his Majesties Union Flagg” on his vessels. Royal mandates had long
prohibited colonial vessels from flying the plain Royal Union Jack as that banner was reserved
for Royal Navy ships alone. By flouting this law, perhaps Johnson consciously saw himself as an
active substitute for the Royal Navy in their absence.84
Rhett’s fleet never found Blackbeard or Vane, but they did capture the infamous
‘Gentleman Pirate,’ Stede Bonnet, in a pitched naval battle off the coast of Cape Fear, North
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Carolina in September of 1718.85 The government’s appropriation of Royal Navy trappings
continued into the trial of Bonnet’s crew. For instance, when one of the accused pirates claimed
they only engaged Rhett’s fleet because they thought they were being attacked by pirates
themselves, South Carolina Chief Justice Nicholas Trott retorted: “And so one pirate might fight
with another. But how could you think it was a Pirate, when he had King George's Colours?”86
Even though provincial naval vessels were not part of the Royal Navy themselves, they adopted
this exclusive Royal banner to legitimize their pirate hunting mission.
Aside from provincial compensation, sailors on pirate hunting missions could also expect
some level of reward from the home government in London. Thanks to King George I’s 1717
promise of rewards for any sailors who captured unrepentant pirates, crews could expect
financial gains up to £100 for the capture of a pirate captain, and lesser amounts for lower
officers.87 The provincial government’s burden of repaying its sailors was also lightened by the
division of ‘booty’ in vice admiralty hearings after Bonnet’s capture. Almost simultaneously
with trial and execution in late 1718, Trott ensured that plunder from Bonnet’s vessel was split
equitably among the sailors.
Oddly enough, Trott required some of Bonnet’s victims (merchant captains rescued by
the South Carolina provincial Navy) to pay salvage fees. This forced at least two ‘rescued’
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merchant captains to surrender their vessels to the South Carolina government due to their
inability to afford these fees. During these proceedings, Trott also ruled that an enslaved African
named Ned Grant would be publicly auctioned off, and the proceeds of his sale would be used
for prize money for the pirate hunters. Grant had been captured by Bonnet after escaping from
his South Carolina master, and then had the misfortune of being recaptured by South Carolinians
during the Battle of Cape Fear. Ironically, throughout these proceedings, the South Carolina
government rewarded pirate hunters by seizing vessels from pirate victims, and by depriving
humans of their freedom.88
As the provincial government was able to ensure that pirate hunters were adequately
reimbursed for their services, larger piratical and political threats awaited the ever-embattled
colony as an eventful 1718 drew to an end. With reports of new pirate fleets off the coast
Governor Johnson opted to expand his naval defenses and ordered a unique combination of scout
boat patrols in the harbor and the impressment of an emergency fleet of merchant vessels to
prevent the expected assault.89 This would be one of the few times where South Carolina
combined its regular naval forces with an impressed merchant fleet.
Worried about the damages that could come to their vessels after being impressed,
several mariners complained to the provincial government and demanded assurances that they
would be reimbursed for damages in battle. As financial negotiations continued, two pirate
vessels under the command of Richard Worley appeared outside the harbor. Johnson dispatched
the colony’s scout boats to prevent their landing on the city’s barrier islands, and then led three
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hundred sailors on four ships, and swiftly defeated the piratical duo. Johnson immediately split
the “small booty” from the captures amongst the captors.90 Once again, a timely deployment of
an emergency fleet prevented Charles Town’s foes from sacking the city.
While provincial victories over Bonnet and Worley raised Charlestonians’ morale,
increased tensions with the Lords Proprietors prevented any true respite. Many within the
provincial government were infuriated with the Proprietors for a number of reasons. High on the
list of grievances was the fact that the Lords Proprietors vetoed the Assembly’s military finance
laws from the Yamasee War, and that they failed to provide adequate military protection for their
beleaguered and embattled colony.91
International politics would also play a role in heightening the crisis between the
provincial government and its proprietary overlords. In response to Spanish attempts to expand
their Mediterranean holdings in 1718, Britain and France had jointly declared war on the Iberian
kingdom in the short-lived War of the Quadruple Alliance.92 As the South Carolina militia
gathered to prevent a rumored Spanish invasion, angry politicos formed an ‘Association’ to
discuss their dissatisfaction with the Lords Proprietors, fomented a bloodless coup, and installed
a sympathetic governor that helped them to call for direct Royal governance. This coup would
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forever be known in South Carolina as the ‘Bloodless Revolution of 1719,’ or simply the
‘Revolution of 1719.’93
For at least some anti-proprietary polemicists, proprietary indifference that necessitated
provincial naval defense was a large justification for the ‘Revolution of 1719’ against the Lords
Proprietors. For instance, in a 1726 pamphlet that challenged Proprietary attempts to retake the
colony, South Carolinian Francis Yonge argued that one of the turning points that led to the coup
was the Proprietors’ dismissal of a legislative session that had convened to find ways to settle
military debts including the two missions against the pirates.94 For men like Yonge, Royal
military protection was the only solution to their inadequate defenses. Even before King George
I’s privy council agreed to “provisionally” facilitate Royal governance of the proprietary colony
in August of 1720, Captain John Hildesley with the H.M.S. Flamborough became the first Royal
Navy post captain in Charles Town.95 Seven years later, Yonge praised the king for having
“Protected...Trade by His Ships of War, and [the] Country by His forces” ever since the Royal
take-over.96
While Yonge was quick to praise Royal Naval protection in his anti-Proprietary
pamphlet, he neglected to mention that South Carolina’s provincial naval forces still continued to
operate both alongside and independently of their new Royal Navy allies, and that the presence
of the Royal Navy did not guarantee internal stability. This was especially apparent during the
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period stretching from 1715 to 1732, which early twentieth historian Verner Crane called South
Carolina’s era of “Defense and Reconstruction.” Crane argued that South Carolina expanded its
southern frontier defenses during this era with numerous forts to challenge Franco-Spanish and
Native American incursions, including the 1716 establishment of a more permanent base at Port
Royal for South Carolina’s two scout boats to operate out of.97
Despite provincial protestations in early 1720 that naval defense costs on the Florida
frontier continued to exacerbate South Carolina’s debt, the Board of Trade hinted at their desire
for continued provincial naval efforts in September of that year. The Board expressed their desire
that a fort should be built on the Altamaha River to the south of the colony (in what would
become the colony of Georgia in the next decade), and were of the opinion that it would be
difficult to do that without a Royal Navy guard ship. However, they proposed that in case a
Royal ship was not available, “that the [new Governor Francis Nicholson] be impower'd and
have directions to hire a sloop or brigantine for this purpose upon his arrival in Carolina.”98 In
essence, imperial authorities expected provincial authorities to fund their own naval defenses
even as the Royal military presence expanded in the region. As it would happen, the king’s
parsimonious Privy Council only provided a small unit of invalid redcoats, building materials,
and a few officials to help with the fort’s construction. Ultimately provincial authorities not only
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hired a merchant vessel and sailors to assist the expedition to build the fort, but used mariners
from the scout boat navy to help build the fort.99
While South Carolina authorities continued to rely on their own mariners to secure
imperial aims in the interwar period, they also came to realize that the presence of the Royal
Navy could exacerbate internal political issues and instability. For instance, some Royal Navy
guard captains enmeshed themselves in local corruption and political dramas. Some provincial
officials accused Captain John Hildesley of the H.M.S. Flamborough of partnering with
provincial naval hero William Rhett in an illegal arms cartel to the Spanish in St. Augustine. The
controversial Royal Navy captain also conspired with ousted governor Robert Johnson in an
aborted attempt to retake his office in 1721.100
Provincial authorities would be forced to draw on their own naval resources again when
imperial conflict with Spain resurfaced for a second short time in the late 1720’s. Between 1727
and 1729, South Carolinians faced an onslaught of Spanish privateer raids on their merchant
shipping as well as ongoing fights with Yamasee and Creek forces on the southern borderlands.
In a letter from September of 1727, one South Carolina merchant lamented that despite this
combination of foes, heavy provincial taxation, and political uncertainty (namely the Lords
Proprietors in London trying take back the colony) the citizens of Charles Town had “fitted out,
at their own Expence, a Sloop [the Palmer, captained by one Thomas Montjoy] with 100 Men”
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to hunt Spaniards alongside a Royal Navy guard ship, H.M.S. Scarborough.101 While other
colonies with Royal Navy station ships occasionally fitted out their own provincial vessels (e.g.
Massachusetts), it is ironic that South Carolina—a colony that had orchestrated a political coup
in part to secure Royal naval protection—still felt the need to employ these vessels.
Historian Nic Butler has found that the South Carolina Council’s decision to outfit that
sloop coincided with the Royal Navy post captain George Anson’s requests to impress local
sailors for the Scarborough. Butler contends that the overextended captain was already tasked
with both hunting Spanish privateers and protecting merchant vessels, and likely found comfort
in the colonial government’s decision to outfit a temporary “privateer” to defend the coast. The
governor’s council allowed the captain to impress sailors for his warship, even though
contemporary British law (the 1708 ‘America Act,’ which was also known as the ‘Sixth of
Anne’) forbade Royal Navy impressment in the Americas. Despite this prohibition, the extent to
which it forbade all impressment was unclear, and no imperial guidance existed to clarify when
it was acceptable for colonial governors and Royal Navy captains to impress seamen. By the
1720s, after a decade of limited clarification over the law from Parliament, Admiralty officials
had officially stopped requiring Royal Navy captains to avoid impressment—a unilateral
decision that Parliament did little to challenge and which would have major ramifications in the
decades to follow. 102 Not for the last time, a Royal official depended on provincial naval forces
to support the Royal Navy’s meagre presence in the area.
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By late September 1727, the South Carolina General Assembly passed a comprehensive
act that allocated funds for provincial naval and land forces to campaign against both Native and
Spanish privateers, and included a specific pay table for sailors aboard the Palmer “Sloop of War
Employ'd in Guarding These Coasts.” This was to be funded by taking paper currency returned
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financial package of over £25,000 (in South Carolina currency) was especially impressive
considering Middleton’s and the Commons House’s disagreements over expanding paper money
then in circulation, as well as a recent Royal prohibition on extending paper money circulation in
the colony.104
Ultimately, Charles Town would wage a successful counteroffensive against Spanish and
Indigenous forces throughout late 1727 and early 1728. In early January 1727/8, a Philadelphia
newspaper reported that Mountjoy and the crew of the sloop Palmer retook a “ship belonging to
London, which the Spaniards were carrying to the Havana; the ship and Goods was Praised and
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one Half was allowed for Salvage,” though other Spanish privateers still cruised off the coast.105
Soon thereafter, an Indigenous attack on a militia patrol boat south of Charles Town coupled
with an allegedly insulting letter from Florida’s Spanish governor convinced President
Middleton to launch the long-planned assault on Yamasee lands near St. Augustine. Scout boat
veteran Colonel Robert Barnwell—leading nearly one hundred English and allied Indigenous
warriors on periaguas and other small craft—devastated several Yamasee villages there.106 This
raid not only demoralized Spanish authorities in the area, but convinced many Spanish-aligned
Natives that their imperial ally could not adequately protect them.107
Not long thereafter, provincial officials would use local naval forces to assist a Royal
Navy survey mission that would set the stage for future relations between both the Royal Navy
and South Carolina navies. President Middleton informed the Upper House of Assembly and the
Commons House that he had news that the Lords of the Admiralty were planning to make Port
Royal, South Carolina, a harbor for Royal Navy vessels to rendezvous in. Middleton contended
that it “behove us to get Proper Persons and Craft to sound the Channels and make Such
discovery as may Encourage the right honble the Lords of the Admiralty to prosecute their
design…” A few days later, a joint committee from both houses consulted with both station
captains Anson and Arnold, and concluded that the provincial government should provide the
Royal Navy with “A Small Sloop [,] Two of the Largest Pilot Boats [,] The Two Scout Boats”
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and buoys to complete the survey.108 One Royal Navy observer remarked that these “Scout
Boats (in Number two) are maintained by the province, to guard the Rivers & Inlets from
Indians, they are both periaguas, one wth ten oars the other wth eight; they Sail & row very
well.”109
This seemingly mundane survey highlights an interesting trend in this era: while
provincial authorities campaigned for greater Royal Navy protection of their coasts, Royal Navy
officials continued to rely on provincial naval forces to support their own assignments. This
negotiation of responsibility for coastal defense between provincial and Royal Navy forces
echoes concurrent arguments within the Board of Trade over whether or not to deploy more
Royal troops to the colonies. While some authorities within the Board of Trade had developed an
extensive plan for increasing Royal military forces in the colonies, many other imperial officials
dissented from this view and expected the colonies to maintain the majority of their own
defenses. The Royal Navy’s dependence on provincial naval assistance at Fort King George and
in the Port Royal survey, as well as South Carolina’s continued independent naval expeditions in
this period all highlight this reality.110
On the empire’s contested northern and southern continental borderlands, imperial
officials encouraged provincial officials to shore up imperial weaknesses with locally raised
navies. While Anglo-Americans in Nova Scotia, New England, and South Carolina always pined
for elusive Royal Navy assistance, they continued to pass legal and economic measures to ensure
that provincial naval forces could fight simultaneous Native and piratical threats with or without
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Royal assistance. Occasionally violent interactions between both naval forces foreshadowed
larger rifts between imperial and provincial officials over the definitions and purposes of
provincial navies in the next imperial war.

Provincial Navies, Privateers, Guarda Costas, and Pirates: The West Indies, 1713-1739

West Indian authorities faced an entirely different interwar situation than their North
American compatriots. For instance, despite some North American naval expansion, the Royal
Navy continued to devote more ships and resources to the rich Caribbean islands than their
continental neighbors. While the Royal Navy expanded its operations in the West Indies during
the previous two imperial wars, it ensured a more permanent presence in the West Indies with
the construction of careening bases at Port Antonio, Jamaica and English Harbour, Antigua in the
late 1720s.111 Historian Peter Earle has found that by the early 1720s, there were “nine Royal
Navy vessels in the West Indies, five on the American coast and two or three in Newfoundland
during the fishing season.”112 Another major difference from the continent was that AngloAmerican officials in the West Indies did not face major conflicts with Native tribes. They
primarily dealt with Anglo-American pirates and Spanish guarda costas. It was also rare that
Caribbean authorities ever deployed land forces or used provincial vessels to transport troops
like their continental compatriots. Finally, Caribbean authorities relied on privateering far more
than provincial officials on the mainland.113 These differences between operational theatres can
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be overplayed, however. Despite the regular presence of Royal Navy warships, imperial
commanders were not always willing or able to pursue the light craft of Spanish guarda costas or
English pirates. Just as with their compatriots on the mainland, Anglo-American officials in the
Caribbean still often had to utilize their own naval resources to defend their shores and to secure
British commerce between 1713 and 1739.
Provincial naval efforts during this period were far from unified or consistent. Scholar
David Wilson attributes the Royal and provincial governments’ eventual victory over Atlantic
piracy to a “series of fragmented and distinctive campaigns, shaped and influenced in
metropolitan and colonial contexts.” Building on this narrative of disjointed naval campaigns, I
will make the case that Anglo-American provincial navies and privateers forged an uneasy and
often tense partnership with the Royal Navy to secure the West Indian islands from piratical,
guarda costas, and regular Spanish imperial threats throughout the interwar period. Even as the
Royal Navy’s footprint increased in the region, Anglo-American authorities in the West Indies
deployed provincial fleets and privateers when emergency situations required it.114
This alliance must be understood in the context of inconsistent messages from the
metropole regarding naval defense. Noting that historian David Wilson has argued that London
had little in the way of an organized plan to eradicate piracy during this period, other historians
such as Shinsuke Satsuma and Sarah Kinkel have also recently emphasized that British naval
policy was restrained. Satsuma has made the case that the ruling Whig party in London worried
over offending potential trade opportunities during the two short conflicts with Spain and
avoided an overly hostile naval policy. Kinkel has expanded on this point in arguing that the
policy made the Royal Navy a “passive force focused on deterrence.” Kinkel has also argued that
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Prime Minister Walpole’s administration detested privateering and considered it a pathway to
piracy.115 This reticence was especially visible in the West Indies, where most of the tension with
the Spanish Empire in the Americas came to a head.
Imperial authorities did not, however, discourage provincial naval defense as a tool. As
previously mentioned, when the Lords of the Admiralty refused to fund a provincial guard vessel
in Nova Scotia in 1724, they argued “when vessels have been fitted out by the Governors of his
Majesty's Islands or Plantations abroad, the inhabitants have borne the charge thereof.” This
laissez-faire attitude towards provincial naval defense was also apparent in the West Indies. In
March of 1723, Barbadian Governor Worsley wrote to the Board of Trade about his fitting out a
sloop “in the nature of a guarda costa” to assist the customs officer in pursuing smugglers. He
wrote that he and the customs officer both had shares in the sloop and that the “expence will not
be much to H.M. besides the maintaining the third part of the sloop...”116 In August, an unnamed
imperial official (the editor of the Calendar of State Papers assumed this correspondent to be
Charles Delafaye, the undersecretary of state for the Northern Department) responded that the
Worsley’s deployment of the sloop “employed in the Custom house affairs to prevent the
running of goods, leave[s] no room to doubt but that step will be approved of,” and doubted even
if the king would ask for a share in “so necessary a service.”117 With attitudes ranging from
apathetic to enthusiastic, imperial officials neither strongly supported nor discouraged provincial
naval defense in this period.
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Any study of interwar provincial naval defenses in the Caribbean must first consider
Governor Lord Archibald Hamilton of Jamaica’s major privateering debacle of 1715-1716. In
1715, Hamilton commissioned around ten privateers with the declared purpose of curtailing
Spanish guarda costa and other pirate activity around Jamaica. Despite these declared aims,
many of these privateers engaged in outright piracy against Franco-Spanish shipping. Historian
E.T. Fox points out that far from being altruistic, Governor Hamilton had financial shares in
these privateering-pirate voyages. Additionally, Hamilton was implicated with loyalties to
Jacobite rebels, and Fox surmises that he may have intended this fleet to support that Stuart
insurrection in 1715. Author Colin Woodward suggested this may have even been the start of a
“colonial Jacobite navy.”118
Whatever Hamilton’s actual motivations, one of his main defenses of his actions was the
necessity of provincial naval defense when the Royal Navy’s presence had been lackluster
immediately following Queen Anne’s War. To be certain, Hamilton could draw on his own past
to substantiate this declared aim. During the final months of the war in 1712, Hamilton
dispatched provincial “advice sloops” that acted as intelligence scouts.119 When questioned by
Jamaican politicians in 1716 “what motive he had for granting ten Comissions in ye Space of a
month for Suppressing of Pyrates when a Kings Ship and a Sloop attended this Island,” Hamilton
gave a questionable answer: while he could not remember if one or more of the vessels were
gone, he assumed that they probably were gone at the time, and that the station frigate was in bad
shape.120 In a subsequent 1718 pamphlet, Hamilton clarified this answer and declared that local
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merchants reeling from guarda costa attacks had complained about the “want of Ships of
War...[and desired that] such a Naval Strength may be order'd for the Protection of the Island.”121
Whatever the truth behind Hamilton's accusation, the fact that this was one of his main
arguments of self-defense suggests that this was a common struggle throughout the West Indies.
In a twist of historical irony, Hamilton’s privateer fleet—ostensibly created for provincial
naval security from Spanish ‘pirates’—helped to spearhead the Caribbean theatre of the AngloAmerican ‘Golden Age of Piracy.’ Even though Hamilton had dictated strict parameters in his
letters of marque (including requiring his privateer captains to fly a privateer jack rather than the
Royal Navy union jack), some of his captains eventually turned to outright piracy against their
own countrymen. This group of Anglo-American pirates (including the likes of Benjamin
Hornigold, and Edward “Blackbeard” Teach) would eventually transform the Bahamas into a
major pirate base by 1716.122 Whatever Hamilton’s initial motives in commissioning his
“privateer” fleet, his actions helped to spur on a wave of pirates that would force governors
throughout the West Indies to expand their own provincial fleets to go pirate hunting.
Historians have largely characterized Britain’s immediate reaction to the growing pirate
threat of 1716-1718, ranging from general amnesties to disorganized Royal Navy cruises, as
inadequate. David Wilson has recently argued that Royal authorities did not respond to the pirate
base in the Bahamas for nearly two years primarily because of postwar debt and general
parsimony. By 1718, Wilson argues, Crown authorities finally supported a major campaign
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against the Bahamian pirate base because renowned privateer captain Woodes Rogers and
private investors devised a colonization plan that required “minimal public expenditure.”123
Even though Royal Navy vessels helped Rogers to clear New Providence Island of pirates during
his July landing, by September all of his Royal Navy escorts had departed.124
With few naval defense options remaining, the experienced privateer and new governor
of the Bahamas utilized local naval strength in creative (albeit dangerous) ways. With threats
from Spanish Cuba and the unrepentant English pirate Charles Vane, Governor Rogers resorted
to hiring former pirates including Benjamin Hornigold and John Cockram to hunt down their old
associates, and ultimately met with some operational success. In a late October 1718 letter to the
Board of Trade, Rogers—still bereft of Royal Naval aid, and limited to help from local ex-pirates
and his own private ship the Delicia—suggested that any future Royal Navy vessels sent to the
island should be under the direct command of the local government. With a small Royal Navy
cruiser, Rogers “could joyne a sloop or two and men from the guarrison [sic] with the best of the
people here and soon be out after any pirate…”125
Rogers’ idea of a cooperative Royal-provincial pirate hunting force highlights what
historian Mark Hanna has called “one of the first unified imperial projects.”126 Historians
generally agree that a combination of provincial naval campaigns and Royal Navy cruises helped
to mitigate the worst of the Anglo-American pirate threats by the 1720’s, but David Wilson has
recently made the case that provincial campaigns (ranging from state-hired vessels to individual
merchant captains who fought pirates while on trading journeys) were often more successful than
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Royal Navy cruisers themselves.127 Though “unified” in cause against pirates and guarda costas,
provincial and Royal naval forces were far from unified in mission or tactics in dealing with
these threats.
The uneasy relationship between West Indian privateers, provincial navies, and the Royal
Navy would continue well into the next two decades as campaigns against pirates continued
alongside a larger focus on Spain’s imperial threat. No island better exemplifies occasionally
unified, but more frequently disparate provincial and Royal paths taken against piratical and
Spanish threats than Jamaica’s experience from 1718 to 1729. In December of 1718, a pirate
captain captured a merchant captain with a lucrative cargo, and Governor Sir Nathaniel Lawes
dispatched two provincial crews in pursuit as “none of H.M. ships of war [were] then in
harbour.” Lawes promised the sailors 1/3 of the shares of “whatever was recovered” as
delineated by a recent Royal proclamation against pirates. The crews found the culprit—a
Spanish pirate with a multiethnic crew—and fell back in defeat after a bloody engagement with
over thirty-five sailors killed, and more wounded.128
Soon after this defeat, Lawes informed his council that “Several Merchants had
Voluntarily offered their Sloops Tackle and ffurniture and to fit them out on the Credit of the
Country towards further pursuing the Pyrates...” The council agreed that “three Sloops should be
forthwith sent out...be Arm'd and Victualled by the Government” and that the “Sloops be at the
Risque of the Owners, and Mens Wages as the others had been before.” The council appointed
specific captains, demanded they “Concert together and have the same Commisons and
Instructions as the Two former.” What the council suggested was an interesting combination of a
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governmentally directed naval assignment and a privateering mission guided by the ethos of
“risk and reward.”129
While the new provincial fleet was on its hunt, six Royal Navy warships arrived in
Kingston Harbor. Far from praising the arrival of Royal military aid, Lawes complained to the
Board of Trade that he had little control over the warships’ captains. In one case, Lawes—still
ignorant of the recent declaration of war between Great Britain and Spain—complained that a
Royal Navy captain failed to deliver his letter to the governor of Cuba inquiring about Spanish
attacks on Jamaican shipping.130 Luckily for Lawes, those sloops “fitted out at the charge of the
country in pursuit of the pirate yt. took the ship Kingston, are return'd with pretty good success”
and recovered the vessel without firing a shot. Around the same time, Lawes reported that
Jamaican “privateers have already made application for Commissions to act against the
Spaniards, and I have with the advice of the Council issued some.”131
Throughout the rest of the short-lived War of the Quadruple Alliance and beyond, Lawes
and his successors struggled to harmonize Royal Navy and provincial maritime defense
strategies and goals. This became immediately obvious in the Jamaica government’s decision to
regularly employ guard sloops despite a Royal Navy presence throughout the 1720’s.132
Desperate to fund regular provincial guard sloops while also cutting costs, Lawes informed the
Board of Trade in late 1720 that he had agreed to the Jamaican Assembly’s levies on slave sales
and proposal to tax Jewish residents £1,000 in order to fit two vessels for the “guarding the
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coasts from pirates and other vessells from Trinidado [Cuba] who frequently commit
depradations [sic] and acts of hostility both by sea and land upon us.”133
While the politics surrounding Jamaica’s expansion of its provincial navy could lead to
unjust treatment of its citizenry, they could also alienate Royal Navy officers like Admiral
Edward Vernon. Tensions were already high between Vernon and Lawes’ administration when
Vernon consistently involved himself in local affairs—ranging from attempting to extradite
alleged Jacobites to England for trial to accusing Governor Lawes and his attorney general of
smuggling.134 In late 1720, in a preface for an act to fit out guard sloops, the Jamaican Assembly
made the following barb: “Whereas...H.M. ships of war ordered here for the encouragement of
trade and defence of this Island have not so effectually answered the end for which they were
sent hither...whereby a great many...vessels as well belonging to this his said Island...have been
taken in sight thereof by pirates and vessels fitted out and commissioned by the subjects of the
King of Spain under pretence of guarding their own coast…” Vernon responded to this
accusation in a letter to the Admiralty, claiming that Royal Navy ships were not equipped to
chase after Spanish-sponsored pirates in small craft, and that the Assembly’s accusation was a
“lying preamble.”135 Just as with the arrival of the Royal Navy in South Carolina in the 1720s,
Jamaicans came to believe that not all of their coastal defense measures could be left to imperial
authorities alone. By April of 1721, Lawes was confident enough to brag to London that “I am
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told our adjacent Spanish Governors are grown more cautious in granting commissions to guard
de la coasts especially since the country sloops have been cruiseing round about the Island.”136
Despite this pattern of provincial naval defense in Jamaica, the story of the island’s
maritime defenses in the 1720’s was not one of total animosity with the Royal Navy, and as it
happened the Royal Navy could also be more dependable than their provincial counterparts at
times. For instance, In February of 1724/5, the next governor—Henry Bentinck, the Duke of
Portland—disagreed with the Assembly over various legislation and attributed the failure of a
new coastal security bill to this dispute. The governor bragged that “I have not sufferd your
Coast to lye Naked, The Commadore having at my instance (very readily indeed) commanded
his Majesties Snow to that Station...”137 The duke reported to the Board of Trade that “I prevaild
wth. the Commadore to order one of H.M. sloops to supply the want of the guard sloop,” that the
Assembly accepted this, and hoped to use the initial money for a provincial guard sloop to
suppress an ongoing slave rebellion.138 At least in this case, the Royal Navy was more
dependable in terms of coastal defense than their provincial counterparts.
The disparate views over the best course of naval protection became even more evident in
1726. An anonymous pamphleteer appealed to the Royal government for permission to enact
reprisals against Spanish guarda costas for shipping losses, and later decried the alleged
inactivity of large Royal Navy warships to pursue swift foes, as well as the inability of the island
to keep financing expensive provincial guard sloops. The governor did admit, however, various
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political disagreements with the Lords of Admiralty as well as the “negligent and disrespectfull
behaviour of most of the Sea Officers” in the area.139 The pamphleteer and the governor may
have disagreed over the Royal Navy’s use in hunting guarda costas, but they both highlighted
major problems that threatened the province’s naval security: heavy financial costs for provincial
officials in outfitting local defense fleets, and personal disputes between local officials and
Royal Navy officers.
Notwithstanding the lack of cohesion between provincial forces and the Royal Navy,
both Anglo-American and Royal officials in Jamaica continued to rely on this uneasy balance of
provincial and Royal Naval protection when a second (though largely uneventful) imperial
conflict broke out again with Spain in 1726. While its causes were imperial disputes in Europe,
local tensions in the West Indies—particularly an uptick in guarda costa attacks—provided a
tense American background for this renewed (though brief) war.140 From 1726 to 1727, Vice
Admiral Francis Hosier led an infamous attempt to blockade the Spanish treasure fleet in Porto
Bello, Panama. Over three thousand Royal Navy sailors, including Hosier himself, would die
from an epidemic of yellow fever during the failed blockade.141
Jamaican participation in Hosier’s campaign was limited, but when King George II sent a
letter in the spring of 1729 warning that Spain had plans to invade the island, Jamaican
authorities scrambled to ready both the Royal Navy and to expand local maritime defenses. The
Jamaican government’s naval defense plan proved that provincial and Royal Navy vessels could
operate in tandem on a large scale if needed. On 7 April 1729, Commodore St. Loe promised
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Jamaican Governor Robert Hunter that he “shall be ready to come into any Measure with Your
Excellency for its safety, and shall keep those Ships that are with me in readiness to go upon any
Service...” and already had some of his vessels scouting for Spanish fleets around the island.
While these ships were cruising, Governor Hunter devised a plan for the defense of
Kingston Harbor that relied almost entirely on merchant vessels. He proposed quickly training
sailors from each ship to operate artillery at the fort, and that various merchant vessels should be
armed, reinforced, and strategically placed to prevent landings. In the case of a successful
Spanish incursion, the merchant captains were to fall back to Kingston and land their men. The
merchant captains were to keep a “strict discipline amongst their People according to the Law of
Arms,” and financial insurance would be provided for wounded sailors and the families of sailors
killed in action. His council agreed to these proposals, and only added that sailors on land would
be put under the command of the local militia.142 While no Spanish invasion would reach
Jamaica’s shores, Governor Hunter’s simultaneous reliance on Royal Navy cruisers for external
scouting and merchant vessels for emergency defense exemplified the ways in which a Royalprovincial naval alliance could work on the field.
Even after the short War of the Quadruple Alliance concluded in 1729, Anglo-American
officials in Jamaica and other islands would still rely on both Royal Navy and provincial naval
forces to combat guarda costas. Historian Richard Harding has found that of the seventy-seven
British vessels taken by guarda costas between 1713 and 1731, 34% of these vessels were taken
after 1727. Negotiations in the early 1730s between Spain and Britain to end both English
smuggling and Spanish guarda costa activity failed, and Spain and France renewed their ancient
alliance in 1733—a worrisome prospect for the Walpole Administration.143
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Just as tensions were heating up with Spain, Rear Admiral Charles Stewart agreed to
dispatch Royal Navy warships to seek restitution for Jamaica ships that had been taken by
guarda costas in the autumn of 1732.144 Even this newly proactive stance did not eliminate the
need for provincial naval activity. A few months after this decision, a Spanish vessel seized an
English sloop in the harbor of Port Morant Jamaica, and “Two Sloops were immediately order'd
to go in quest of the said Pirate.”145 Though the master of the sloop was released by the Spanish
and restitution made, Anglo-American authorities had still felt it necessary to send what were
likely provincial sloops out to look for the missing merchant.146
Despite growing Royal Naval involvement in the region by the early 1730s, provincial
naval activity continued in many areas. In early 1735, a Spanish guarda costa with over 120
Hands “most Negroes and Mollattoes” with two prize sloops in tow, attacked an English sloop
and forced it to run ashore on the Isle of Saba. His “Excellency General Matthew...instantly
fitted out a Sloop of his own with sixty Men to go in quest of the Pirate and her prizes.” Even
though he could not find the guarda costa, the "Example was followed by another gentleman
who fitted out a Sloop at his own Expence,” but did not have enough sailors himself. With the
guarda costa still at large, “till better Measures can be thought of, out of his great Generosity, is
fitting out his Sloop a second time for the Security of the homeward-bound Ships...”147 Even at
this late date, merely four years before the next great imperial contest (the War of Jenkin’s Ear),
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West Indian officials still felt the need to fit out small provincial vessels “till better Measures”
(perhaps adequate Royal Naval assistance) could be thought of.
From 1713 to 1739, colonial governors and assemblies in the West Indies juggled various
maritime defense options, ranging from commission privateers to developing standing provincial
navies to relying on Royal Navy assistance. With major threats from Anglo-American pirates
and Spanish guarda costas, they came to rely on a loose combination of provincial and Royal
Naval responses to these enemies. While imperial authorities did not discourage provincial naval
activity, their restrained naval response to these threats perpetuated regional instability in the
West Indies and forced provincial governors to use their own resources to defend their shores—
and to help secure the West Indies for the Empire at large.
From the end of Queen Anne’s War in 1713 to the beginning of the War of Jenkin’s Ear
in 1739, Anglo-American officials on Britain’s North American borderlands and in the West
Indies navigated a maelstrom of piratical, Native, and imperial maritime threats by developing
flexible systems of provincial naval defense. Though occasionally deploying privateers, colonial
officials on the contested borderlands of New England, Nova Scotia, and South Carolina
depended on centrally controlled emergency fleets and guard vessels to pursue Abenaki,
Yamassee, and Anglo-American raiders. While occasionally outfitting guard vessels like their
continental brethren, West Indian officials dispatched impressed vessels, privateers, and guarda
costas and pirates. Though imperial officials expanded the Royal Navy’s physical presence
throughout the Atlantic world in the interwar period, parsimony, operational difficulties, and a
guiding ethos of military restraint ensured that provincial naval forces would be necessary to
secure the empire’s maritime security in the interwar period.
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Chapter III. The War of Jenkin’s Ear and the Incomplete ‘Royalization’ of Provincial
Navies, 1739-1754
When Great Britain declared war on Spain in 1739 after nearly a generation of relative
peace with its traditional foes, few imperial officials could have expected a nine-year conflict
that would ultimately pit them against the French as well. This conflict, the War of Jenkin’s Ear
(which eventually bled into a larger imperial and European conflict called the War of the
Austrian Succession/King George’s War) was different from the wars against Louis XIV in that
it was largely inspired by maritime tensions.1 By the late 1730s, after a series of failed
negotiations over British navigation rights and Spanish guarda costa activity, Prime Minister
Robert Walpole’s political foes convinced his ministry to declare war on the Spanish.2
This fight against the Spanish had roots in navigation disputes in the West Indies, but also
in territorial disputes on the North American mainland that directly involved provincial naval
forces. With borderland conflicts common between South Carolina (Britain’s southernmost
colony) and the Spanish and their Native allies throughout the last century, British statesman
James Edward Oglethorpe and other imperial officials planned a ‘buffer’ colony for the region
south of South Carolina called Georgia. Pleased with this arrangement, South Carolina’s
legislature immediately sent the scout boat Carolina with ten sailors to protect Georgia’s earliest
settlers in early 1733. The Carolina—along with several other small provincial vessels—would
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prove to be vital in Oglethorpe’s provocative military expansion south of Savannah at Frederica,
Georgia in 1736.3
British expansion in Georgia (backed by provincial naval craft) inflamed Spanish
authorities at St. Augustine, and competing Anglo-Spanish claims on the Georgia coast had all
the potential to blow up into all-out war. This border dispute took on greater imperial dimensions
when Oglethorpe and his Spanish counterpart, Governor Francisco de Moral y Sánchez, agreed
to cease expansion and let their respective overlords in Europe decide the Florida-Georgia line.
The British Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle, took a hard line against rumored Spanish
military plans to invade Georgia and promised to protect the fledgling colony. He also secured
Oglethorpe a place as the overall military commander of both South Carolina and Georgia. When
Spain demanded a complete British withdrawal from Georgia, pro-war politicians and even King
George II agreed to send Royal Navy reinforcements and British troops to the New World.4 It is
telling that British military expansion in Georgia—largely contingent on provincial naval
assistance—would ultimately help propel the British Empire to war against Spain in 1739.
Any study of provincial navies in the War of Jenkin’s Ear must consider the massive
expansion of the Royal Navy’s war making capabilities in this period. By all accounts, the Royal
Navy had achieved “naval supremacy” by the end of the war in 1748.5 When the Newcastle
ministry made the final push for war in 1739, the Royal Navy had over 117 vessels in serviceable
or nearly serviceable condition, twenty of which were stationed in North America and the West
Indies. In terms of finance, Walpole’s reduction of the national debt in the interwar period
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coupled with a decades-old banking and finance system allowed Britain to bankroll the war
effort.6 Logistical improvements also occurred throughout the war, including the direct
Admiralty takeover of victualling for Royal Navy ships in Jamaica—a task that had previously
been handled by inefficient private merchants.7
The Royal Navy’s leadership also made leaps towards professionalization during the
nine-year conflict, although the Admiralty’s transformation of the Navy into a more regimented
and uniform fighting force would take years to complete. In late 1744, when the Duke of
Bedford became the first Lord of the Admiralty, he brought with him a host of new Admiralty
Lords (Anson, Sandwich, and Grenville) that one scholar has described as a “generation of
politician administrators.” Between the mid-1740s and early 1750s, the new admiralty politicos
successfully cemented the Admiralty at the helm of Britain’s disorganized naval bureaucratic
web, instituted stricter discipline for the navy, advocated for more offensive naval warfare
(particularly in North America), ordered officers to wear uniforms for the first time, and ordered
the construction of more powerful warships.8
Coinciding with the Royal Navy’s administrative reform and expansion in the War of
Jenkin’s Ear was the massive growth of privateering. In fact, there were more privateers in the
War of Jenkin’s Ear than in any previous conflict. Even though Britain encouraged the practice,
it struggled to codify and enforce new regulations on the rapidly growing practice.9 Historian
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Carl Swanson holds that privateering was especially popular with empires during this period as
“belligerents' sea power was augmented, yet national treasuries did not have to pay the cost.”10
While privateering expanded during this conflict more than ever, so too did the
proliferation of colony-funded provincial navies. While borderland colonies had funded some
small provincial forces in the interwar period, the war prompted Anglo-American provinces
between Nova Scotia and Barbados to fund guard vessels and local navies on a much larger scale
than ever before. Dozens of small, medium, and large provincial warships (e.g. the South
Carolina galley Charles Town, the Massachusetts frigate Massachusetts, and the Rhode Island
sloop Tartar) patrolled shipping routes, intercepted enemy privateers, and spearheaded naval
assaults on enemy ports such as Fortress Louisbourg and St. Augustine. In essence, provincial
naval forces returned to the offensive and defensive tasks they had taken up in Queen Anne’s
War, but on a much larger scale. For instance, for the first time, Massachusetts provincial vessels
hunted for Spanish prey as far south as the Carolinas, and Rhode Island’s guard sloop transported
its colony’s troops to the West Indies for operations in Cuba.11
What is especially astounding for this era, however, is the scale on which provincial
navies from various American colonies cooperated with one another, and the extent to which
Anglo-Americans throughout the British Atlantic became aware of other provinces’ naval
activities. Much of this can be attributed to the growth in trade and correspondence in the
decades leading up to the War of Jenkin’s Ear. By 1740, increasingly regularized ship traffic
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along with mail and newspaper circulation increased in the Atlantic world and transformed the
British Empire “from a rimless wheel of dissimilar trades into a linked community…”12 In this
growing Atlantic web of commerce and travel, Anglo-Americans became aware of other
colonies’ provincial naval efforts, and shared experiences of coastal defense. Take for instance a
1743 South Carolina newspaper report that “The Boston Province Snow (Prince of Orange
[Italics mine]) commanded by Capt. [Edward] Tyng, was spoke with on Wednesday last,
cruizing off our Bar.”13 Where provincial navies had operated on mostly regional terms before,
by the 1740s, colonial vessels had begun to patrol waters far beyond their regional homeports.
The fact that Anglo-Americans from multiple colonies began to coordinate provincial
naval warfare on a large scale reflects larger sociopolitical trends occurring throughout the
British Atlantic world at the time. By the 1730s, the British government had come to expect
Anglo-Americans to defend themselves, but also had become willing to deploy large Royal
military forces in the New World. Even though the Admiralty stationed more Royal Navy guard
vessels in the colonies, the King's ships were not able to fully meet the colonies' wartime defense
needs—a factor that inspired the continued growth of provincial guard ships alongside an
increasing Royal Navy presence in North America. The contemporary metropolitan policy of
encouraging colonial participation in battle alongside Royal forces inspired the Walpole
ministry’s 1739-1740 plan to attack an unspecified major Spanish port in the West Indies with
both the Royal Navy, British regulars and a large force of provincial soldiers from several
colonies. This force famously met defeat in its attempt to take the Spanish South American port
of Cartagena.14
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Notwithstanding the ultimate failure of the expedition, the British government not only
expected the bulk of Anglo-Americans to build a large army to attack a distant target, but also to
“provide victuals, transports, and all other necessaries” for the American soldiers sent to the
West Indies until the Crown could reimburse the colonies. British authorities also promised
assistance by Royal Navy commissioners in finding private transports.15 From the precipice of
the conflict, imperial officials counted on some level of provincial naval transport for American
troops. Nevertheless, this growing imperial reliance on provincial naval assistance would be
tempered by the British government’s unwillingness to create a coherent policy or strategy
regarding Anglo-American navies.
Throughout the War of Jenkin’s Ear, two seemingly divergent trends emerged that would
forever change the Royal-provincial naval defense partnership. On the one hand, Parliament’s
willingness to bankroll some provincial fleets and expeditions demonstrated metropolitan
recognition of the importance of Anglo-American sea power for the first time. On the other hand,
vagueness in Parliamentary legislation regarding prize distribution coupled with Royal Navy
misconduct throughout the war angered Anglo-American officials, limited the utility of joint
expeditions, and set the stage for future conflict between Americans and the Royal Navy.16
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“Where the King’s Ships Are Not:” Provincial Naval Warfare in the Southern Colonies,
and Imperial Involvement, 1739-44

Maritime tensions were the main causes of the War of Jenkin’s Ear. Nevertheless,
throughout much of the first half of the conflict, Royal Navy vessels failed to adequately protect
the North American shoreline from Spanish privateers—prompting nearly universal adoption of
provincial guardships, and growing awareness amongst Anglo-Americans of their own (and their
neighbors’) maritime potential. After paying scant attention to colonial naval defense concerns
for the first few years of the conflict, outcries over Royal Navy negligence on the Carolina
station coupled with General Oglethorpe’s campaign for financial compensation for outfitting a
provincial navy inspired Parliament to support provincial naval forces for the first major time.
In an April 1740 report to the Board of Trade, Royal customs surveyor and administrator,
Robert Dinwiddie, estimated that Anglo-Americans from Newfoundland to the West Indies
operated over 2,000 seagoing vessels, while British vessels travelling to the colonies numbered
around 1,000. Dinwiddie guessed there were around 24,680 sailors operating out of Britain’s
Atlantic colonies at that time.17 Whatever the accuracy of this report, by the beginning of the
War of Jenkin’s Ear, imperial officials—and Britons at large—were becoming increasingly
aware of the scale of growing provincial naval capabilities.
This growing awareness is also evident in an April 1740 pamphlet by Irish newsman and
printer, George Faulkner. Faulkner argued that the American colonies were “so well peopled,
and have such a Number of Ships and Sailors, that they are both able and willing to put out 40 or
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50 large Ships of Force at their own Expence.” He maintained that if governments from New
England to the West Indies should provide over forty galleys “built in the Nature of the French
or Spanish Gallies, their Men exercised to Arms as our Foot are,” they could capture St.
Augustine and other Spanish ports. Faulkner contended that these swift oared vessels—with
roots in Greco-Roman navies of antiquity—would be suitable for action in the West Indies as
they had been in the Mediterranean for millennia, and that provincial naval efforts would give
the Royal Navy more room to operate elsewhere. Faulkner would later claim that “What gives
us the greater Certainty of Success in this War, is, the great Strength and vast Trade our
Plantations in America have acquired since the last War...,” but did admit Royal military
assistance would still be necessary to some extent.18
While Faulkner’s assumptions that Spanish ports could be easily taken by provincial
fleets were belied by the various defeats Anglo-Americans would face throughout the war, he
was far from the only European to appreciate Anglo-Americans’ growing provincial maritime
power at the time. A few years later in April of 1745, Admiral Peter Warren—a Royal Navy
official who had previously worked alongside provincial fleets in the failed attack on St.
Augustine in 1740 and who would soon fight alongside them in the siege of Louisbourg—wrote
Whitehall should encourage every colony to fit out their own provincial navies that would be on
the “same footing” as Royal ships.19
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Problematically, imperial officials never created such a standard policy based on
Warren’s suggestion, and provincial officials continued their forebears’ policy of funding local
navies on their own. In fact, Anglo-Americans not only took the initiative to defend their coasts
from growing numbers of Spanish privateers, but began to appreciate and study the naval efforts
of their neighbors for the first time.20 The scale of this universal provincial naval response is best
illustrated by Lt. Governor George Thomas’s (and his successors’) long battles with the Quakerdominated Pennsylvania Assembly over maritime defense.
In 1741, Thomas complained to the assembly that it would be “very disreputable to this
Province...to remain inactive, When Boston, Rhode Island, & New York, are fitting out Vessels
of fforce [sic] to secure their Navigation by attacking the Enemy.” Three years later (after France
joined the Spanish in the war against the British), Thomas—still at odds with the Quakers over
the same issue—argued that Pennsylvania should fit out a provincial guard ship to fight
privateers as “the Governments of New-England, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, enter'd early
into this Method…Virginia has been lately obliged, from the Disability of the King's Ships upon
that Station to do the same.” Thomas also argued that the Royal Navy’s protection was
inadequate.21 With growing news that other colonies built provincial navies, Thomas contended
that Pennsylvania’s very honor as an English colony was at stake.
While Thomas’s pleas to the assembly reveal growing provincial awareness of AngloAmerican naval power throughout the course of the conflict, it was his temporary successor—
acting President Anthony Palmer—who best summarized the state of provincial naval activity by
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the end of the war. In the summer of 1748, Palmer tried to convince the Assembly that the
colony should fit out a “Ship-of-War” to assist a Royal Navy sloop in the area. After all, the
“neighbouring Colonies of New England, New York, Virginia, South Carolina, or the West India
Islands...have almost all at times found it necessary, notwithstanding the Guardships station'd
among them, to fit out Vessels of War to act in conjunction with those Guardships, or
independant [sic] of them as Circumstances required.” Not only were those vessels useful,
“being immediately under the Command of their respective Governments...obliged to
Cruize...where...the King's Ships are not,” but they were also signs that a colony was not
unwilling to “do all in its own Power” to assist Royal military efforts.22 In essence, by 1748,
provincial naval defense was not only a wartime necessity for many Anglo-Americans, but a
necessary show of loyalty to the Crown.
Naval operations in South Carolina and Georgia in the first four years of the conflict (c.
1740-1744) illustrate not only the tensions between provincial and Royal Navy forces, but the
events that led Parliament to consider funding provincial naval forces for the first time. General
James Oglethorpe in Georgia and his colleagues in South Carolina had long depended on a loose
confederation of standing provincial navies (largely centered around both colonies’ scout boat
systems) and Royal Navy guard ships. Francis Moore, an English travel writer who spent time in
Georgia before the war broke out, described the prewar responsibilities of provincial naval forces
on the Georgia coast and the sorts of sailors who manned Oglethorpe’s scout boats. He wrote
that a scout boat was a “strong-built swift Boat, with three swivel Guns and ten Oars, kept for the
visiting the River-Passages, and Islands, and for preventing the Incursions of Enemies, or
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Runaways…” Regarding the sailors, he wrote that the crew was composed of men “bred in
America, bold and hardy, who lie out in the Woods...Most of them are good Hunters or
Fishers...”23 All told, by 1736, Oglethorpe employed around four small crews of Georgia and
South Carolina scout boat and periagua sailors. These vessels operated under Oglethorpe’s
direction independently, but also at times in tandem with the resident Royal Navy sloop Hawk.24
Paying for this substantial provincial fleet was more complicated in Georgia than in
colonies with governors and assemblies. Georgia was technically a private colony run by a board
of Trustees in London, but these Trustees depended on substantial yearly Parliamentary grants
for the colony’s civil and military maintenance. By 1738, Walpole promised the Trustees that the
imperial government would cover the colony’s military costs if the Trustees continued to apply
to Parliament for grants for non-military costs.25 Despite this assurance, no immediate funds
came from London for local forces, and Oglethorpe ended up personally funding his provincial
navy for the first few years of the conflict while holding out hope that Parliament would
eventually reimburse him.26
Oglethorpe’s naval activities were closely followed by British observers from the very
beginning of the war. The 1740 edition of the widely circulated news journal The Gentleman's
Magazine reported that British privateers were beginning to use Frederica, Georgia as a base to
raid Spanish shipping. Additionally, it reported that in November of 1739, Spanish raiders
massacred and decapitated some of Oglethorpe's Scottish highlander rangers. One of
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Oglethorpe's scout boats reported the alarm to the general, and Oglethorpe immediately “ordered
several Boats to be got ready, by which we imagine he intends to retaliate this Hostility.”27
It was earlier in that tense Autumn of 1739 that Oglethorpe received King George’s
military instructions: to “make an Attempt upon the Spanish Settlement at St Augustine” if he
could get the cooperation of the South Carolina government, and to encourage privateering
against Spanish shipping.28 While Oglethorpe would ultimately lead a major siege of the Spanish
city with naval and infantry assistance from both South Carolina and the Royal Navy throughout
the first half of 1740, the expedition—like the contemporaneous attack on Cartagena de las
Indias—was an utter failure. In the immediate months and years following the defeat,
contemporaries and historians alike have argued over who was most responsible for the
campaign’s failure.29 Despite controversy over the defeat and tensions between provincial and
Royal forces, the unsuccessful siege inspired long-lasting innovations in the provincial naval
capabilities of both South Carolina and Georgia.
From the very beginning of the joint campaign, tensions were high. After a successful
raid on Spanish forts north of St. Augustine in the late winter, a confident Oglethorpe implored
South Carolina to assist him with the capture of the Spanish capital. Even though Oglethorpe and
Royal Navy Captain Vincent Pearce consistently tried to convince South Carolina authorities to
commit sufficient funds and troops to assist in the siege, it would not be until early April that
they agreed to send assistance—notably refusing to provide engineers or a deadline for when

27

The Gentleman's Magazine: And Historical Chronicle, Volume X, For the Year M.DCCXL (London:
Edw. Cave, 1740), p. 139.
28
“Instructions for Governor Oglethorpe” (Order, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/654 Part 1
[[1739]]/10/09).
http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_654_Part1_085 and
Rodney E. Baine, “General James Oglethorpe and the Expedition Against St. Augustine,” The Georgia Historical
Quarterly Vol. 84, N0. 2 (Summer 2000), p. 201. Jstor https://www.jstor.org/stable/40584271
29
For a good overview of the historiography of the siege up to the 21st-century, see Baine’s “General James
Oglethorpe and the Expedition Against St. Augustine.”

123

they would be ready. Even when the South Carolina legislature agreed to provide assistance, they
still required an immediate loan from Oglethorpe in pounds sterling to outfit their troops and
vessels.30
Despite this haggling, Benjamin Franklin’s Pennsylvania Gazette reported in May that
by early April “the [South Carolina] General Assembly have empower'd...the Lieutenant
Governor to raise a Regiment of Foot, and a Troop of Rangers to assist General Oglethorpe...in
Conjunction with several of his Majesty’s Ships of War: as also to provide Sloops, Boats, Guns”
and other necessities.31 Indeed, contemporary estimates of both colonies’ provincial fleets during
the expedition highlight the scale of this undertaking. In April of 1740, Oglethorpe reported that
he employed three sloops, a long boat, a schooner, and numerous armed small boats including a
“Colony Periagua being a Guard De Coast.” This fleet included over 140 sailors and officers,
and cost Oglethorpe an extraordinary sum of £453 a month.32 South Carolina’s government
provided an armed schooner with 54 “Volunteers and their [enslaved] Negroes,” and numerous
“Craft, Viz: 3 Sloops, one of which attended the [Royal Navy] Men of War,” with 20 sailors in
total, and “14 Schooners and Decked Boats” which employed over 56 armed men and sailors.33
While the Pennsylvania Gazette bragged that the naval efforts were done in
“conjunction” with the Royal Navy, provincial officials largely placed their naval forces under
the command of Commodore Vincent Pearce—captain of the H.M.S. Flamborough, and at least
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eight other frigates and smaller Royal Navy vessels.34 Pearce and his squadron’s general
relationship with provincial authorities and forces can best be described as tense. Throughout this
campaign and the rest of the war, southern provincial authorities and Royal Navy commanders
recognized that Royal Navy forces needed provincial naval assistance, but regularly clashed over
logistics and tactics. One major operational tension was anger over Royal Navy impressment
policies. Even though Parliament had banned impressment in American colonies in 1708 with
the ‘Sixth of Anne,’ Admiralty officials stopped requiring personnel-depleted Royal Navy station
captains to follow this act by the mid-1720’s. These impressments continued throughout the war,
and Parliament gave them official sanction in 1746 when it condoned impressment in mainland
North America, but banned it in the more lucrative West Indies colonies—a double standard that
infuriated many Anglo-Americans.35
While colonial governments did still periodically opt to “Impress a Sufficient number of
men and make provision for their subsistence” to man provincial navy vessels, Royal Navy
impressment was far more frequent and far more unpopular.36 This sentiment was particularly
evident during the preparations for the attack on St. Augustine. A privateer named Captain Davis
sailed south to Tybee Island, Georgia, after “his Men [were] impressed into the Men of War, and
himself engaged in much Controversy at Law...[which] put a full End now to any farther
Thoughts about privateering…” He chose to “admit the Sloop he had with him into the publick
Service, among so many others employed” by Oglethorpe. Davis’s decision to join Oglethorpe’s
provincial navy not only hints at the possibility that provincial service could be an occasional
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escape from Royal Navy impressment, but also highlights the malleability between independent
privateering and provincial navies.37
In a more extreme case, the South Carolina Gazette claimed that on 17 May, a press gang
from the H.M.S Tartar tried to impress several sailors from the merchant ship Caesar in Charles
Town Harbor, and in an ensuing scuffle, Royal sailors killed one of the merchant men.38
Governor William Bull wanted to have the man responsible for the killing put on trial, but the
Royal Navy captain and his crew set sail for St. Augustine before proceedings could begin. This
evasion of the law, argues military historian James P. Herson, “made for bad press and may have
contributed to poor contemporary and historical hindsight…” regarding the siege—and
particularly regarding Pearce and his Royal Navy squadron.39
While impressment surely soured some contemporary and future scholarly opinions of
Pearce and his squadron, by all accounts the provincial and Royal Navies largely cooperated
before, during, and even after the disastrous siege. Royal Navy officers also continued to
recognize the utility of provincial navies throughout the campaign. For instance, in late 1739,
Captain Peter Warren (who would eventually serve under Pearce's command at the siege) and the
crew of the H.M.S. Squirrel had captured a Spanish schooner, and Warren asked the South
Carolina government to operate the schooner with ten local sailors as an “Advice Boat to bring
any Intelligence...for the Service of this Government.”40
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During the preparations for the siege in the spring of 1740, Pearce himself surveyed one
Captain Thomas Walker’s schooner at Governor Bull's request, and made the case that “it would
be best for the Province if she should be bought.” The colony never purchased the vessel.
Nevertheless, a few months later during the final weeks of the siege, Pearce wrote Governor Bull
and asked him for the schooner’s presence to assist the Royal Navy flotilla. The governor not
only hired Walker’s schooner, but fitted it with provincial sailors to assist the Royal forces.41 It is
worth noting that the South Carolina government agreed to this task despite having previously
purchased another schooner (the Pearl), which was captained by a Royal Navy officer, and was
likely crewed by local sailors.42 All in all, it seems Royal Navy officers were more than happy to
utilize South Carolina’s provincial naval resources—whether through unpopular methods of
impressment, or more routine requests for provincial vessels to assist Royal Navy ships.
While provincial and Royal forces faced many challenges throughout the several weeks
of the siege, one of their primary obstacles was the presence of six well-armed Spanish halfgalleys in St. Augustine’s Matanzas’s Bay. In a stroke of fortune for the Governor Manuel de
Montiano, Cuba's governor had agreed to send him the six sleek vessels, and nearly two-hundred
sailors. This assistance came during a period in April when no British ships were patrolling the
Florida coast—a critical mistake during the preparations for the siege. These half-galleys had
cannons at fore and aft, but Montiano added guns on their starboard and port sides as well. These
swift vessels, with only one mast each and a shallow draft, allowed the St. Augustine garrison
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nearly total command of Matanzas Bay by the time Oglethorpe’s invasion force arrived by early
May.43
By early June, Commodore Pearce feared the upcoming hurricane season, and warned
Oglethorpe that he could only expect Royal Navy assistance into early July. By mid-June, this
impending deadline, combined with sundry mishaps including the Spanish defeat of the English
garrison at nearby Fort Mose and the Royal Navy’s failure to prevent Spanish ships from
resupplying the city’s garrison, left provincial leaders desperate for a quick solution to taking the
well-fortified town.44 Throughout much of the second half of June, Colonel Alexander
Vanderdussen—overall commander of South Carolina’s troops—continuously offered to
spearhead a joint provincial-Royal Navy assault on the Spanish half-galleys. With support from
Captain Warren, Vanderdussen promised Commodore Pearce that he could provide at least eight
small boats and various canoes to transport his troops, to transport his men alongside the Royal
Navy. Pearce wavered between supporting and dismissing the attack, but ultimately decided the
assault would be too dangerous. Within days, storms forced the warships out to sea, Cuban
resupply vessels once more made it to the St. Augustine garrison, and the siege was all but
over.45
Contemporaries and historians have long debated whether provincial forces or the Royal
Navy was more culpable for the ignominious withdrawal from the siege in early July. Historian
Trevor Reese makes the convincing case that imperial support for the expedition was limited as
most Royal Navy forces in the Americas were concerned with the concurrent siege of Cartagena
de las Indias. Reese contends that imperial preference for control over the more lucrative Spanish
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West Indies prevailed over provincial North American desires for a strong assault on St.
Augustine.46 Whatever fault imperial authorities had for the failure, many of the leading figures
in the siege blamed each other for the defeat. Historian Douglas Edward Leach observes that
between 1740 and 1743, South Carolinians, British army officers, and Oglethorpe’s allies
engaged in a pamphlet war over the controversy.47 Indeed, in one example, a South Carolina
legislative committee complained that Commodore Pearce was “always declaring himself ready
to give any assistance but never giving any at all,” and was unreasonable in his dismissal of
Vanderdussen's plan of attack. Perhaps most damning, the Commodore had left South Carolina's
“Province Schooner,” (presumably the Pearl) to “shift for herself” at the mouth of Matanzas Bay
without any assistance from the Royal Navy.48
Whatever criticism South Carolina legislators had for specific Royal Navy commanders,
the colony’s Commons House of Assembly still admitted a firm reliance on imperial protection.
In a letter to King George II immediately following the withdrawal from St. Augustine,
provincial legislators lamented the expedition’s costs, but thanked the monarch for the
“Assistance of so many of your Majesty's Ships of War, the good Effect of which we have
already in many Instances, experienced.”49 Both Pearce’s requests for provincial schooners, and
provincial willingness to place local ships and crews under the commands of Royal Navy
officers demonstrated some of this “Good effect.” Even in the wake of disaster, provincial-Royal
Naval cooperation was possible to some degree, if clouded by infighting.
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With little time to recuperate from the defeat at St. Augustine in 1740, Lt. Governor Bull
in South Carolina and General Oglethorpe in Georgia both had to adapt their provincial naval
establishments to increasing waves of privateer attacks against the two colonies’ shipping. In
fact, historian Carl Swanson has attributed the British failure at St. Augustine to an increased
onslaught against the Carolina coast. This wave of enemy privateering between 1740 and 1742
stretched as far north as New York. By the end of the war, Spanish and French privateers would
capture 736 English vessels in North America and the West Indies. Swanson suggests that while
Royal Navy station ships did cruise after enemy privateers throughout the war, the task was
sometimes too large for the navy to handle.50
Despite the Admiralty Board’s October 1740 instructions for Royal Navy ships to expand
their patrols off the South Carolina and Georgia coasts, their presence was inadequate to defend
local commerce. Provincial anger at alleged Royal Navy indolence would inspire repeated
provincial petitions for greater naval assistance from London.51 This is evident in Lt. Governor
Bull’s October 1741 letter to the Duke of Newcastle, Lt. Governor Bull, wherein he decried
“...the Interruption [Spanish privateers] give to the Trade of this Province; more especially at this
time when his Majesty's Ship Phoenix is unfit for service...[and] his Majesty's Ship Tartar” was
due to leave soon—a fact that would leave the province defenceless and ripe for raiding. Even
when the Carolina Royal Navy station ships pursued Spanish privateers, they evaded capture by
sailing into shallow water. Lt. Governor Bull pleaded with the Duke of Newcastle to send
material and laborers to help build shallow-water galleys to pursue these privateers.52 If imperial
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authorities provided materials to build light-draft and swift row galleys, South Carolina’s
government could potentially save money on vessel construction while also fighting enemy
vessels in shoal waters where Royal Navy frigates were unable to sail.
In fact, Bull’s desire to expand the colony’s small-boat service extended back to July of
1740. Immediately following the retreat from St. Augustine in July, the governor informed the
Commons House that:
“When I consider the Situation of our Southern Frontier...by the Spaniards in their Row Galleys,
which are capable of coming into any of our Inlets...where our larger Vessels cannot get at them;
and be ready to intersept any of our Craft, and also encourage the Desertion of our Slaves...The
best and cheapest Way to disappoint such Attempts would be to [have] 4 or 6 Boats fitted with a
6 Pounder, and several Swivel Guns, Oars…”53
In essence, Bull not only feared that Spanish light craft would raid local commerce, but
that they would foment social disarray by encouraging slaves to run away from plantations. This
warning should have concerned the planter-heavy Commons House. Only a year before,
enslaved Africans along the Stono River—just a few miles south of Charles Town—rose up
against their masters and killed several inhabitants in what would become known as the ‘Stono
Rebellion.’ The rebels tried to flee south to Spanish Florida where the governor had promised
freedom to any English-held slave that made it to St. Augustine. In their journey southward, the
rebels tried to hold off South Carolina militiamen that had been sent to pursue them, but they
were overpowered. Soon thereafter, South Carolina authorities executed the captured rebels.54
Despite fears of ongoing slave revolts, the Assembly initially tabled the governor’s plans
for a galley fleet. By mid-December, the assembly agreed to ask the King for six galleys while
also reluctantly agreeing to fund local construction of two of the craft. The reasoning for this
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move is unclear, but perhaps provincial authorities hoped for greater imperial assistance while
providing for the possibility of being refused.55 Whatever the assembly’s reasoning, the move to
finance local galleys was ultimately sound. While the Board of Trade ultimately forwarded the
colony’s request for galleys to the Duke of Newcastle, there is no indication he ever agreed to the
proposal, and Lt. Governor Bull was still campaigning for Royal involvement in the project by
the end of 1741.56 In the spring of 1741, General Oglethorpe also requested galleys (among other
supplies) from the home government and lamented the lack of Royal Navy protection on the
Georgia station. Imperial officials ultimately did not grant his requests either.57
All in all, the British government’s opinion on the colonies’ provincial navies by the end
of 1742 is best summed up by the Privy Council’s decision in November of that year to not
provide cannon for South Carolina’s two newly built galleys (the Beaufort and the Charles
Town). Upon reviewing a plea from Lt. Governor Bull to provide nine-pound cannon for the
vessels, a committee from the Privy Council deliberated on the matter for nearly a year with the
colony’s agent and with the Ordnance Board, and finally came to the conclusion that “as these
[row galleys] are intended to Secure the Inland passages of the Province the said Board
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conceives that the Inhabitants ought to furnish themselves with such Ordnance otherwise the rest
of His Majestys Colonys may hereafter Solicit the like favour.”58 This default assumption that
Anglo-Americans should fund their own provincial navies mirrored the Admiralty’s 1724 refusal
to assist a Nova Scotia provincial guard ship, and declaration that “when vessels have been fitted
out by the Governors of his Majesty's Islands or Plantations abroad, the inhabitants have borne
the charge thereof.”59
Whereas British authorities expected South Carolina’s “Inhabitants” to fund and crew the
galleys, it is worth examining who the “inhabitants” of the colony were that crewed these two
small warships. The surprising amount of demographic information on the galleys’ crews allows
us a rare opportunity to examine the diverse backgrounds of sailors within the South Carolina
provincial navy. Early on in their service in the summer 1742, neither galley was well-manned,
and one of the crews on the provincial establishment was as small as three men. Realizing he
needed a light craft to accompany him on one of his cruises, Royal Navy Captain Hamar of the
H.M.S. Flamborough felt “Obliged to Man her Out of His Majesty's Ship under my Comand.”60
By July of 1742, provincial authorities hastily impressed and recruited soldiers, sailors,
and ships for a relief mission to aid General Oglethorpe as Spanish forces invaded Georgia.
News reports and subsequent petitions indicated that there were 126 white and 14 black men
(presumably enslaved and free, but sources are unclear) on both galleys. While these unusually
large crews likely indicated the presence of soldiers being transported southward in addition to
sailors, these numbers also likely attest to the racial diversity of the naval crews as well.61

58
Acts of the Privy Council of England, Colonial Series, Vol. III, A.D. 1720-1745 (London: His Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1910), W.L. Grant, James Munro, and Sir Almeric W. Fitzroy, eds. pp. 708-709. It should be
noted that imperial authorities had previously promised to recompense colonies involved in the Cartagena of
59
See previous chapter for discussion on this policy.
60
Captains Log, HMS Flamborough, 29 June 1742, ADM 51/358, TNA
61
Legislature Minutes, South Carolina, 19-22 November 1742 and 1 December 1742 Journal of the
Commons House of Assembly September 14, 1742-January 27, 1744, ed. J.H. Easterby, (Columbia: South Carolina

133

Despite the colony’s recent experience with a major slave rebellion and restrictions on the rights
of free and enslaved Africans to carry weapons, it is clear that South Carolina’s ruling class still
depended on the labor of black mariners and soldiers to support the war effort against the
Spanish.62 In addition to racial diversity, there is evidence that at least one Jewish sailor (known
only as Mr. Hart) served on board the Charles Town when it sank with its ten man crew in a
squall in 1743. Interestingly, Hart was the only man named in the South Carolina Gazette’s
notice of the tragedy.63
While imperial authorities were not quite ready to directly support provincial naval
efforts, mercantile anger over Royal Navy negligence was beginning to make an impact at
Westminster, and provincial naval activity played a role. Particularly useful for the colony’s
pleas for naval assistance was a rising lobby of London merchants intimately connected with
Carolina’s trade, and who had powerful connections within the British government.64 In early
1742, Parliament listened to various testimonies by merchants and ship captains directly affected
by alleged Royal Navy negligence in the southern colonies. Virginia merchants and traders
claimed privateers purposefully cruised after Chesapeake commerce because they knew the
station captain, Sir Yelverton Peyton, was unwilling to cruise after the enemy or protect the
trade. One merchant shared a letter from Thomas Lee—a Royal council member in Virginia—
that complained that “the guardships guarded them so little, that they hired two sloops to secure
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their trade.” South Carolina's agent, James Crokatt, briefed Parliament on the Royal Navy's
history in Charles Town dating back to the first guard ship in 1719, and argued that they
currently had the smallest number of guard ships to date (Captain Charles Fanshawe’s Phoenix,
and Captain George Townsend’s Tartar—the same captain whose press gang was implicated
with the murder of a sailor who resisted impressment in the weeks leading up to the St.
Augustine expedition).
Crokatt continued in his complaint, noting that Royal Navy captains frequently impressed
sailors, extorted local merchants, and rarely left port to cruise after the enemy. At one point
before departing for England, Fanshawe refused to lend Royal sailors to fit out a provincial sloop
to pursue the Spanish. In response to all these affronts, South Carolina’s government acted in the
same manner as Virginia, and the “government fitted out two sloops, which, the first time they
sailed, took a Spanish privatier.”65 It is noteworthy that one of the private captains Charles
Town’s government contracted with to defend the coast was New England privateer Captain
John Rous, future hero of the 1745 Siege of Louisbourg and future Royal Navy captain. Even
though Rous was a privateer by trade, the provincial government (along with local merchants)
gave him provisions, guaranteed bounties for Spanish privateers and enabled him to impress
sailors. Rouse was, as one scholar has put it, a “quasi-governmental coast guard” captain.66
Rous’s example further testifies to the blurred lines between provincial naval and privateer
service, and also demonstrates that Anglo-American officials were supportive of impressment so
long as it was by their authority as opposed to the Royal Navy.
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Ultimately, the Parliamentary committee that heard the complaints concluded that “due
and necessary care had not been taken to keep a proper number of his Majesty's ships employed”
in protecting English commerce, and wanted the rest of the House of Commons to “bring in a bill
for the better protecting and securing the trade and navigation of this kingdom…”67 Historian
H.W. Richmond has argued that Admiralty resistance led to the bill’s failure, as it “contained
stringent clauses to tie the stationed ships securely to their stations and allow their Captains no
liberty of action.” In practice, the bill would have given colonial governors and councils near
total control over station ships' orders. Despite the legal failure, with rising complaints from
many different colonies over Royal Navy performance, stronger instructions were given to Royal
Navy captains to work with governors.68
With significant pressure from trading interest groups and increasing numbers of ships
lost to Spanish privateers in the Americas (on top of numerous accounts of provincial navies
forming to fill in for reticent Royal Navy commanders), imperial authorities committed to more
than just a change of rhetoric in instructions to new Royal Navy station captains. The 1742
edition of the Scots Magazine reported that an Admiralty court martial commenced on 9 June
“to inquire into the conduct of Sir Yelverton Petyon, late Captain of the Hector, and Captain
Fanshaw, late Captain of the Phoenix, during the time they were stationed at Virginia and South
Carolina. The court adjudged Sir Yelverton to be dismissed as a Captain of the Royal navy; and
adjudged Captain Fanshaw to be mulcted six months pay for the use of the chest at Chatham.”69
Even before court martialing these captains, Admiralty officials had dispatched Captain
Charles Hardy with the HMS Rye (alongside the sloop HMS Hawke) to replace Fanshawe, and
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gave him specific instructions to be more proactive in hunting Spanish privateers and convoying
merchant vessels than his predecessor.70 Whatever the tone change in these instructions, many
provincial authorities in Charles Town did not consider Hardy’s arrival to be an improvement
upon Fanshawe, with some South Carolina elites accusing Hardy of being as inactive as his
predecessor.71 While provincial authorities would never be completely happy with Royal Navy
station captains, these actions did signal that imperial authorities were beginning to take coastal
defense in the Southern colonies more seriously.
As Charlestonians continued to allege that Royal Navy captains on their station were
inactive, General Oglethorpe in Georgia would have appreciated any permanent Royal Navy
presence on the Georgia coast. Not long after the defeat at St. Augustine, Oglethorpe formed a
“Marine Company of Boatmen” with recruits from Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina, and
which operated heavily armed scout boats alongside the regular scout boat service. Whatever the
novelty of American marines, small craft could not take on Spanish privateers at sea. With most
British warships staying centered at Charles Town, Oglethorpe had expanded his own provincial
navy to include the schooner Walker and the Faulcon and St. Philip sloops. He had purchased
these ships in Charles Town, crewed them with South Carolina sailors, and used redcoats from
the British Army’s 42nd Regiment of Foot to act as marines on these larger vessels.72
Indeed, Oglethorpe had every reason to be confident in these provincial forces. In a
December 1741 letter to the Georgia Trustees' accountant, Oglethorpe had justified his
provincial navy's existence by pointing to Captain Fanshawe's and Captain Townsend's inability
to curb Spanish privateering outside Charles Town. He bragged that his own provincial forces
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had “already forced one of the Enemys Sloops on Shore…”73 In a June 1742 “List of the Military
Strength of Carolina & Georgia,” Oglethorpe reported thirteen vessels in the colony’s service,
ranging from the “guard schooner” to small boats that various infantry regiments used.
Excluding soldiers that manned the latter craft, Oglethorpe’s provincial navy exceeded one
hundred sailors. It is telling that he excluded South Carolina’s scout boats or galleys, and briefly
mentioned the “Men of War Stationed at Charles Town” at the end of the report.74
Around the same time Oglethorpe filed that report in June of 1742, the general received
intelligence of a large Spanish invasion force that was likely headed for coastal Georgia, and he
forwarded the news to Charles Town. Oglethorpe’s successful defense of the colony highlighted
further flaws in the uneasy relationship between provincial and Royal Navy forces. The invasion
threat prompted Governor Bull and his council to summon Captain Hardy and Captain Franklin
of the recently arrived H.M.S. Rose on 18 June to discuss the best method to assist their southern
neighbors. Though Hardy informed the council that his ship was too damaged to sail south at that
time, Frankland offered to take his vessel, the H.M.S. Flamborough (now captained by Joseph
Hamar), and the Charles Town galley with him on the way back to his own home station in the
Bahamas.
Rather than keeping his promise, Frankland abandoned the flotilla early on, and Hamar
himself took his own vessel, two small Royal Navy sloops, and the Charles Town Galley to
assist Oglethorpe. Hamar made it to St. Simon, Georgia by 13 July, but ordered his flotilla to
retreat back to South Carolina when he sighted the numerically superior Spanish invasion force
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of forty vessels. Captain Hardy—having finished the Rye’s repairs—led a subsequent joint
provincial-Royal relief force with six colonial vessels, only to discover that the Spaniards had
fled by that point. Much to the chagrin of the South Carolina government, Hardy ordered the
provincial vessels to return home, and decided against hunting for what remained of the Spanish
forces as he feared they may have sailed to attack South Carolina’s weakly defended Port Royal
district.75
While the provincial relief force that accompanied Hardy did not see much action, the
fact that the colony was able to send out six armed vessels with more than 600 sailors and 78
guns testifies to the colony’s growing provincial naval establishment. Each provincial naval
captain was given a letter that ordered them to obey orders from Captain Hardy. Bull and his
council also commanded each captain to follow “Articles and Orders for the regulating and better
[Government] of the Vessels & Forces by sea fitted out from Charles Town...pursuant to ye
direction of the Statute of the 13th of Charles the 2d: Chapter 9th.”76 If these articles of war
resembled that late seventeenth century statute for the Royal Navy, they would have mandated
public worship for sailors, listed various punishments for sundry crimes, detailed how prizes
were to be distributed, etc. In essence, the South Carolina government considered its provincial
naval forces subordinate to Royal Navy authority, but also bound by the same standards and
rules the Royal Navy operated under.77
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While South Carolina’s provincial forces and their Royal Navy allies sailed confusedly
back and forth between both colonies, Oglethorpe’s small army of one thousand men and even
smaller provincial navy fended off a Spanish army twice its size, as well as a substantial Spanish
fleet. After scattered skirmishes with enemy forces for several days, Oglethorpe found enough
time to organize his infantry forces at strategic locations. By 5 July, Spanish Governor Montiano
led his force of 36 vessels ranging from ships to galleys into St. Simon’s Sound, and set the
scene for one of the largest battles an Anglo-American provincial navy would ever engage in.
Aside from a few of his own privately owned vessels, Oglethorpe had impressed several
merchant ships and their crews in the sound and fitted out the largest—the Success—as his
flagship. Oglethorpe added twenty guns on board, crewed it with sailors, British regulars, and his
own provincial marine company.78 According to a member of the Success's crew, Oglethorpe
“came on board of us, and made a handsome Speech, encouraging us to stand by our Liberties
and Country...He was convinced they were much superiour in Number, but then he was sure his
Men were much better, and did not doubt (with the Favour of God) but he would get the
Advantage.”79 Oglethorpe’s provincial navy as well as gunners at Fort St. Simons traded cannon
fire with the vastly superior Spanish force for hours, and Oglethorpe’s men ably resisted their
opponents’ attempts to board the vessels. Despite the provincial navy’s stand, the Spaniards sunk
one of Oglethorpe’s sloops, destroyed one of his land batteries, and broke through the Georgian
lines—successfully sailing up the sound and landing the main invasion force. Though his naval
forces were not adequate to stop the Spanish onslaught, Oglethorpe’s land forces defeated the
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Spanish invaders in several engagements throughout the next several weeks, and forced them
back to Florida. For now, the British hold on Georgia was secure.80
While Oglethorpe’s victory over the Spanish invasion was noteworthy, some South
Carolina authorities criticized Royal Navy Captain Hardy’s “returning hither, before so
considerable a part of the Service as the destroying the Enemys Strength by Sea: And for which
Our Shipping were fitted out at so considerable an Expence…”81Some scholars have attributed
the colony’s dispute with Hardy to the well-established acrimony between the colony and Royal
Navy officers, as well as disputes over who had authority over station ships.82
As ever, tensions between provincial officials and the Royal Navy could be overplayed,
and Hardy did finally agree to lead provincial and Royal Navy vessels in a major expedition in
the late summer. The October 1742 edition of The American Weekly Mercury reported that
Hardy led a mixed force of six Royal Navy ships and sloops, “Four Provincial Vessels,” and the
two South Carolina galleys to hunt for Spanish forces outside St. Augustine. General Oglethorpe
joined the fleet with his own schooner and various “small craft.” On 27 August, the “Provincial
Vessels received their orders from the Commodore,” and a few of them scouted Matanzas bay
where they sighted the infamous Spanish half-galleys that had caused both colonies so much
trouble. The next day, both colonies' provincial navies opened fire at the galley crews from
outside the bay. Although the Spanish wounded a few provincial sailors, the South Carolina
galleys were able to cause enough structural damage to force the Spanish back to the protection
of the Castillo de San Marcos.83 Although nothing significant was accomplished in this
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scrimmage, it did demonstrate that provincial and Royal Navy forces could work together to
some extent. Such coordination would have been useful at the Siege of St. Augustine two years
earlier.
Even this level of moderate cooperation between the Royal Navy and provincial forces
would do little to assuage Anglo-American authorities who were becoming irate over the
growing costs of naval defense as the war dragged on. By mid-1743, Oglethorpe had gotten little
assurance from London that his extensive military expenditures would be reimbursed, and he
travelled to England to directly appeal his case to the House of Commons.84 In March of 1744,
Oglethorpe—himself a veteran member of Parliament—spoke before the House of Commons,
highlighted the tenuous position of the empire’s southernmost American colony, and effectively
convinced the imperial government to reimburse his expenditures of more than £66,000.85 More
than £22,000 of the reimbursement directly covered provincial vessels purchases, upkeep, and
pay.86
While Parliament reimbursed Oglethorpe, it also officially placed Georgia’s soldiers as
well as provincial naval forces on a Royal pay establishment similar to that of the British army.87
For the first time in colonial history, the imperial government officially supported a provincial
navy. Imperial funding of Georgia’s provincial navy indicated a sea change in imperial attitudes
to provincial maritime forces. Though not incorporated into the Royal Navy by any means, the
same government that built first-rate warships at Portsmouth, England bankrolled schooners and
scout boats in coastal Georgia.
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While Parliament agreed to fund provincial forces in Georgia in 1744, this assistance did
little to secure the rest of the North American coastline. When France joined Spain in the war
that same year, provincial officials from Nova Scotia to South Carolina still relied on local funds
to fit out provincial navies to assist Royal Navy station ships. The British government’s
willingness to hear provincial complaints over Royal Navy inactivity in 1742 and its decision to
fund Georgia’s provincial navy in 1744 created the potential for a mutually beneficial maritime
defense alliance between periphery and center.

Limited Support: The Growth and Limits of Imperial Support for Provincial Navies, 17441754.
In 1744, Parliament changed the matrix of provincial naval defense forever by agreeing
to fund Georgia’s provincial navy. When France declared war on the British in 1744, imperial
recognition and support of provincial navies would extend to Nova Scotia and New England.
Despite growing metropolitan support for provincial forces, inconsistent imperial policies
towards provincial navies combined with growing provincial anger at Royal Navy excesses to
limit the effectiveness of the burgeoning Royal-provincial naval partnership.
Legal battles related to provincial navies, prize money, and impressment were the results
of various Parliamentary acts such as the 1740 “Act for the more effectual securing and
encouraging the trade of his Majesty's British subjects to America, and for the encouragement of
seamen to enter into his Majesty's service” (13 Geo 3, c. 4), the 1744 “Act for the Better
Encouragement of Seamen in his Majesty's Service, and Privateers, to Annoy the Enemy” (17
Geo. 2. c. 34), and the 1746 “Act for the Better Encouragement of the Trade of His Majesty’s
Sugar Colonies in America” (19 Geo. 2, c. 30). The 1740 act removed impressment protections
for privateers and tightened some admiralty court proceedings but offered bounty money for both
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privateers and Royal Navy sailors for enemy captures. The 1744 privateering act created tighter
rules for adjudicating prizes in prize courts than had previously been enforced and attempted to
enforce discipline on privateers by making crimes and misdemeanors on privateer ships subject
to the same punishments as in the Royal Navy.88
Even as the British government began to fund Oglethorpe’s provincial navy on an official
military establishment and support various provincial naval efforts throughout the latter years of
the war, it failed to differentiate between privateers and provincial government fleets in one of
the imperial government’s largest attempts to regulate privateering. Vague language such as
“encouragement of the officers and seamen of his Majesty's ships of war, and the officers and
seamen of all other British ships and vessels, having commissions, or letters of marque…” did
not directly recognize colonial governments’ own naval forces even though Parliament was well
aware of them by now.89
It is important to note that Anglo-Americans themselves still often failed to differentiate
between commerce raiders with letters of marque and government-funded warships, calling both
“privateers” at random.90 Even though this dissertation insists on a difference between provincial
government-funded naval forces and private commerce raiders with letters of marque, the
difference was not always obvious to eighteenth century observers. Nevertheless, Westminster’s
failure to include the colonies’ regular naval forces in prize court legislation would lead to legal
battles between agents for New England’s provincial navy and the Royal Navy for years to
come.
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While Parliament failed to set an imperial standard for provincial navies in 1744, it also
exacerbated the Royal Navy’s quickly souring relationship with its Anglo-American subjects
with its 1746 act to encourage Caribbean trade. In the act, Parliament banned most Royal Navy
impressment in the lucrative Caribbean—notably giving the Royal Navy leeway to impress
seamen in North American colonies. Historian Christopher Magra argues that this act “quickly
produced a disaffected, rebellious spirit in North America.”91 By 1747, anger at Royal Navy
impressment would lead to violent riots in Boston.
Both imperial vagueness regarding provincial navies as well as increasing tensions with
the Royal Navy would come to a head as the momentum of the war shifted to the empire’s
northernmost colonies near French Canada in 1744. While provincial authorities had outfitted
navies to fight Spanish privateers in the first few years of the war, the reopening of hostilities
with France in 1744 sent the region into a panic. With earlier notification of the commencement
of hostilities than their English foes, the French governor of Louisbourg on Isle Royale, the
Seigneur Du Quesnel, dispatched two privateers and an invasion force to attack the AngloAmerican base at Canso. The force quickly captured the English settlement, as well as its solitary
Royal Navy guard sloop.92
Almost immediately, authorities throughout the northeastern colonies mobilized their
provincial naval forces to counter the French onslaught. Massachusetts Governor William
Shirley's quick dispatch of the provincial snow Prince of Orange with soldiers played at least
some role in repelling Du Quesnel’s forces from taking Annapolis Royal that summer.93
Massachusetts' quick response was a result of the maturation of what could be called New
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England’s provincial naval network. After nearly a century of commissioning tax-funded ships,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut each could boast of a complex “naval
establishment” of sorts that involved bureaucratic government committees that procured vessels
and regulated pay for officers and sailors.94 New England’s provincial naval network had
reached such a point by mid-1744 that Rhode Island’s government was able to facilitate several
joint patrol cruises between its province sloop, Tartar, and Connecticut’s province sloop,
Defence. At one point, Captain Prentice of the Defence even made the friendly boast that “We
can out sail the Rhode Island sloop much...We beat their tip top boats at Rhode Island to their
great mortification.”95
Despite this cooperation between New England governments early in the war, the
region’s provincial navies suffered from the Royal Navy’s largest ailment: perennial manpower
shortages.96 To offset this issue, in the summer of 1744, the Massachusetts governor, council,
and assembly passed the “Act for the more effectual guarding and securing our Sea Coasts, and
for the Encouragement of Seamen to enlist themselves in the Province Snow or such Vessels of
War as shall be commissioned and fitted out by this or other of his Majesty's Governments.” This
act granted sailors of provincial warships total claims over captured French shipping and cargo,
and £3 bounties for the capturing or killing of enemy sailors. The act also awarded £3 to
provincial navy crews from other colonies, privateers, and merchant ships with letters of marque
for every enemy sailor captured or killed off the Massachusetts coast.97
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What was extraordinary about this law was not only that it was the first time a colony
promised financial rewards to other colonies’ provincial navies, but also that it essentially copied
elements of the British government’s 1740 “Act for the better Supply of Mariners and Seamen to
Serve in His Majesty's Ships of War.” The act promised £5 prizes “unto the Officers, Seamen,
Marines...Onboard such of His Majesty’s Ships of War, as also of Privateers…” that followed
the aforementioned 1740 privateering act.98 While the British act mentioned Royal Navy ships
and privateers, the Massachusetts law specifically targeted the crews of provincial “Vessels of
War.” For the first time, authorities from one colony offered to support the provincial navy of
another.
While Massachusetts may have adapted imperial standards for its own provincial naval
establishment, the similarities with Parliamentary legislation caught the attention of the Board of
Trade. What ensued was the first of many inconsistent imperial rulings on the status of provincial
navies. In October of 1744, the Board of Trade requested Francis Fane—a member of Parliament
and a commissioner for the Board—to compare Massachusetts' law with the British
government’s various bounty laws, and to decide if the Prince of Orange and similar vessels “are
to be deemed ships of war or privateers, and whether they are entituled to the bounties given by
the said British acts.”99 Fane did not oppose the act by “point of law,” but worried over the
vagueness of the act. He argued that the “Province Snow and the other Vessells mentioned in the
said Massachusetts Act, will be Entitled to the Bounty given by the said British acts...as
Privateers because they are not in his Majesty's Pay.” Fane also noted that he worried that the
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colony's legislature had “gone a little too far in disposing of His Majesty's right to the Prizes
taken from the Enemy, solely by their own Authority…”100 Ultimately, Fane argued that
provincial ships were privateers if they were not on the Royal payroll—perhaps an oblique
reference to the government’s recent funding of the Georgia navy.
While Fane dismissed Massachusetts' provincial navy as a fleet of privateers, the Board
of Trade was still uncomfortable with simply dismissing the law and decided to table the debate
until Governor Shirley and Massachusetts’ agent in London could better explain it. By the spring
of 1747, the King’s Privy Council reviewed the act that had been in bureaucratic limbo for two
years. The Privy Council concluded that the act “relates to the public service & security of the
said Province and therefore We see no reason why His Majesty may not be graciously pleased to
confirm the same…” The king ultimately agreed with the Privy Council and confirmed the act by
June of 1747.101
Even though the Royal approbation of the Massachusetts law took several years, it
highlighted two conjoined trends in the latter years of the War of Jenkin’s Ear: Whitehall’s
increasing recognition of provincial navies, and its confusion over how to classify them or
incorporate them in the larger war effort. At the same time, Admiralty officials continued their
age-old “laissez-faire” attitude towards provincial navies, particularly when a ‘hands-off’
approach to colonial naval defense could save them money. For instance, in the spring of 1745,
Thomas Corbett—the secretary to the Admiralty—informed Commodore Peter Warren that their
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“lordships hope that your letter to Gov. Clinton, about the province of New York supporting a
guard vessel as the other neighbouring colonies did, has had its due effect.”102
While Admiralty officials generally continued their hands-off policy in regards to
provincial navies, some Royal Navy officers—particularly Warren—began to lobby for greater
imperial support for provincial naval forces. He called for colonists to begin:
“…arming some proper vessels to guard their own coast and trade. [Such] vessels should be in
some measure on the foot[ing] of the king's ships, or at least [should] never be molested by
them…Where the colonies are not in a capacity alone to bear the expense of such vessel, two or
more of them might join in it...This I believe, the colonies [might] be brought to, if strongly
recommended by the ministry to their different governors, and by them to their legislatures
[italics mine]. New England has shown the others a very laudable example, by fitting out two or
three. If this could be effected, then his Majesty's ships of force...might be employed in
distressing the enemy more effectually…”103
Warren’s support for provincial navies would be evident in the 1745 joint provincialRoyal attack on Louisbourg. This siege, holds historian W.A.B. Douglas, “demonstrated the
surprising strength and homogeneity of combined regular and provincial forces.”104 While the
siege itself proved to be the best example of provincial-Royal Navy cooperation, interservice
rivalries and post-war legal battles related to prizes captured during the siege also highlighted the
limits to which Anglo-American and Royal forces could cooperate.
After the British government refused to spearhead an attack on Louisbourg in 1744,
Governor William Shirley (with the lobbying of Maine merchant William Vaughan) convinced
the Massachusetts legislature to lead an assault on the French stronghold in the spring of 1745.
Without direct guarantees of British military assistance, he hoped that neighboring colonies
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would lend military assistance, and that the British government would reimburse the colonies for
taking France's Canadian privateering base. The Massachusetts government's plan called for a
joint land and naval assault with troops and vessels from every northern colony stretching to
Pennsylvania. The colony's leaders were perhaps too enthusiastic. Outside of New England, New
York forces merely provided an artillery battery. Massachusetts's neighbors, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, and Connecticut did, however, send several provincial guard sloops as well as
units. By May, New England’s provincial governments had assembled a fleet of nearly one
hundred vessels to carry its large provincial army to attack the French port.105 Aside from scores
of transport vessels, this flotilla would ultimately include a squadron of fifteen provincial naval
vessels and privateers from every New England colony, with a combined strength exceeding one
thousand sailors.106 Undoubtedly, one of the most impressive provincial vessels was
Massachusetts’ recently constructed 400-ton, twenty gun frigate Massachusetts.107
Even with the largest provincial naval force assembled to date, Shirley did not believe the
expedition could be successful without Royal Navy assistance. In a late March letter to the Duke
of Newcastle, Shirley described the New England colonies' vast military preparations, and
complained that Royal Navy officers in the West Indies were not able to assist the expedition. He
continued: “I shall hope that Providence will favour the small Naval Force, which I have been
able to muster up here, with Success; and that our Land Forces will still be able to maintain their
ground on Cape Breton 'till I shall receive his Majesty's Royal Pleasure upon this matter…”108
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Luckily for Shirley, changes in the Admiralty’s administration (including the Duke of
Bedford’s appointment as the First Lord of the Admiralty, as well as Admiral George Anson as
one of its commissioners) may have played a role in policy changes in North America. In early
1745, the Duke of Newcastle ordered the creation of the first ever North American Squadron that
coordinated the Royal Navy guard ships north of North Carolina. By March, the Lords of the
Admiralty received word of Shirley’s preparations, and ordered Commodore Warren—a
longtime advocate of a stronger Royal Navy presence in the northeast—to assist the provincial
forces in taking Louisbourg. When Warren arrived with ten Royal ships of the line and
instructions from the Duke of Newcastle to take command of provincial “shipping,” Governor
Shirley and the provincial military leader William Pepperell placed the Anglo-American vessels
under Warren’s command—the same decision made by South Carolina authorities during the
campaigns of 1740-2.109
In many ways, Warren (himself a veteran of the disastrous St. Augustine campaign)
reversed the trend so common in southern colonies wherein Royal and provincial naval forces
failed to cooperate. Historian W.A.B. Douglas contends that “there is strong evidence that both
Warren and Shirley intended to consider the armed colony cruisers and king's ships as a
homogenous squadron attached to the expedition.” Douglas highlights Warren’s inclusion of
provincial ships in his line of battle, his inclusion of provincial commanders in councils of war,
and the fact that Warren ordered Royal Navy and provincial navy crews to distribute captured
prizes equally—a conciliatory tactic never tried by other Royal Navy commanders.110
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After a month of deadly assaults, bombardments, and raids, the French garrison at
Louisbourg surrendered to the Royal-provincial invasion force on 17 June 1745. Governor
Shirley bragged to the Massachusetts legislature that Louisbourg “was won, under the most
signal Favour and Direction of the Divine Providence, by the indefatigable Toil of His Majesty's
New-England Subjects (chiefly of this Province) supported by a Squadron of his Ships of War at
Sea…”111 Perhaps one of the most concrete examples of the fruits of this partnership was New
England privateer Captain John Rous’s promotion. Rous was a New England privateer that had
previously acted as a coast guard for South Carolina authorities, and now served in the provincial
navy of the New England invasion force at Louisbourg. Admiralty authorities were so impressed
by news of his fight with a French frigate during the siege that they commissioned him as a
captain in the Royal Navy, purchased his vessel the Shirley, and made it an official part of the
navy.112
To be certain, Rous’s rise from part-time provincial navy captain and privateer to an
officer in the Royal Navy highlights the imperial government’s growing appreciation for
provincial naval capabilities. This is evident in the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Duke of
Bedford’s plans for an abortive 1746 conquest of French Canada, in which he ordered that Royal
forces should be accompanied by “such ships of war, sloops and such other armed vessels (which
may be furnished by the provinces) as his Majesty's admiral commanding in chief shall please to
appoint.”113 Even when this joint expedition was cancelled by imperial authorities, Parliament
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still reimbursed the New England colonies for their military expenses (including naval
expenditures) for the siege of Louisbourg and the cancelled 1746 expedition.114
The evidence presented thus far may create the appearance of a growing and unreserved
spirit of support and approbation of provincial navies in the imperial center. However, this
growing imperial enthusiasm for provincial forces was inconsistent and often shallow.
Chief among the flaws in the arrangement was the fact that the British government never created
a permanent legal standard or definition for these provincial fleets. Legal uncertainties over the
status of provincial fleets fostered bitter transatlantic legal battles, particularly after the victory at
Louisbourg. A few weeks after the city fell, provincial naval forces captured several French
prizes both independently and alongside the Royal Navy. With Commodore Warren’s promise
that the joint fleet would share in the “common stock” of any prizes captured, questions
immediately arose over whether seamen in Royal Navy ships and provincial vessels should have
an equal share of the booty. Beyond mere disputes over plunder, major controversy arose over
the very nature of provincial navies themselves, and whether provincial vessels should receive
the same prize shares as Royal Navy ships or privateers.115
The first salvo in the transatlantic dispute over the definitions of provincial navies came
in the Massachusetts vice admiralty court of Robert Auchmuty in the early months of 1746.
Auchmuty, like the vice admiralty judges of other colonies, was not merely a provincial justice,
but “officially appointed at Whitehall with Admiralty warrants.”116 Auchmuty himself was a
veteran jurist with training at the Middle Temple in London, but was still ill prepared for the
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prize claim of Captain Richardson and the crew of the Resolution—a private sloop leased to the
Massachusetts government for the expedition against Louisbourg.117 On 2 September 1745,
Richardson and his crew recaptured an English vessel called The Two Friends from the French.
Richardson and his men declared themselves the crew of “his Majesty's Vessel of War and in his
Majesty's Pay,” and thus entitled to “one Entire Eighth” of the vessel’s value as a salvage fee.118
They based their claim on Parliament’s 1744 “Act for the Better Encouragement of Seamen in
his Majesty's Service” which guaranteed Royal Navy vessels ⅛ the value of a recaptured English
vessel no matter how long it had been in enemy hands. Conversely, the act merely granted
privateers that recaptured English vessels shares (“moieties” of the value) that decreased by
percentage the longer the English vessel had been controlled by the foe.119
It was clear to Richardson and his men that it would be more profitable to be counted as
part of the King’s Navy rather than as mere privateers. Unfortunately for these provincial sailors,
Judge Auchmuty was not convinced by their claim, and held that “Every Kings Ship is in his pay
and Service and part of his Royall Navy but Every Ship in the Kings pay and Service is not the
Kings Ship or part of the Royal Navy.” The judge examined the history of private ships in the
Royal service as far back as Edward III’s reign, more recent parliamentary legislation, and then
Captain Warren’s specific prize agreement for his joint fleet before the Siege of Louisbourg, and
found nothing to support the argument that the Resolution was a Royal ship of war. Auchmuty
reasoned that Warren’s instructions could not be construed to equate the Resolution with Royal
Navy ships in the fleet because he “treats those Vessels in Contradistinction to his Majestys
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Ships by sometimes Calling them private Ships & Vessels of War and at other Times Colony
Cruizers…” Furthermore, the Resolution’s owners still expected a share despite contracting her
to the government—a move that highlighted her status as a privateer rather than a vessel of war.
Auchmuty would only grant the Resolution’s crew a moiety of the value of the prize.120
At least some provincial elites were taken aback by the ruling. Nathaniel Sparhawk, the
son-in-law of William Pepperell (the overall commander of American soldiers at the siege of
Louisbourg who evidently also had some financial interest in the Resolution), wrote his father-inlaw to lament that “She is, contrary to the expectation of every one, deemed a privateer instead
of a King's ship…” and worried that appealing the case in London would cost Pepperell more
money than it was worth.121
While Auchmuty’s ruling was unpopular with some of the expedition’s provincial
leaders, it also pointed to larger legal uncertainties over the legal status of provincial navies on
both sides of the Atlantic, and wider tensions between provincial and Royal military forces over
prize distribution. To contextualize the disputes between provincial and Royal Navy forces one
must also note the concurrent agitation between New England’s land forces and the Royal Navy.
While Warren and Massachusetts General Pepperell argued over which force should receive the
French surrender, New England troops rioted and brawled with Royal Navy sailors in the streets
of occupied Louisbourg. They were angry at alleged condescension from Royal marine officers,
not being allowed to plunder French homes, and being left out of prize distribution from captured
French ships.122 Whatever tensions existed between the American land forces and Royal Navy
forces during and after the siege, subsequent battles between provincial and Royal Navy officers
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would take on a transatlantic dimension.
Much of this tension surrounded the prize-court disputes over the French ship Notre
Dame de Deliverance. The Deliverance was one of three French merchant vessels (including the
Heron and Charmante) that fell prey to Anglo-American forces at Louisbourg in the weeks after
the city’s capture. In August of 1745, Captain Benjamin Fletcher of the provincial brigantine
Boston Packet spotted what he thought was a French frigate. Realizing his small crew could not
take on such a vessel alone, he raised a French flag as a decoy, fired guns to alert the Royal Navy
ships nearby, and fled for the protection of Louisbourg. The Royal Navy frigates Chester and
Sunderland quickly captured the “frigate,” which turned out to be a treasure-laden vessel worth
nearly £400,000.123
For more than four years after this lucrative capture, agents for the Boston Packet,
Chester, Sunderland and other nearby provincial and Royal Navy ships tried to convince various
admiralty appeals courts in London of their competing claims to the rich prize.124 While
interested parties argued over which vessels were most responsible for the Deliverance’s capture,
questions over the legal status of the provincial vessels arose time after time. In fact, proctors for
the provincial vessels argued in London courts that their clients belonged to vessels that were
essentially ships of the Royal Navy. For instance, in one of the earlier hearings in May of 1749,
Charles Pinfold, one of the advocates for the Boston Packet, argued that the vessel was no
privateer as the colony had purchased her. Pinfold continued that “Privateers are fitted out at
Private Expence with Letters of Marque, Security is given, and an Agreement made with the
owners.” He pointed out that the Boston Packet was a government-controlled vessel without
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private owners at the time. Additionally, Pinfold made the accurate observation that no recent
Parliamentary legislation differentiated between a “Man of War and a Vessel in his Maty’s
Pay.”125
In a subsequent hearing, agents for some of the other provincial vessels interested in the
case echoed Pinfold’s argument when they said their clients were “not Privateers, belonging to
particular Owners, but were Ships of War, of considerable Force, fitted out by the Colonies of
the Massachusetts Bay and Rhode Island…” As ships of war, they had played a signal role in the
siege and as part of Warren’s fleet.126 While these arguments were made by English barristers in
London, they clearly represented the belief among many provincial authorities and sailors that
they were vital members of a military mission rather than a privateering enterprise.
Agents for the Royal Navy frigates involved in the Deliverance’s capture had a different
understanding of the role of provincial vessels in the expedition. In one hearing, some of the
Royal Navy’s legal representatives argued that the “American Privateers, by their Junction with
Sir Peter Warren, became no otherwise Part of his Squadron, or subject to his Command…”
While spending much time decrying the provincial men as mere privateers, the agents for the
Royal frigates did make one sound accusation against their opponents: If the point of the
expedition was to capture Louisbourg, and the capture of the Deliverance occurred after the fact,
why should the provincial ships be considered part of a joint squadron? After all, the provincial
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governments had been “reimbursed by the Parliament of Great Britain” for fitting out warships to
take Louisbourg.127
Ultimately, after several years of lengthy litigation, on 5 July 1750, the Lords
Commissioners of Appeal for Prizes (including members of the Admiralty’s new cohort of
reformers, Lords Anson and Sandwich) ruled that the Royal Navy vessels in Louisbourg harbor
(“in sight” of the Notre Dame de Deliverance), as well as the two Royal Navy frigates that
captured the French vessel were all entitled to shares of the prize. The Lords specifically
excluded the other American “privateers” that made claims on it. Nevertheless, by November the
Lords did declare that the “armed vessel” Boston Packet and the Royal Navy warships should all
receive equal shares.128 The Admiralty had awarded an American provincial crew an equal share
to the Royal crews, but had also successfully avoided calling the American vessels “Ships of
War.”
Some historians have made the case that the Admiralty’s decision to exclude the other
provincial ships was problematic. J. Revell Carr makes the case that while the Admiralty
excluded other provincial vessels from the prize, it rewarded Royal Navy vessels that barely
participated in the Deliverance’s capture. Carr brings to light an anonymous 1748 essay
(possibly written by the Boston firebrand Samuel Adams), which he believes exemplifies
contemporary provincial anger. The anonymous colonial author lambasted the British
government for inadequate naval patrols off the New England coast, not sharing plunder from
the three captured French vessels with New England infantrymen, and British soldiers for
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abusing Anglo-Americans during the siege. Britain’s most damning affront, the author argued,
was its recent decision to return Fortress Louisbourg to the French in the peace negotiations at
Aix-la-Chapelle. Carr contends that the letter demonstrated the growth of the “seeds of
discontent that brought the Americans to the brink of revolution.”129
While Carr’s description of Anglo-Americans ready to revolt in 1748 is probably
excessive, his description of the Deliverance prize case as a major hurdle to the Anglo-American
defensive partnership is sound. The years of legal battles over the prize’s fate demonstrated two
diverging imperial and provincial views of the importance of provincial navies. While imperial
officials were finally starting to encourage the colonies to build provincial fleets (and even
occasionally funding them), they still only thought of these vessels as auxiliaries for the Royal
Navy. Thus, they never even made room for provincial navies in imperial legislation.130
On the other hand, many Anglo-Americans were increasingly coming to see their
provincial navies as equals to (if not superior to) the Royal Navy. This mood is best illustrated in
a late 1747 letter from the young South Carolina merchant, Henry Laurens, to his colony’s agent
in London. Laurens (who would one day be a founding father of the United States), bragged that
“we are fitting out two fine Bermuda Sloops on purpose to Cruize on this Coast...As to Men of
War, they are out of fashion here.”131 In other words, local provincial fleets were more useful to
Laurens than the best-armed Royal Navy guard ships.
It is important to note that North Americans were not alone in commissioning provincial
navies throughout the conflict. Even though the Admiralty and Parliament devoted more Royal
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Navy warships to the West Indies (and even favored Caribbean governments with lax
impressment laws), Caribbean governments still felt the need to fit out local ships when Royal
Navy vessels were far away. For instance, in the summer of 1746, England’s Gentleman’s
Magazine published a letter from an Antiguan who lamented that because of the “indolence of
his majesty's ships...the country have fitted out a guard de costa…” The correspondent, echoing
contemporary complaints on the North American mainland, further alleged that “pretend that
they cannot sail well enough to catch the privateers; but all the world knows, that they can sail
well enough to protect and retake the merchant ships, if they would keep cruizing in proper
stations.”132
Whatever complaint some West Indians had over Royal Navy inactivity, the Royal
Navy’s longstanding policy of stationing more Royal Navy ships in the Caribbean, recent
expansion of Royal dockyards throughout the West Indies, and legislation banning Royal Navy
impressment in the West Indies all illustrated London’s growing naval commitment to its most
lucrative provinces in the Americas. With London’s increasing commitment to the protection of
West Indian commerce throughout the 1740s, the War of Jenkin’s Ear would prove to be the last
major time West Indian governments would fit out provincial navies for maritime defense.
While the British government’s failure to create a consistent legal policy regarding
provincial navies threatened future cooperation between provincial forces and the Royal Navy,
its 1746 decision to allow Royal Navy impressment in North America inspired violent resistance
to the Royal Navy throughout the northeast, and set a precedent for future violent resistance to
impressment in North American ports. Of course, this tension did not begin in 1746. Royal Navy
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commanders had long impressed sailors from North American merchant vessels, privateers, and
even their former provincial naval partners with impunity.
One such case occurred in Boston in November of 1745 when Lt. Governor Spencer
Phips allowed Captain Arthur Forest of the H.M.S. Wager to impress a few men, provided they
were nonresident aliens and had not served in the Louisbourg expedition. Ignoring this
prohibition, the ship’s press gang (along with local sheriffs) attempted to capture several sailors
that had served on the provincial vessel Resolution. A subsequent melee left two provincial
sailors dead, and three members of the press gang in provincial custody (the rest of the press
gang escaped with the Wager as it left Boston harbor). Historian Jack Tager holds that this
violent encounter would be a “rallying cry” for the rioters in the Knowles Riot two years later.
While Governor Shirley vocally opposed the violence, local officials in Boston criticized
him and his administration for allowing impressment in the first place, and called it a violation of
the Magna Carta and Parliamentary legislation. While Shirley convinced Commodore Warren to
cancel calls for impressment throughout the northeast, Royal Navy commanders ignored this
directive and continued to rely on the unpopular practice to keep their ships fully crewed. Even
locals were not safe from resistance to impressment. When newly minted Royal Navy Captain
John Rous (himself a New Englander, former privateer, and former provincial naval hero) tried
to impress sailors for the H.M.S. Shirley in February of 1746, angry locals (along with a
privateer crew from New York) assaulted Rouse and his press gang.133
None of these violent clashes in the final years of the War of Jenkin’s Ear could compare
to the Knowles Riot of 1747. When Commodore Charles Knowles prepared to sail to the West
Indies in late 1747, he stopped to impress sailors in Boston because of the recent Parliamentary
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legislation that had banned impressment in the Caribbean. Nearly three hundred angry privateers
fought the press gangs—an act that would ultimately inspire a general urban riot that would last
for three days. Bostonians imprisoned Royal Navy officers, destroyed one of the Royal frigates’
barges, and forced Governor Shirley to provide refuge for some Royal Navy commanders in his
home.
Rioters demanded that Shirley not only deliver them the officers hiding in his house, but
also that he execute one of the still-imprisoned members of the press gang that had killed men
from the Resolution two years previously. Shirley declared he would wait for the king’s
instructions before putting anyone on trial, and did his best to coax the crowd by promising to get
the recently impressed men released.134 Shirley later reported that along with other local
dignitaries, Captain Edward Tyng of the provincial Massachusetts frigate “stood some time at
the Door parlying [sic] and endeavouring to Pacify ‘em…”135 In a moment of pure historical
irony, a prominent provincial navy captain attempted to defend Royal Navy officers from a
crowd still angry that Royal sailors had killed provincial sailors.
As the violence of the riot escalated, Governor Shirley only barely convinced
Commodore Knowles not to order his ships to fire on Boston. Ultimately, representatives from
several factions convened a town meeting, condemned the mob (much to the dismay of the
young firebrand Samuel Adams), and arranged for the release of the impressed sailors. While
some historians such as Denver Brunsman have seen the riot as the last major violent movement
against impressment in North America, Christopher Magra has made the case that the Knowles
Riot was the precursor to the violent riots of the Revolutionary-era less than two decades later.136
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Whether or not the riot inspired later riots during the Imperial Crisis of the 1760s, it is
certain that much of the original animus that led to the Knowles Riot surrounded Royal Navy
abuse of provincial navy veterans. Ultimately, Parliament’s decision to condone impressment in
North America in 1746 undermined its own limited efforts to support provincial naval warfare
throughout the North American colonies and inspired colonial opposition to the Royal Navy’s
presence in general.
Even as Anglo-American resistance to Royal Navy impressment increased in Boston in
the final years of the War of Jenkin’s Ear, imperial authorities began to slowly cut back their
support for large provincial navies and developed a laissez-faire attitude towards the few small
provincial naval forces they did bankroll during peacetime. Even after General Oglethorpe had
returned to England, the British government had continued to pay for Georgia’s provincial
flotilla (including Oglethorpe’s provincial marine corps, a merchant ship converted into a frigate,
a schooner, a sloop, a periagua, and sundry boats). With peace overtures already beginning by
1746 and in response to shoddy book-keeping by provincial officers, the War Office suspended
all support for provincial naval forces in Georgia outside the crew of one scout boat, the Prince
George.137 The Crown did offer South Carolina authorities three boats in 1749, but the local
assembly (much to the chagrin of the Royal Governor John Glen) decided to take the expense of
fitting out the vessels themselves in order to expedite naval patrols for runaway slaves south of
Charles Town.138
While Parliament did agree to finance some scout boats on the southern borderlands of
the continent, it continued to bankroll a more substantial fleet on the Nova Scotia frontier.
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Provincial vessels had assisted the Royal Navy off of Nova Scotia for several years after the
campaign at Louisbourg in 1748. Nevertheless, by 1748, the Admiralty ordered Governor
Shirley of Massachusetts to disband two hired vessels (the Anson and Warren) as it planned to
cut costs. Shirley refused to follow the order as he believed they were still necessary for coastal
security, and the Board of Trade eventually agreed to help find funds for the vessels.139 In fact,
when Lord Halifax—the new president of the Board of Trade—planned a new settlement in
Nova Scotia after the war, he consulted provincial naval (and Royal Navy Captain) John Rous,
and even agreed that the new colony needed to employ three provincial guard sloops. Rous
would later be appointed the “senior naval officer” of the new port.
Even with Rous at the helm in Halifax, the ever-parsimonious Admiralty refused to
station many Royal Navy vessels at Nova Scotia in the postwar years, and Rous and local
political officials relied on a “sea militia” of several small sloops and other vessels to guard the
coasts. This was especially important as tensions with the Mi’kmaq led flared up in the early
1750s. From 1749 to 1755, the Board of Trade and Parliament funded eleven provincial
schooner, sloop, and boat crews on the empire’s northern American borderlands. However,
imperial authorities barely inquired into the actions of this fleet, and local officials likely avoided
mentioning it too much in letters to London as they worried it would convince the Admiralty that
Royal Navy warships were not needed in the area. Historian W.A.B. Douglas argues that the
Admiralty’s noninvolvement was the “essential ingredient of success” in this arrangement.140 In
essence, imperial funds were important for the Nova Scotia sea militia, but London’s
noninterference allowed local officials to control the fleet to their best advantage.
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By the end of the War of Jenkin’s Ear, the Board of Trade and Parliament agreed to fund
a few provincial small craft and sloops on British America’s northern and southern borderlands.
While this imperial intervention was novel, the British government never fully respected or
harnessed America’s provincial maritime potential to its full potential. By excluding provincial
navies from major legislation, and by overlooking Royal Navy excesses throughout major port
cities, imperial officials soured Anglo-American opinions towards their partners in the Royal
Navy.
From 1739 to 1748, the British government agreed to recognize and finance some
provincial navies for the first time, thereby creating the potential for a mutually beneficial naval
defense partnership between periphery and center. Nevertheless, the British government’s failure
to include provincial navies in major sea-prize legislation and its failure to limit Royal Navy
impressment damaged any potential joint-Royal-provincial naval defensive alliance. Imperial
inconsistencies and Royal Navy overreach would continue to plague Anglo-American relations
for the few remaining decades before the American Revolution.
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Chapter IV. The Decline of Provincial Navies and the Rise of Royal Navy Maritime
Hegemony in America, 1754-1763

The War of Jenkin’s Ear/King George’s War ended in 1748 the same way many of the
earlier colonial conflicts had: a return to the status quo ante bellum. On the tense imperial
borderlands, particularly in Nova Scotia where Britain had returned Louisbourg to the French,
Anglo-Americans feared future violence with their French, Acadian, and Native neighbors. To
shore up the British position in Nova Scotia, the Board of Trade (led by the Earl of Halifax)
created the port town of Halifax, Nova Scotia in 1749. In response to British expansion, Acadian
Catholic priest Jean-Louis Le Loutre and his Maliseet, Mi’kmaq, and Franco-Acadian allies led a
bloody uprising against British authorities in what became known as ‘Father Le Loutre’s War.’
Between 1749 and 1755, Royal Navy Captain John Rous and Nova Scotia officials continuously
augmented the few Royal Navy ships in the area with several small vessels and crews from the
region’s provincial ‘sea militia.’
While the Lords of the Admiralty did little to support these provincial forces, funds from
the Board of Trade allowed these provincial crews to bridge communication gaps, support
Anglo-American infantry forces campaigning against Le Loutre’s forces, and helped prevent
smuggling on contested waterways around Nova Scotia. Naval scholar W.A.B. Douglass
contends that this provincial naval force’s petite guerre against Franco-Indigenous forces paved
the way for future larger Royal Navy campaigns on the northern borderlands during the Seven
Years War.1
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Despite successful coordination between a few Royal Navy vessels and Nova Scotia’s sea
militia during the fight with Le Loutre’s forces, substantial Royal Navy involvement would be
necessary to secure Britain’s loose foothold on its northern American peripheries. This was
especially true considering the French government’s reestablishment of Louisbourg as a major
military base after 1749. After Captain Rous seized French vessels accused of smuggling in
1751, both British and French authorities began to send large frigates each year to Halifax and
Louisbourg to compete for naval hegemony in northern waters.2 Ultimately, mutual military
escalation in Nova Scotia echoed both empires’ larger territorial fights in North America,
including the vast swath of land between the Ohio River and the easternmost Great Lakes.3 By
the mid-1750s, with ongoing territorial disputes and active border wars, war with France was
inevitable.
Even as the stage was set for renewed imperial struggle with France, a battle raged within
the British government itself over the proper role of the Royal Navy in society. By the end of the
War of Jenkin’s Ear in the late 1740s, Great Britain’s new Lords of the Admiralty—including
Bedford, Anson, and Sandwich—had initiated dramatic administrative reforms that would
transform the Royal Navy into a hegemonic and disciplined fighting force for the rest of the
eighteenth century and beyond. The Admiralty’s centralization program faced several immediate
challenges in the years leading up to the Seven Years War. First and foremost, while having
jurisdiction over its own personnel, the Admiralty did not control the empire’s general naval
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policy itself and followed orders from the King’s cabinet ministers such as the First Lord of the
Treasury (the period’s equivalent of the prime minister) and various Secretaries of State
(including the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, who oversaw the empire’s
Western European and American affairs). In the interwar years between 1748 and 1754, the
parsimonious Henry Pelham dominated the ministry, and much to the chagrin of naval reformers
called for military spending reductions and favored diplomatic solutions in foreign affairs.4
During Pelham’s tenure, French King Louis XV’s government massively expanded its battle
fleet while British authorities failed to refit decaying ships or to keep up the pace with their
archrival. Even though the British fleet would eventually catch up with their foes, naval
unpreparedness would create several logistical problems at the beginning of the Seven Years
War in 1756.5
In the first few years of the Seven Years War, Anglo-American governments planned to
utilize provincial navies on the same scale as they had in the previous imperial conflict.
However, by 1758 the Royal Navy’s aggressive expansion and campaigning in the New World
made the existence of substantial provincial navies unnecessary, and they gradually fell out of
use by the early 1760s. While the Royal Navy’s expansion and novel aggressive campaigning
saved colonists from provincial naval defense costs, the Royal Navy’s aggressive enforcement of
impressment and postwar imperial trade policies angered American dissidents, and paved the
way for the imperial crisis of the 1760s and 1770s.
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Provincial Naval Planning and the Decline of Provincial Naval Operations, c. 1754-1758.

Throughout the Seven Years War, Anglo-American governments from Nova Scotia to
Barbados deployed a few provincial ships to assist Royal Navy forces and to defend their own
shores when Royal ships were far away or incapacitated. For the first time, this cooperation even
extended to a joint provincial-Royal Navy fleet on the Great Lakes. Despite initial expectations
that colonial governments would have to contribute large provincial naval forces to support the
imperial war effort as they had done in previous conflicts, the Royal Navy’s expanding presence
and naval supremacy after 1758 made the existence of extensive provincial navies unnecessary.
By 1754, the British government and Anglo-American governments faced the dual crisis
of French military expansion and increasingly strained relations with their traditional Iroquois
allies. To solidify the Anglo-American partnership with the Iroquois as war clouds loomed and
to facilitate defense plans, the Earl of Halifax and the Board of Trade called on the northern
colonial governments to hold a joint conference at Albany, New York that summer.6 Historians
throughout the last two centuries have frequently cited some of the conference participants’ calls
for a general colonial political union as early birth pangs of the future United States. More
recently, however, scholars such as Andrew D.M. Beaumont have made the case that both
British and Anglo-American authorities were equally eager to create an organized American
political union for mutual military assistance.7
While scholars may disagree over connections between the various plans for colonial
union at the Albany Congress and the future American Revolution, they have seldom noted the

6

Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: the Seven Years' War and the fate of empire in British North America,
1754-1766 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), pp. 72-79.
7
Andrew D.M. Beaumont, Colonial America and the Earl of Halifax (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015), pp. 135-143.

169

importance of one precocious element of these proposals: an early drive for a multi-colony
provincial naval force of some kind. All told, Anglo-Americans and imperial officials seemed
interested in a pan-colonial naval force to contest the French on the Great Lakes and on the
Atlantic. The most visionary naval plan at Albany came from Pennsylvania delegate Benjamin
Franklin. Franklin had previously defied Philadelphia’s Quaker elite when he campaigned for the
commissioning of a provincial naval warship to guard the colony from French raids in 1747 at
the end of the War of Jenkin’s Ear.
Expanding on his proposal from seven years before, at Albany Franklin suggested that a
prospective American grand council and congress (under the authority of the British government,
of course) would fund and construct “guard-vessels to scour the coasts from privateers in time of
war, and protect the trade.” In his defense of the final Albany Plan, Franklin argued that “small
vessels of force are sometimes necessary in the colonies to scour the coast of small privateers.
These being provided by the Union, will be an advantage in turn to the colonies which are
situated on the sea, and whose frontiers on the land-side, being coverd by other colonies, reap but
little immediate benefit from the advanced forts.”8 While other delegates, including Thomas
Pownall—an unofficial representative of the Earl of Halifax at the conference and future
governor of Massachusetts—made vague arguments for a provincial naval force on the Great
Lakes and seacoast, Franklin’s proposal—which would ultimately be the basis for the final draft
of the Albany Congress’s Plan of Union—was the only plan that called for a centralized colonial
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navy.9 This plan clearly demonstrated the fact that Anglo-American leaders expected that they
would need substantial provincial naval forces in the coming fight with the French.
Despite his plan’s novelty, Franklin’s proposal for a proto-Continental Navy was
premature. On the one hand, the Albany Congress itself met with little support from colonial
legislatures who prized local autonomy over a united colonial military alliance.10 On the other
hand, imperial officials seemed to be just as disinterested in a major colonial maritime force as
their Anglo-American constituents. The Board of Trade’s own simultaneous proposal for a
colonial union omitted discussions of naval defense. Additionally, for reasons that are unclear,
the Board reported to the king that Albany commissioners had planned a “Naval establishment
upon the Lake to secure the navigation,” but the Albany Congress’s calls for provincial coastal
warships as well.11 While Halifax’s Board was not opposed to supporting provincial navies (as
evidenced by their support for Nova Scotia’s ‘sea militia’ throughout the interwar period), they
were also not prepared to support a pan-colonial provincial navy.
Even though the plans for colonial union came to naught, one element from the
discussions survived: imperial support for a naval force on the Great Lakes. In 1755, the Duke of
Newcastle ordered British Army General Edward Braddock to take charge of all land-based
military operations in the colonies. By April, Braddock met with the governors of Massachusetts,
New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia in Alexandria, Virginia to coordinate war
plans. Braddock informed the governors that imperial officials had called for a multi-pronged
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attack on both French frontier forts as well as French Canada itself.12 The various governors
agreed with Braddock that a naval force was necessary on New York's contested borderlands,
and “advised the building of two Vessels of Sixty Tons upon the Lake Ontario...according to a
Draught to be sent By [Royal Navy] Commodore Keppell, who desired that an Account might be
laid before him of the Cost of 'em, and undertook to defray it…” The attendees delegated
Massachusetts Governor William Shirley (who had substantial provincial naval experience
himself) with coordinating the naval plan. The attendees also planned for similar vessels to be
built at Lake Erie, with the expenses of naval and land defenses there to be covered by the
provincial governments of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.13
The plans at the Alexandria, Virginia meeting between Braddock and the colonial
governors reflected larger British and French concerns over naval mastery of the Great Lakes—a
goal that both imperial governments saw as key to winning the war in the northwest. While
imperial officials ordered the construction of lake warships to counter the French fleet
(particularly on Lake Ontario), lake crews on small craft typically avoided large fights with
enemy vessels. Instead, they transported troops and supplies, warned of enemy advances, and
attempted to intercept enemy communications.14 These vessels involved the Royal Navy to an
extent, but largely fell under the British Army’s aegis as it struggled to force the French out of
the American colonies’ northwestern frontiers.
The Lake Ontario navy of 1755-6 was a rare example of a fusion between the Royal
Navy and colonial provincial naval forces. While Commodore Keppel (and by extension, the
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Crown) paid the wages of the fleet’s predominantly Anglo-American sailors, provincial
governments themselves largely financed the construction of the seven-vessel fleet on Lake
Ontario. Whereas Royal Navy Captain Housman Broadley served at the small flotilla's
“commodore,” Governor Shirley—acting as temporary commander of Anglo-American forces—
hired merchant captains to act as Broadley’s subordinate officers. In late 1755 Shirley even
convinced a council of fellow Anglo-American governors to underwrite the expansion of the
Lake Ontario fleet without any assistance from the Royal Navy when French naval expansion
seemed imminent.
This fusion of provincial and Royal naval resources extended to the Lake George-Lake
Champlain theatre as well. Captain Joshua Loring, a former Massachusetts privateer that had
transitioned to the Royal Navy organized a similar fleet while British forces laid siege to Fort
Carillon—later known as Fort Ticonderoga. While Loring drew on both provincial and Royal
financial assistance to construct vessels such as the twenty-gun brig Duke of Cumberland, many
of his “sailors” included officers and soldiers drawn from provincial and regular AngloAmerican and British infantry regiments. British Army commanders such as General Amherst
were also largely responsible for metropolitan funds for the eastern lake fleet. Despite Loring’s
presence, the lake naval forces were largely under the purview of the British Army in that
theatre.15
While joint provincial-Royal construction and manning of armed vessels on the Great
Lakes was certainly novel in the history of provincial naval activity, Massachusetts Lt. Colonel
John Bradstreet’s “Batteaux Service” in that same theatre of operations reflected some of the
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southern colonies’ scout boat services. Batteaux were flat, shallow-water cargo boats that had a
lengthy pre-war service history on New York’s inland waterways and lakes. Bradstreet’s flotilla
of several thousand provincial bateaux men, which has been characterized by one historian as the
“contemporary sister organization” to the famed Roger’s Rangers, transported soldiers and
supplies to frontier outposts such as Fort Oswego on Lake Ontario. Occasionally, these
backwoods sailors even disembarked to fend off large groups of Franco-Indigenous raiders.16
While often compared to Roger’s Rangers, it might also be said they were a distant cousin of
South Carolina’s provincial scout boat navy.
Convinced by the success of the hardy mariners, in late 1757, Bradstreet—in much the
same manner as Franklin’s proposed colonial navy—asked the British government to bankroll an
even more extensive multi-colony bateaux service led by American officers (Bradstreet reasoned
they would hesitate to serve under British officers), and bankrolled by imperial funds. While the
British commander of North America at the time, Lord Loudoun, did not accept the petition in its
full form, he did promise Crown reimbursement for personal costs for Bradstreet’s proposed
1758 naval assault on Fort Frontenac.17 In fact, British army commanders frequently drew on
imperial funds to support lake navies, though various issues with credit and delays in payment
had the potential to hamper the Empire’s war efforts at times.18 Nevertheless, by the end of the
conflict in 1763, Anglo-American and imperial officials had cooperated to construct or purchase
nearly thirty small war and cargo vessels on Lakes George, Ontario, Champlain, and Erie.19
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While combined provincial and Royal efforts maintained fleets near the most active
fronts of the war around the Great Lakes, there was no such large-scale naval cooperation on the
coasts of North America and in the West Indies. The main reason for this was likely Britain’s
near-domination of the maritime theatre of the war after 1758, but a survey of those few colonial
provincial naval forces that operated up to that point is still warranted. Though on a smaller scale
than in the previous imperial conflict, Anglo-American governments throughout the British
Atlantic commissioned provincial navies to fight French privateers. This naval effort was
understandably more potent in regions directly affected by warfare with the French, particularly
in New England. For instance, after news of the 1756 declaration of war against France,
Governor Shirley’s administration in Massachusetts spearheaded an effort to use local tax money
to fund two provincial warships: the Prince of Wales snow (captained by Nathaniel Dowse) and
the King George frigate (captained by Benjamin Hallowell, Jr).
The aptly named Massachusetts frigate King George was a particularly useful adjunct for
Royal Navy forces operating in northern waters throughout the Seven Years War.20 In the
summer of 1757, Lord Halifax’s ally and Shirley’s successor as governor, Thomas Pownall,
reported to Prime Minister William Pitt that Massachusetts had a “naval Establishment (which
no other Province has).” While Pownall apparently did not realize that most British colonies had
established provincial navies at some point throughout their history, he did realize their utility,
and expressed the hope that they would be useful adjuncts to the Royal Navy.21 Indeed, near the
end of the conflict in October of 1762, the next Massachusetts Governor; Francis Bernard,
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bragged that the King George was instrumental to Royal Navy Admiral Lord Colville's victory
over the French in Newfoundland. Even though the “junction of the King George with Lord
Collville appeared to be an accidental meeting instead of a Concerted Measure...I recd from Ld.
Colville such an high testimony of Capt.. Hollowel [sic]...”22
Whereas provincial governors of Massachusetts envisioned the colony’s navy as a useful
adjunct for an ever-expanding Royal Navy presence in the North Atlantic, colonies to its
immediate south and in the West Indies deployed provincial naval forces on a much more
temporary basis in order to stop the widespread threat of French privateers. Even though the
Royal Navy effectively eliminated the French navy as a serious threat by the late 1750s, it was
unable to fully control elusive French private men of war. By the end of the conflict, French
privateers had captured 1,400 British ships in the Caribbean theatre alone.23
Between 1757 and 1759, there appeared to be a minor “provincial naval” fever
throughout the Atlantic that echoed Anglo-American naval planning in the last conflict.
Nevertheless, within a few years, much of the impetus to fit out local provincial forces faded as
Royal Navy patrols and fleets gained momentum against the French throughout the Atlantic
world. In 1757, the Connecticut government purchased a brigantine, Tartar, and assigned
Michael Burnham as its captain. Burnham, who had been one of the last captains of the colony
sloop Defence during the previous imperial war, led his crew on a journey to the West Indies to
protect Connecticut trade interests there. By 1758, without any significant debate, the provincial

22
Francis Bernard to John Pownall, 20 October 1762, in The Papers of Francis Bernard, Governor of
Colonial Massachusetts, Vol. I: 1759-1763, ed. Colin Nicolson (Boston: The Colonial Society of Massachusetts,
2007), pp. 278-279.
23
Rodger, Command of the Ocean, p. 277, Thomas M. Truxes, “The Breakdown of Borders: Commerce
Raiding during the Seven Years' War, 1756-1763,” Commerce Raiding: Historical Case Studies, 1755-2009, Eds.
Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine (New Port: Naval War College, 2013), pp. 16-18.
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA591580.pdf

176

government decided to sell the Tartar.24 To the east in 1757, Rhode Island’s government took
charge of two vessels (including the privateer brigantine Abercrombie), and ordered them to hunt
for a French privateer that was harassing English commerce off of Block Island. While Rhode
Island’s government commissioned numerous private men of war throughout the conflict, it
abandoned its only attempt at a provincially-funded guard vessel in late 1758.25
Farther south in 1757, the traditionally pacificistic Pennsylvania government agreed to fit
out a 22-gun provincial vessel known as the Pennsylvania Frigate, with the express purpose of
the “Protection of our Trade.”26 Far from answering this purpose, the Pennsylvania Frigate’s
captain John Sibbald faced accusations of inaction and cowardice in colonial newspapers in New
York and Pennsylvania. By late 1758, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives Committee of
Correspondence wrote the Lords of the Admiralty to complain about the “Losses sustained by
the Merchants of this colony...notwithstanding the great Expence they have for some Time past
been at in supporting a Ship of War to guard the Coast, and humbly pray the Assistance from our
Mother Country, of a Vessel or Vessels of superior Force…”27 Despite early disappointment
with the frigate, the Pennsylvania government kept the vessel cruising to protect the colony’s
trade for the rest of the conflict. Pennsylvania would prove to be the only colony other than
Massachusetts to keep a provincial frigate cruising for this long in the war.28
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Provincial naval patrols also occurred in the Southern colonies, although the immediate
French threat was much more muted there, and Spain’s late entry in the war in 1762 also delayed
concerted provincial naval expeditions in the Southern colonies along the Florida borderlands.
Nevertheless, South Carolina and Georgia did fit out some provincial naval forces. In South
Carolina, a committee of concerned merchants and elites discussed creating a voluntary fund
from which “one or two Vessels of War may upon any sudden Occasion be immediately fitted
out” in case French privateers were to attack Charles Town. They contended that “his Majesty's
Ships cannot at all Times go over the Bar, the Consequences of which we need not mention.”29
Even though locals continued to manage their own coastal defenses when needed, an
episode in the summer of 1757 demonstrated just how intermeshed provincial and Royal defense
efforts had become. When a French privateer attacked local merchant vessels in the waters of
Charles Town, the local government fitted out an emergency fleet of two small vessels to pursue
it. While one provincial vessel had a crew of local volunteers and infantrymen from Lt. Colonel
Henry Bouquet’s 60th Regiment of Foot (the ‘Royal Americans’), the other provincial vessel
was manned entirely by Royal Navy sailors and marines from the H.M.S. Arundel.30
Even though the Royal Navy (and elements of the British Army) demonstrated
willingness to assist South Carolina’s provincial forces in 1757, this cooperation seems to have
ended by 1758. A Charles Town correspondent reported that even “Tho' we have not a Man of
War or other Vessel cruizing from Port in this Province, to protect our Coasts against the Insults
of the French Privateers that may be upon it, we are assured that the Province of Georgia has—a
fine Sloop having been impressed there…” Georgia Governor Henry Ellis put the vessel (Tryal)
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under the command of a privateer captain, assigned the captain of the colony’s scout boat as a
pilot, and added the sailors from the scout boat as well as several volunteers to its crew. The
source reported that in a subsequent battle with a French privateer crew (that included escaped
African slaves from South Carolina), the Tryal’s crew suffered many casualties, but successfully
withstood several boarding attempts. With this pyrrhic victory in mind, the South Carolina
correspondent declared that: GEORGIA has made its Effort; and surely it must now be our Turn!
'Tis true, the Event of our Sister-Colony's Endeavours carries some Disappointment in it, but we
cannot think they have been fruitless. We cannot conclude this account without this Observation,
that those who go with a sincere Intention of finding the Enemy, seldom fail to meet them.31 It is
likely that the correspondent’s conclusion was an acerbic commentary on what he believed to be
the Royal Navy’s alleged inactivity in patrolling for French privateers.
While it is tempting to see Ellis’s provincial navy as an example of colonial self-reliance
in the wake of imperial negligence, scholars have largely noted that this period saw increasing
colonial reliance on imperial military initiatives. Even independent provincial naval expeditions
during the late 1750s should be seen within the context of Britain’s growing military strength
throughout the Atlantic world. For instance, historian Andrew D.M. Beaumont has argued that
Governor Ellis’s ability to “act decisively upon his own initiative” was precisely why the Board
of Trade’s Lord Halifax had made him the governor of Georgia. Beaumont contends that
throughout 1756 and 1757, ministerial infighting and military inaction by British commanders
such as Lord Loudoun damaged Britain’s war effort. To counter this, Lord Halifax depended
upon the colonial governors to carry on the fight against the French with local resources. In
short, Beaumont holds that even colonial authorities acting on their own initiative could still
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advance metropolitan military goals.32 By 1759, provincial naval forces in South Carolina and
Georgia had made some strides against French privateers, but these minor naval forces paled in
comparison to the large Southern provincial navies of the War of Jenkins Ear.
Just as in the last war, provincial navies were only moderately active in the West Indies.
In fact, within the first few years of the war, political infighting, arguments over finance, and the
overwhelming presence of Royal Navy guardships limited the service lives of even those few
provincial ships in the region.33 That is not to say that there was never any use for local defense
vessels in island provinces. For instance, late in the war in 1761, the Bermuda government fitted
out two sloops to chase after French privateer sloops. The emergency fleet successfully forced
the raiders away.34 Despite occasional utility for emergency fleets and provincial guardships, the
Jamaica governor’s 1757 speech to a joint session of his council and the island’s assembly
provides a poignant picture of the decline of provincial navies in the West Indies:
...I apprehend there will be no Occasion for an Island Sloop, two Vessels having been already
commissioned, by an Order from the Lords of the Admiralty, for the immediate Protection of our
Coasts[;] The great Sums of Money usually expended in Time of War for that Service will now
be saved, the Country relieved from so heavy a Burthen, and the purpose more fully
answered…35

The decline in provincial naval warfare throughout the Atlantic world in the late 1750s
coincided with the decline of its sister institution: privateering. Though Parliament initially
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encouraged widespread privateering at the beginning of the conflict, and even though it allowed
privateers to raid neutral merchant ships that carried French goods, by 1759 the British
government decided to limit the issue of Letters of Marque when tensions arose with neutral
powers concerned about British assaults on their shipping.
Aside from diplomatic concerns over privateering excesses, Royal Navy vessels were
also more efficient in commerce raiding during the Seven Years War than privateers. In his study
on British privateers throughout the eighteenth century, historian David Starkey calculated that
between 1739 and 1751, British authorities condemned 408 enemy vessels captured by privateers
and 449 vessels captured by the Royal Navy. Between 1756 and 1763, British courts condemned
382 privateer prizes and 794 Royal Navy prizes. Starkey connects the decline in British
privateering to the Royal Navy’s victories in the 1750s and 1760s.36
The decline in privateering after 1759 was noticeable in America as well. New York
merchants had fitted out three times as many privateers in the Seven Years War than they had in
the War of Jenkin’s Ear. By 1759, however, over-hunting of enemy commerce reduced the
number of prizes available for privateers. New York’s Vice Admiralty Judge Lewis Morris—a
veteran administrator that had overseen privateering cases since the War of Jenkin’s Ear—
condemned more prizes in 1758 than in any year in his long career, but saw fewer and fewer
cases as British victories and “over-fishing” of French prizes continued.37 All in all, Royal Navy
military victories throughout the Atlantic world by the end of the decade disincentivized
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provincial governments from outfitting large provincial navies, and private merchants from
pursuing privateering.

Royal Navy Supremacy at Sea, 1758-1763

Even though provincial governments initially believed that they would have to create
extensive provincial navies as in the previous conflict, the Royal Navy’s expansion and victories
over its French enemies after 1757 (coupled with Spain’s belated entry into the conflict in 1762)
made the creation of extensive provincial navies unnecessary. To fully appreciate why colonial
governments consciously decided to cut back on provincial navy spending, one must fully
examine the reasons behind the Royal Navy’s growing hegemony in the Atlantic world in the
late 1750s.
The seeds of Royal Navy squadrons replacing private naval squadrons at sea were sown
as early as the mid-1750s, but imperial naval strength would only fully be realized by the end of
the 1750s. Historian W.A.B. Douglas argues that when Royal Navy Captain John Rous led a
force of Royal ships to help take French Fort Beausejour in Nova Scotia in the summer of 1755,
it was “perhaps symptomatic of that state of affairs that [Rous's squadron was] composed
entirely of King's ships rather than a mixed force of provincial and [Royal] naval vessels.”38
The Royal Navy’s ultimate maritime hegemony by the end of the 1750s did not come
easily. The Duke of Newcastle, Sir Thomas Pelham-Holles (the brother of Prime Minister Henry
Pelham, and his successor after 1756) initially hoped to contain French aggression to North
America and to avoid an all-out European conflagration. The Newcastle administration feared

38

Douglas, Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy, pp. 208-211.

182

that if another worldwide imperial war broke out, the battle fleets of the recently expanded
French and Spanish navies would potentially outnumber and overpower the Royal Navy. While
important members of the Whig opposition such as William Pitt (and naval reformers in the
Admiralty such as Lords Bedford and Sandwich) called for an aggressive maritime assault on
France, Newcastle and his allies insisted that diplomatic solutions in Europe and limited warfare
against the French were preferable. Ultimately, the ministry did not dedicate enough Royal Navy
vessels to intercept French reinforcements sailing for the New World—a misstep that played a
major role in the expansion of the war beyond the North American continent in 1756.39
What had begun as border skirmishes in North America quickly became a major world
war between 1756 and 1758. In the English Channel and on the French coast, the Royal Navy’s
Western Squadron made a few patrols along the French coast and into the Atlantic throughout
1756 and 1757 but failed to stop three major French squadrons sailing for the Caribbean and
Canada. The Western Squadron's inactivity allowed the French to heavily reinforce
Louisbourg—a fact that delayed the long-planned Anglo-American assault on French Canada.
To calm public anger over mediocre progress in the war effort, William Pitt (then the Southern
Secretary of State) planned for a major Royal Navy-army assault on the port of Rochefort,
France in late 1757. Infighting between the British Army and the Royal Navy, faulty
intelligence, and bad weather forced the invasion force to withdraw. A subsequent joint raid on
the French port of St. Malo in the summer of 1758 was more successful, and resulted in the
destruction of 80 French privateer vessels and merchant ships (along with four French naval
vessels under construction).40
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In the Mediterranean, the French captured the island of Minorca in the spring of 1756. A
Royal Navy relief force led by Admiral Byng failed to recover the island, and Byng himself was
executed by the Admiralty for his alleged inaction. By early 1758, however, the Royal Navy
was able to contain and overpower the main French fleet in the Mediterranean, and prevented it
from sailing across the Atlantic to reinforce Louisbourg.41 Between 1758 and 1759, Royal Navy
forces also slowly seized France’s West African possessions in Senegal. While the British
government considered the Mediterranean an important strategic theatre, the seizure of French
slaving colonies in Africa clearly was designed to harm France’s economy while also bolstering
Britain’s transatlantic commerce.42
In the East Indies, the French and British East India Companies (along with their
respective Indian allies) had long been at war with one another. A Royal Navy force had already
been sent to India in 1755 to assist the East India Company's own naval forces (the Bombay
Marine) in a fight against their enemies in the Angrian Indian kingdom, and was prepared for the
larger fight against the French when news of war arrived in 1756. Between 1756 and 1759,
British and French forces (alongside their Indian partners) fought a largely inconclusive war of
attrition. Both British and French squadrons fought each other to a standstill on numerous
occasions, and both sides captured important trading outposts from one another. By 1761,
however, British forces had largely forced the French out of India with the capture of
Pondicherry.43
While clashes between the British and French empires occurred throughout the world,
Prime Minister William Pitt’s decision to focus the British war effort on the North American

41

Robson, History of the Royal Navy, pp. 30-42.
Robson, History of the Royal Navy, pp.83-85.
43
Rodger, Command of the Ocean, pp. 274-275.
42

184

theatre after 1757 proved to be one of the war’s major turning points, and the Royal Navy was a
key component in this plan. Historian Eliga Gould has made the case that growing resentment
against long-standing Whig concerns with political and military involvement in continental
European affairs encouraged Prime Minister William Pitt to focus on a “Blue Water” vision of
British empire. This vision utilized naval power to expand the British imperial reach into the
Americas—a move that would both bolster British wealth and harm the empire’s French
enemies.44
The positive effects of this renewed British attention to the North American theatre
became apparent in the summer of 1758 when Admiral Boscawen led over twenty-one battle
ships and two frigates—the first Royal Navy fleet that had ever wintered in Nova Scotia—
alongside 12,000 soldiers in a successful assault on Fortress Louisbourg. This act would serve as
the first step in the larger conquest of Canada that would occur throughout the next two years. It
is telling that Massachusetts’s government, which had spearheaded a large provincial flotilla in
the siege of 1745, did little more for the naval assault on the city than to utilize the provincial
frigate King George as a scouting vessel and commerce raider on the coast surrounding
Louisbourg.45 The capture of Louisbourg demonstrated that the Blue Water Strategy hinged
more on Royal than provincial naval resources.
Even though fighting continued in every corner of the world, the Royal Navy held the
advantage over the French in North America and in the West Indies after the 1758 seizure of
Louisbourg and subsequent 1759 capture of Quebec. While Pitt’s adoption of more aggressive
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naval warfare against French interests certainly aided the British war effort, one other factor
worked in the British empire’s favor: Spain’s continued neutrality. King Filip VI of Spain had
long sought to maintain peaceful relations with the British empire. However, when the king died
in the summer of 1759, the Spanish government’s devotion to neutrality died with him. His half
brother and successor, Charles III, hated Britain and sought to restore his kingdom's traditional
alliance with France. Charles III oversaw a further expansion of the Spanish navy and sent
squadrons to reinforce garrisons in the West Indies.
At the same time, ongoing peace talks between Britain and France proved to be
unfruitful. Pitt's desire to continue the war at any cost and to welcome a fight with the
increasingly belligerent Spanish was unpopular to the war-weary British public, and the prime
minister resigned in the autumn of 1761. Despite his resignation, Spain belatedly formalized a
military alliance with France in the winter of 1761.Within weeks of the declaration of war,
officials in London planned to use the large British infantry and naval forces already
campaigning against the French in the Caribbean to capture Havana, Cuba. They were to be
assisted by Anglo-American provincial regiments, volunteer units of free blacks and French
Huguenots. On 6 June 1762, the British invasion force surprised Havana's defenders, and began a
massive siege. After hundreds of casualties and months of fighting, the weary Spanish garrison
finally surrendered to the British on 13 August 1762. The siege of Havana would be the only
major British or Anglo-American expedition against the Spanish during their short period of
participation in the conflict. News of the British victory would also play a major role in
strengthening the British hand in the ongoing peace talks in Paris in the autumn of 1762.46
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During Spain’s brief participation in the conflict, Britain and its Anglo-American subjects
faced their traditional French and Spanish enemies together for the first time since 1748.
Nevertheless, the military situation was much different at the end of the Seven Years War than
during the War of Jenkin’s Ear. By 1762, the Royal Navy had overpowered its French rivals in
almost every corner of the globe and was more than prepared to take part in an assault on
Havana.
It is interesting to note that Southern provincial governments did not engage in any major
military campaigns against Spanish Florida. While Anglo-Americans undoubtedly fitted out
privateers and occasional provincial fleets, a policy of proactive defense at this late stage in the
conflict was preferred over major campaigns against the Spanish. This sentiment was best
expressed in a Spring 1762 issue of the South Carolina Gazette, which reported that “The
general assembly of this province have [sic] resolved to continue both the scout-boats, and the
look-outs, during the continuation of the present war with France and Spain.”47 British victories
over Franco-Spanish forces throughout the Atlantic world and ongoing peace talks likely made
the need for expensive expeditions against St. Augustine (such as had been planned in the
previous conflict) unnecessary.
All told, the Royal Navy played a key role in achieving Britain’s first imperial victory
over its foes in half a century. In London, the Admiralty Board’s continued insistence on
professionalization, insistence on aggressive strategies, new battleship designs, the capture of
large numbers of enemy mariners, British assaults on neutral ships carrying French goods, and
French economic collapse all contributed to Britain’s growing naval advantage as the long war
blazed on. Behind aggressive military expansion throughout the war, new methods for
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distributing supplies to ships, and Whig Prime Minister’s William Pitt's ability to get consistent
credit and funding for both the navy and army also played large roles in the British naval
victory.48
The Admiralty’s growing interest in overseas conquests paralleled an even larger shift in
the British government’s relationship with its overseas empire in America. Throughout the last
several decades, a number of scholars have noted an increased metropolitan interest in colonial
military defense with the onset of the Seven Years War. Kurt Nagel has argued that by the late
1740s, the British government had begun to take the reins of colonial military defense policies
while also continuing to insist on colonial self-defense measures—a contradiction that would
play a role in fostering the imperial crisis of the 1760s. London’s total involvement in colonial
military affairs would crystallize by the Seven Years War with William Pitt’s aforementioned
adoption of a Blue Water strategy that increased military involvement in America.49 Thus, the
Royal Navy’s growing presence in American naval warfare represented a growing metropolitan
interest in the governance and defense of its American colonies at midcentury.
Even if the Royal Navy’s expanded operations in the Atlantic world supplanted the need
for provincial navies, British naval dominance over the French and Spanish required significant
American assistance and sacrifice. For instance, in 1759, after Royal Navy Admiral Durell
requested men for his ever-undermanned squadron at Halifax, Nova Scotia, Rhode Island’s
government promised bounties “out of the general treasury, over and above the King’s, of forty
shillings sterling” for all men who would join the Royal fleet.50 This sort of spending did not
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come easily. For instance, even though Parliament had reimbursed some of Massachusetts’s war
debts by 1759, the colony continued to employ more than 25% of its adult male population in
infantry and naval services (including on bateaus, privateers, and on the King George) on its own
coin. Even though these charges sapped the colony’s economic strength in the short term, the
promise of future Parliamentary reimbursement encouraged Massachusetts and other colonial
governments to provide thousands of soldiers and sailors for the imperial cause.
While economic reimbursement from London was vital in securing Anglo-American
military expenditure throughout the conflict, another force also drove colonial governments to
continue to support the imperial cause: a growing belief among Anglo-Americans that they were
equal “partners” with the British army in the war against the French. Scholars have noted that
this growing patriotic fervor was not shared by British army leaders (particularly General
Amherst) who saw colonial governments and their forces as fickle subordinates rather than as
imperial partners.51 While these tensions had existed on land for sometime, they also continued
to plague provincial-Royal cooperation at sea. As discussed in the previous chapter, in the early
1750s, Anglo-Americans had failed to convince imperial authorities that their provincial
warships at Louisbourg had been the equals of Royal Navy frigates.
As ever, the main controversy between Anglo-Americans and the Royal Navy was
impressment. In the aftermath of the 1747 Knowles Riots, Royal Navy captains typically only
impressed American sailors already at sea rather than in port. This new strategy did little to
assuage colonial authorities, and met with violent resistance near Boston Harbor in 1758 when a
merchant vessel fired on a boat carrying a press gang from the H.M.S. Hunter.52 Despite early
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reservations, the Royal Navy did not always limit its impressment to sea—a fact that would bring
about significant resistance throughout the Northern port cities.
Anger at Royal Navy impressment on land and sea during the Seven Years War must be
understood within the wider context of unsavory recruitment policies by imperial infantry and
naval forces. Throughout Colonial America’s towns and cities, British Army recruiters often
relied on coercion and violence to force Anglo-Americans into personnel-depleted regiments.
Thus, Anglo-American mobs frequently assaulted regular army recruiting parties; mob violence
against Royal Navy press gangs was a simultaneous occurrence.53 For New Yorkers, these two
threats coalesced in the spring of 1757 when Lord Loudon’s troops assisted the Royal Navy in
impressing over 800 men. While mariners could not resist Royal Navy press gangs that had large
red-coated units at their disposal, individual crews did put up hefty resistance when they had the
chance. One representative example occurred in 1760, when the crew of the privateer Samson
engaged in a naval shootout with a Royal Navy crew that tried to impress them. Even though
local lawmen tried to help the press gang, the privateer crew was largely able to escape from
New York Harbor.54 It should be noted that sailors also resisted local officials’ attempts at
impressment, including a case from 1758 in which mariners fired on a New York militia
company that tried to force them into the colony’s transport service.55 Nevertheless, as will be
seen in the conclusion to this dissertation, Anglo-American anger over Royal Navy impressment
would play a major role in the postwar imperial crisis.
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While colonists resented the Royal Navy for its impressment policy, they also grew to
despise its role in suppressing illicit Anglo-American trade with the French. As early as 1755,
Admiralty officials took note of the widespread North American trade with the French in
Louisbourg and the West Indies, and ordered Admiral Augustus Keppel to patrol for smugglers.
Anglo-American smugglers often had patronage from colonial governors, including
Pennsylvania Governor William Denny. Denny sold ‘flag-of-truce’ passes to merchant captains
who would tacitly go on diplomatic missions to French territories with the understanding that
they would engage in illicit trading with the enemy. Metropolitan anger over this smuggling
coupled with provincial anger over British attempts to end the practice further strained relations
between periphery and center. When British commanders such as Lord Loundon placed
embargoes on colonial ports to prevent this trade, Anglo-Americans raised hues and cries over
financial losses. By the early 1760s, Parliamentary anger at this widespread trade would prove
to be fundamental in its decision to curb provincial autonomy with numerous imperial reforms,
beginning with legislation surrounding Writs of Assistance (which will be discussed below).56
By the early 1760s, Parliamentary leaders had come to the conclusion that to secure their
new possessions in the Americas and to crack down on excessive provincial economic and
political autonomy, they would have to expand Royal military forces throughout the colonies
while also enacting numerous reforms that would fund these forces. These reforms included
expanding vice admiralty court jurisdiction and enforcing customs laws with a fleet of purposebuilt coast guard vessels. Historian Eliga Gould argues that Britain's decision to strenuously
enforce trade laws and tax policies began to make enemies of important merchants and ordinary
sailors who had “cut their political teeth resisting the navy's wartime press gangs during the
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1740s and 1750s.”57 Ironically, the imperial laws destined to bring Anglo-Americans closer in
line with British maritime policies would alienate the colonies’ sailors to the point of all-out
rebellion.
Between 1754 and 1757, provincial governments planned for major provincial naval
campaigns against the French as they had in the previous imperial conflict. However, beginning
with the capture of Louisbourg in 1758, William Pitt’s ‘Blue Water Strategy’ (which relied on
the Royal Navy to spearhead the conquest of French possessions in North America) made the
existence of large provincial navies unnecessary. With dozens of Royal Navy warships actively
pursuing French privateers and capturing French ports, provincial governments felt that they
could finally delegate the responsibilities of coastal defense to their imperial overlords. While an
expanded Royal Navy presence may have made Anglo-Americans feel secure while the war
raged on, the imperial fleet would play a major role in exacerbating the postwar imperial crisis of
the 1760s and 1770s that would ultimately pave the way for the Revolutionary War.
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Conclusion: Provincial Navies and the Imperial Crisis, c. 1762-1775

Even though provincial navies had played only a small role in the British victory in the
Seven Years War, the century-long legacy of provincial naval service (coupled with long-held
colonial anger at Royal Navy excesses) would play a significant part in shaping Patriot resistance
during the imperial crisis of the 1760s-70s. In particular, Anglo-Americans would use stories of
their provincial naval service to contest British taxation and would also draw on familiar
maritime defense tactics to oppose Royal Navy enforcement of imperial policies.
Unsurprisingly, the first major connection between pre-Revolutionary provincial navies
and the imperial crisis occurred in the ever-turbulent port city of Boston. By the middle of 1760,
Boston, like many other northeastern ports, faced an economic recession as the war with France
began to wind down. It also faced political infighting between conservative elites (and supporters
of extending Governor Francis Bernard’s prerogative powers) such as the colony’s Chief Justice
Thomas Hutchinson and populist politicians such as James Otis. Among the sharpest disputes
that arose between these political factions was the battle over Writs of Assistance, one of the first
controversial imperial reforms of the 1760s. The British government had equipped customs
officers with greater authority to utilize search warrants (writs) on vessels suspected of
smuggling. Otis’s campaign against the writs of assistance and Hutchinson’s attempts to ban the
popular Boston town meeting endeared him to poorer laborers and merchants concerned with
increasing imperial trade restrictions.1
Aside from Otis’s resistance to what he considered growing imperial overreach, he also
opposed Governor Francis Bernard’s handling of the colony’s provincial navy in the final year of
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the war against France—a case he documented in the 1762 pamphlet A Vindication of the
Conduct of the House of Representatives of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay. One early
nineteenth century historian made the bold case that this pamphlet “has been considered the
original source, from which all subsequent arguments against taxation were derived.”2 With the
French having commenced an assault on Newfoundland that summer and with coastal fishermen
fearing a renewed assault on the New England fisheries, Governor Bernard and his council
expanded the crew of the provincial sloop Massachusetts and sent it on various patrols without
consulting the colony’s assembly. Bernard’s unilateral strategy may have appeared harmless to
the governor, but what may have seemed like a small quibble over the defense of the coast set
the pace for larger constitutional arguments that would resound throughout the next few decades.
Overall, Otis’s larger argument was not with the existence of a provincial navy in
Massachusetts, though he questioned if “the province's trade has truly received a Benefit from
those Vessels equal to the Tax...paid for their Support.” Rather, Otis characterized Bernard’s
fitting out of the sloop without approaching the assembly (coupled with other extraparliamentary expenditure) as a symptom of arbitrary executive power. A legislative committee
responded with the claim that “No Necessity therefore can be sufficient to justify a house of
Representatives in giving up such a Priviledge; for it would be of little consequence to the people
whether they were subject to George or Lewis, the King of Great Britain or the French King, if
both were arbitrary, as both would be if both could levy Taxes without Parliament.”3 Ultimately,
as in so many cases throughout the Atlantic world in the preceding century, battles over
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provincial navies reflected larger sociopolitical divisions and tensions within colonial society
rather than squabbles over naval policy.
While Otis and his colleagues equated Bernard’s naval expenditure with taxing the
populace without representation—a clarion cry that would resound throughout colonial protests
for the next decade--they also expressed an anxiety common throughout seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century British politics: that an executive would keep a standing military force to
arbitrarily oppress his subjects. This fear was evident when Otis wondered “If the Governor and
Council can fit out one man of war, inlist men, grant a bounty and make establishments, why not
for a navy, if to them it shall seem necessary, and they can make themselves the sole judges of
this necessity.”4 Historian Sarah Kinkel has made the case that later in that decade, AngloAmericans dissidents—like their compatriots among the Patriot Whigs in Britain—protested
Royal Navy enforcement of metropolitan trade laws partly due to their “preexisting fears about a
professional military…”5 While men like Otis did not oppose provincial navies on principle, they
did fear that excessively powerful governors could wield them in the same manner as a standing
army to squash the rights of the citizenry.
While it may seem hyperbolic to assume a governor could maintain a private navy to
enforce his will (or imperial laws), there were some cases where provincial navies supported
unpopular British policies during the imperial crisis. For instance, the Georgia scout boat Prince
George was fundamental in securing the delivery of stamps after Parliament’s infamous 1765
Stamp Act. This act was one of Parliament’s first major attempts at external taxation on internal
colonial commerce and required colonists to pay a stamp duty on various official documents and
licenses. This wildly unpopular act met immediate resistance throughout the American colonies.
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In Georgia, merchants were furious that they could not export rice (the colony’s cash crop)
without customs papers with the stamps affixed and took to the streets to protest the policy
throughout the autumn of 1765.
Throughout the next several months, Wright mobilized the colony’s Royally-funded
ranger force, elements of the Royal Navy, and volunteers to defend the stamps and his own
safety when the local chapter of the Sons of Liberty threatened numerous violent riots. Along
with a few colonial rangers, the crew of the Prince George, transported and guarded the colony’s
stamp collector during his initial landing.6 After the governor’s swift response, one anonymous
Georgian who opposed the Stamp Act lamented that “Our liberty here is at a very low ebb.”
Undoubtedly, the governor’s ability to utilize a Royally-funded infantry force (and provincial
scout boat) in support of the Stamp Act did little to quell colonial fears that their rights were
threatened by standing military forces.7
While the imperial crisis raised larger questions over the ability of the governor to use
provincial navies to enforce unpopular imperial mandates, the legacy of provincial naval service
from previous conflicts also shaped the way Anglo-Americans protested British policies. For
example, as early as 1764, a committee of Massachusetts politicians from the governor’s Council
and Assembly (leery of reports that the British ministry and Parliament were plotting a round of
taxes on the American colonies) drew on their colony’s century-and-a-half of military service to
demonstrate their loyalty to the Crown and to decry imperial taxation. In response to
Parliament's reason for raising taxes on the colonists, to “defray the charges of a war undertaken
for [the colonists'] defence, to which it is said they have never yet sufficiently contributed, the
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Province of Massachusetts Bay deem it proper briefly to set forth their own...exertions and
expenses in the common cause…”
Among the major expenses the committee delineated were the various attacks on Canada
throughout the previous imperial wars, contributions to campaigns in the Seven Years War, and
the commissioning of “armed vessels for the protection of trade, [which] cost 34,795 [pounds].”
While still in debt from the most recent conflict, the colony's government could still declare that
“From its infancy to the present age, this colony, with no expense to the Crown, has defended the
territory granted to it; and thereby mightily extended the British empire and immensely increased
the British commerce.”8 While provincial naval expenses were only one factor in the colony’s
long list of complaints against recent British trade acts, this complaint reiterated long-held
provincial anger at bearing the brunt of the costs of naval defense. If the colonies were willing to
build their own fleets to defend trade and to advance the cause of the British Empire, why were
they being singled out by discriminatory imperial policies?
While Massachusetts explicitly listed its provincial naval expenses as evidence that the
colony should not be taxed by Parliament, other colonies drew on more general descriptions of
their military exertions to justify their protests. For instance, in his 1764 pamphlet The Rights of
the Colonies Examined, Rhode Island politician Stephen Hopkins (a future signer of the
Declaration of Independence and founder of the Continental Navy) detailed various colonies’
historical wartime sacrifices as evidence that they should not be taxed by Parliament. For
instance, Hopkins argued that:
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....in the year 1746, when the Duke D'Anville came out from France, with the most formidable
French fleet that ever was in the American seas, enraged at these colonies for the loss of
Louisbourg, the year before, and with orders to make an attack on them; even in this greatest
exigence, these colonies were left to the protection of heaven, and their own efforts...9
While Hopkins made no explicit mention of his colony’s naval service in this example,
he must certainly have considered the fact that Royal Navy Admiral Warren had personally
requested Rhode Island’s colony sloop Tartar to scout for DuCasse’s squadron during the
invasion scare.10 In the mind of Anglo-American dissidents, Parliamentary taxation to fund
standing military forces punished colonial governments that had funded their own defense
measures for generations.
Whereas Anglo-Americans drew on their history of provincial naval expenses and
general military costs to argue against British taxation without representation, this same legacy
also defined how many disaffected colonists opposed the metropole’s expansive maritime
enforcement policies. One critical component of Parliament's plans to levy taxes on American
colonists in the years following the Seven Years War was the Admiralty's desire to expand the
North American Squadron’s peacetime fleet to twenty six vessels (and 3,290 sailors). While
France's empire in North America had essentially come to an end in 1763, the British
government hoped that maintaining a peacetime garrison of thousands of red-coated regulars
(along with an expanded naval presence) would prevent future imperial competition over its new
American territories. Aside from military fears, imperial authorities also hoped the Royal Navy
could crack down on widespread American smuggling—a potentially lucrative service that
would serve immediate imperial interests and allow for peacetime prizes for Royal Navy crews.
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The first peacetime commander of the newly expanded squadron, Lord Colville (who had
recently utilized Massachusetts’s provincial warship King George in the attack on
Newfoundland), zealously embraced his new powers to seize and confiscate illicit cargo and
trading vessels.11
By 1764, Admiralty officials funded the construction of six small sloops and schooners
for the Royal Navy to use in the pursuit of North American (and occasionally French) smugglers.
While the Royal Navy did fund this small cutter fleet, the most effective (and unpopular) antismuggling vessels were “peacetime privateers” commissioned by the American Board of
Customs Commissioners. Their crews lived off the proceeds of their captures and tarnished the
reputation of the Royal Navy in American waters even though they were independent of the
imperial fleet. For many Whiggish American traders and smugglers, Britain’s new “sea guard”
was little better than the guarda costas that had prowled their shores throughout the recent
imperial conflicts.12
For many traders in Rhode Island (which depended heavily on the molasses trade with
the West Indies that was now threatened by Parliament’s 1764 Sugar Act), British coast guard
vessels were a major threat to lucrative trade routes. Such warlike threats to the colony’s
commerce had warranted a warlike response. This military response, particularly in the
traditionally rebellious colony of Rhode Island , drew on nearly a century of commissioning
“emergency fleets'” to face immediate piratical and imperial threats. With ongoing Royal Navy
captures of sugar smugglers and rumors of impressment plans, Rhode Islanders began to stage
violent resistance to Royal Navy guard ships as early as 1764. Historian Michael R. Deriderian

11

Neil R. Stout, The Royal Navy in America, 1760-1775 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973), pp. 27-

30,
12

Stout, Royal Navy, pp. 59, 128-9.

199

has accurately called this violence pre-revolutionary “maritime skirmishes.”13 When Lt. Thomas
Hill and the crew of the revenue schooner St. John tried to recruit sailors in Newport, local peer
pressure and threats of violence stalled recruiting. To make up for this loss, Hill seized a local
smuggling vessel. Soon thereafter, a rumor arose that when Royal Navy sailors went on shore to
claim a deserter and plundered a local farm, the locals had planned to fit out an armed vessel to
attack the St. John. Allegedly they were only deterred from this attack by the presence of the
nearby Royal warship Squirrell.
While some scholars have made the case that the planned attack on the St. John was a
mere rumor, it is clear in Lt. Hill’s correspondence that he believed a mob had almost overtaken
his vessel. Although Hill had been absent during the violence, some of his subordinate officers
reported that a “mob filled a sloop full of men, and bore right down to board us…” While Royal
Navy firepower prevented this mob from attacking the St. John, gunners at the local fort fired at
the mainsail of the schooner and forced it to fall back.14 The violent battle for navigation in
Rhode Island had commenced, and impromptu fitting out of warlike vessels would serve Rhode
Islanders in their fight against the Royal Navy just as it had with pirates and other maritime foes
before.
Throughout the rest of the 1760s, Rhode Islanders violently resisted impressment
attempts by the Royal Navy, and even burned the Liberty—the former sloop of the elite
Bostonian smuggler which the Royal Navy had captured and turned into a revenue cutter.15 It is
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important to note that the customs officer who seized the Liberty, Benjamin Hallowell, was the
former provincial navy captain of Massachusetts’s province ship King George. Hallowell’s
actions led to the plundering of his home during an ensuing riot in Boston, and his loyalty to the
Crown ultimately led him to flee to Canada when the Revolutionary War broke out. While
riotous traders and Whigs drew on traditional provincial naval strategies to resist the British
during the imperial crisis, Hallowell’s case reminds us that previous service in Anglo-American
provincial navies did not always correlate with resistance to British authority.16
Whereas Rhode Islanders used mob violence to secure their shipping and sailors from the
Royal Navy throughout the late 1760s, they transitioned to all-out naval assaults on Royal
revenue cutters by the early 1770s. This elevation of violence occurred after Lt. William
Dudsington and the Gaspee schooner (already unpopular in other colonies) seized numerous
Rhode Island smugglers and brought them to the vice admiralty court in Massachusetts. In
response to these seizures and Dudingston’s refusal to show proof of his authority, Governor
Wanton of Rhode Island engaged in a vicious war of letters with the lieutenant and his superior,
Admiral Montagu.17 In a letter to Wanton, Montagu claimed that the Gaspee was stationed at
Rhode Island to protect the locals from piracy and to end smuggling. He also claimed that he had
been informed that “the people of Newport talk of fitting out an armed vessel to rescue any
vessel the King's schooner may take carrying on an illicit trade. Let them be cautious what they
do; for...any of them are taken, I will hang as pirates.” Even though Wanton denied knowledge
of local preparations to assault the Gaspee, Montagu warned that any provincial mob would meet
deadly force if they molested the king’s ships.18
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Even though Montagu feared an attack by a Rhode Island vessel, he could never have
fathomed the multi-boat attack that would occur against the Gaspee in the summer of 1772.
Many decades after the raid, the last survivor, Ephraim Bowen, recalled that on one June night in
1772, the Gaspee grounded when chasing a suspected smuggler. A Providence merchant by the
name of John Brown had a local shipmaster get eight long boats ready to assault the schooner.
About the “time of the shutting up of the shops...a man passed along the main street beating a
drum, and informing the inhabitants of the fact that the Gaspee [italics mine] was aground on
Namquit Point...inviting those persons who felt a disposition to go and destroy that troublesome
vessel, to repair” to the rendezvous point. The armed mob, including future Continental Navy
Admiral Abraham Whipple, ambushed the Gaspee by sea, wounded Dudingston, and burnt the
schooner.19
While one might argue that this was merely an angry mob of Whiggish merchants that
burnt a King’s vessel, this strategy which utilized a drummer rallying volunteers on a whim to
fight off an imminent maritime threat actually fit within the region’s long history of emergency
fleets. Take for example a case from 1704 when a French privateer was reported off the coast,
Governor Samuel Cranston was “immediately caused the Drum to beat for Voluntiers, under the
Command of Capt. [William] Wanton, and in 3 or four hours time Fitted and Man'd a Brigantine,
with 70 brisk young men well Arm’d…” Two years later, when Rhode Island came under
numerous legal attacks, Cranston would cite Rhode Island’s frequent “fitting and sending out
vessels upon the discovery, and to secure the coast” as evidence of the colony’s utility and
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loyalty to the Crown.20 How ironic that Rhode Island elites would use the same strategy to resist
the Crown sixty-eight years later.
For many reasons, the 1772 attack on the Gaspee mirrored Rhode Island’s emergency
fleets of Queen Anne’s War. On a familial level, the 1704 emergency fleet captain, William
Wanton, was the father of Governor Joseph Wanton—the provincial politician who continually
denied that Rhode Islanders had planned a naval assault on the British and who would deal with
the immediate fallout from the Gaspee riot.21 On a strategic level, both naval expeditions relied
on a local authority (or elite) having a drummer rally volunteers on a whim, and piling them into
boats or a vessel to fight off an immediate threat to colonial commerce. Rhode Island, like so
many other colonies, had traditionally raised (or impressed) emergency fleets when Royal Navy
vessels were absent in order to defend the coasts during the emergency, and had now turned that
same strategy on the Royal Navy itself.
For some scholars, the Gaspee Affair fits into larger discussions of mob violence in the
decade leading up to the American Revolution. In her famous study on pre-Revolutionary War
mob violence, historian Pauline Maier argued that the Gaspee Affair was one of many typical
eighteenth century crowd uprisings throughout the Atlantic world. These uprisings involved
elites and commoners acting in concert to solve a local problem (i.e. to fight impressment) rather
than to advance “revolutionary goals.” Nevertheless, Maier argues, Anglo-American riots against
British authorities during this era took on a new meaning as they were fights against impositions
from an “external power.”22 While the Gaspee riot may have demonstrated how an angry Anglo-
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American crowd could use traditional patterns of mob violence against imperial officers, it also
demonstrated the continuity of provincial naval defense strategies throughout the eighteenth
century. It should be noted here that while Anglo-American dissidents drew on historic examples
of provincial naval service to protest British taxation and employed traditional naval tactics to
combat Royal Navy commerce vessels, none of these activities or examples would have been
possible without a large pool of common sailors willing to resist British authority. For decades,
scholars have asserted that the opening moves on the path to the Revolutionary War began on the
docks of colonial ports where common sailors had so long taken part in disorderly riots against
authorities.23
All in all, there were numerous other factors that led Jack Tars to spearhead violent
protests against British authority. On a macro-scale, economic issues plagued Northern port
cities in particular during the final years of the Seven Years War and after. Just as provincial
naval and privateering expeditions declined after 1759, wartime industries in port cities that had
blossomed to support the war-effort (i.e. ship building) declined as Anglo-American forces
conquered French Canada.24 Historian Jesse Lemisch has noted that a perfect storm arose for
maritime discontent in the mid-1760s: post-war unemployment for tens of thousands of former
privateers, new British trade restrictions, and reduced shipping opportunities thanks to colonial
nonimportation protests and the Stamp Act Crisis. In New York City during the late 1760s and
early 1770s, unemployed sailors engaged in violent protests and riots against the British garrison.
Aside from political qualms with the red coated garrison, sailors competed with off-duty British
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infantrymen for part-time jobs and resented the competition. In essence, common sailors had
personal economic and political motives to protest British policies and taxation without
representation.25 It is important to note that Jesse Lemisch has found that one of the many
unifying factors for these common seamen was their shared experience of serving on privateer
vessels during the Seven Years War. While the difference between privateers and governmentfunded provincial navies has been maintained throughout this dissertation, it is worth noting that
the legacy of private naval warfare—whether involving colonial navies or privateers—continued
to shape the way Americans protested British authority throughout the imperial crisis.
Whereas economic and political concerns unique to the 1760s drove some sailors to resist
British authority in the streets of port cities, one traditional bogeyman continued to foster
common sailors’ resentment to British authority: impressment. Numerous scholars have pointed
to the 1747 Knowles riot as the prototype for maritime crowd actions against Royal Navy press
gangs in later decades. By the late 1760s, violent brawls with authorities, effigy burnings, and
bonfires became common tropes in sailor-initiated riots in ports from Maine to South Carolina.26
It will be recalled that the Knowles riot, one of the largest pre-Revolutionary riots of this sort,
had its own roots in the Royal Navy’s violent attempts to impress Massachusetts provincial navy
sailors. Whether members of privateer crews, provincial guard ships, or merchant vessels,
common sailors could find much common cause in the fight against Royal Navy conscription.
This violent resistance to impressment would continue throughout the imperial crisis.
With the 1746 impressment act still in place, Royal Navy ships impressed hundreds of American
sailors, sometimes even sending them back to Britain. Just as it had in Boston in 1747, this
policy led New Yorkers to form a violent mob and burn a Royal Navy tender in the summer of
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1764, and inspired similar riots throughout the colonies as far south as Virginia. Violent
resistance to impressment could occur on the water, as well. As late as 1775, armed American
mariners in whaleboats in Marblehead, Massachusetts surrounded a Royal Navy vessel and
rescued their impressed compatriots.27 Even if provincial navies had largely ceased to function
by the 1760s, the vital participation of provincial naval veterans in the Knowles riots of the
1740s helped to stoke the flames of provincial anger against the Royal Navy that still burnt hot
two decades later.
All told, Britain’s taxation policies and the Royal Navy’s attempts at orderly control
failed to reduce Anglo-American dissidents to submission. While the customs authorities and the
Royal Navy did make some headway in enforcing the Sugar Act, the costs of maintaining a large
peace time Royal Navy fleet were probably higher than any revenue made by subsequent
imperial tax-laws such as the Townshend Acts. The larger goal of connecting the American
colonies to the metropole through increased imperial domination also failed as the thirteen
mainland American colonies became more and more alienated.28 Although Anglo-Americans
could not convince the metropole to lighten its taxation policies by invoking their decades of
provincial naval service to the Crown, they did use old provincial naval strategies and techniques
to violently resist the Royal Navy’s enforcement of these new imperial acts
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EPILOGUE
It would be impossible to draw a direct line between the provincial navies of the colonial
era and the Continental and State Navies of the Revolutionary War. Nevertheless, one can find
some echoes of the legacy of provincial navies in the American war effort at sea in the fight for
Independence. This connection becomes even more evident when one realizes that historians
throughout the last century have typically placed coastal New England—the region with the
earliest and largest provincial naval establishments—as the birthplace of the Continental Navy.
While the first shots of the war were fired at Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill throughout
the spring and summer of 1775, New Englanders in whaleboats attacked British shipping near
Boston. When the Second Continental Congress formed the Continental Army out of New
England militia units, and placed General George Washington as commander, the Virginia
military veteran drew on the Congress’s limited funds to fit out merchant ships as warships to
challenge the British stranglehold around Boston.1
The initial fleet of New England vessels, like the provincial fleet that attacked
Louisbourg in 1745, was one of merchant ships. Historian Christopher Magra has argued that
despite their civilian origins, this merchant fleet was “the first American navy” of the war. In a
method that “defies classification as privateers,” patriotic merchants leased their vessels to the
Continental Congress, making them “temporary property of the United Colonies…” As this fleet
grew, the need to clothe, feed, and pay sailors and shipwrights were some of the many factors
that elevated the Congress’s role as a central power.2 One might recall that in 1690, the costs
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associated with the New England assault on Quebec—largely a naval campaign—led the
Massachusetts government to issue the first ever paper money in the colonies. Just as with
provincial navies of decades past, fitting out what would become the Continental Navy would
inspire lasting governmental and financial change.
While the fitting out of merchant ships as warships in Boston in the summer of 1775
would start the slow process of the formation of an American Navy, the concept of
commissioning a continental fleet was just as controversial at the beginning of the American
Revolution as it had been during the Albany Conference of 1754. That summer, Rhode Island's
provincial government—still dealing with ravages by Royal Navy ships—urged its delegates to
the Continental Congress to campaign for a Continental Navy to help deter these attacks.3 Some
congressmen such as Pennsylvania’s John Dickinson were hesitant to escalate the war effort
anymore when there might still be a chance at peace through diplomacy. Firebrands such as
Massachusetts's John Adams and his cousin Samuel Adams contended that creating a
Continental Navy would be a show of force that would stand a better chance of achieving peace
through strength. While one of Pennsylvania’s delegates plied for diplomatic resolutions to the
violence, one of the colony’s other representatives—Benjamin Franklin—backed John Adams
and other hawkish congressmen who called for a pan-colonial navy to contest the Royal Navy’s
growing stranglehold in the northeast. It should come as no surprise that Franklin, who had come
up with the idea of a continental navy to support the British war effort twenty-one years before,
would be more than willing to use the same idea while fighting them in 1775.4
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By October of 1775, Congress created a Naval Committee of men representing several
colonies, including South Carolina's Christopher Gadsden—a veteran of the Royal Navy,
himself, and Stephen Hopkins—the former governor of Rhode Island. Hopkins, then nearly
seventy years old, would have been well aware of the benefits of provincial naval warfare,
having served as governor while his colony hired a guard vessel during the Seven Years War,
and having attended the Albany Congress where talk of a proto-Continental navy had occurred.5
While the Continental Congress worked on making a national fleet a reality, eleven of the
thirteen state governments (excepting New Jersey and Delaware) took the initiative themselves
to build local fleets. While the Continental Congress had greater resources to build larger
warships with larger crews than state fleets, local governments bankrolled large flotillas of
smaller vessels (i.e. galleys) to defend regional coasts and ports. Just as with colonial provincial
navies of previous wars, these state-funded fleets were widely outnumbered by locally
commissioned privateers.6 Nevertheless, regionally focused state navies carried the legacy of
provincial navies forward into the fight against the British even more than the Continental Navy.
Even though one can find echoes of provincial naval traditions in the Continental and
state navies of the Revolution, it is equally striking that a number of provincial navy veterans
served in both state and national naval branches throughout the war. One of the most well-known
examples is South Carolina’s Captain John Joyner. His experience also exemplifies the
contemporary tensions between many American officials over the importance of regional versus
national maritime defense needs. Near the end of the Seven Years War, Joyner commanded one
of the colony's scout boats, but saw little service other than making coastal surveys. By 1775,
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however, a provincial government committee ordered Captain Joyner and his compatriot Captain
John Barnwell to coordinate an assault with Georgia forces on a British supply ship near
Savannah. Forces from both colonies captured over 20,000 pounds of gunpowder from the
British ship and sent at least 5000 pounds to help George Washington's army then surrounding
Boston. Ultimately, both colonies’ local naval forces scored a local victory for both their
respective governments and the Patriot cause in general.7
Although Joyner’s Revolutionary career began with promise, it would end in tragedy. By
1778, South Carolina's government hoped to use valuable local staple crops (indigo and rice) and
credit to purchase a few frigates from the French government. The state sent its commodore
Alexander Gillon and several representatives for the transaction, including the well-experienced
Joyner. On the journey over, Joyner faced a mutiny and temporary imprisonment by the British,
but was luckily able to take advantage of family connections in Bristol to secure his release.8
Unfortunately for Gillon and the state government, it would take three years to acquire even a
single frigate. After much haggling, Gillon secured the lease for L’Indien—later the South
Carolina— a frigate that the French government had ordered to be constructed in neutral
Amsterdam, and which had been placed under the temporary guardianship of the Chevalier de
Luxembourg.9 The French had initially built the frigate with the intention of selling it to the
prominent American envoy Benjamin Franklin and his compatriots, but various economic and
diplomatic issues (including Dutch neutrality until 1780) delayed this plan. It is interesting that
Franklin himself had secured the initial audience with the French government for Gillon,
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especially since he had criticized the commodore for seeking such a large vessel for local
defense purposes.10
By mid-1782, Commodore Gillon reached Philadelphia and there became enmeshed with
the Chevalier in legal battles over some of his transactions in Europe. With these troubles in
mind, the commodore placed John Joyner as its commander. While the vessel's new captain
aimed to bring it back to South Carolina, three Royal Navy vessels captured his vessel and its
450 man crew that December. Only a few months later, the war would be over.11 Ultimately,
Joyner’s tenure as captain of the South Carolina was brief, disastrous, and limited to the final
months of the Revolutionary War. What is noteworthy for this study, however, is that a state
which had previously only built provincial navies for regional campaigns in the southeastern
colonies now had the ability to secure warships from European powers, and to do all this while
depending on the experience of a provincial navy veteran.
South Carolina’s provincial sailors were not the only veterans who saw service in the
Revolution. For instance, historian Philip Chadwick Foster Smith has argued that
Massachusetts's provincial navy of the Seven Years War set a “precedent for the Massachusetts
State Navy of the Revolutionary War.” While Captain Hallowell of the King George frigate
stayed loyal to the king, his lieutenant Daniel Souther became a major captain in the state's
Revolutionary navy, his pilot Eleazor Giles became a Patriot privateer, a twelve year old servant
onboard named Samuel Tucker later captained two of General Washington's schooners and a
Continental frigate.12 Ultimately, provincial naval veterans throughout the colonies provided a
small but significant officer corps for the Continental, state, and privateer fleets.
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While the legacies and veterans of pre-Revolutionary provincial naval shaped the
development of the Continental and state navies, at least one surviving provincial navy vessel—
the Georgia scout boat Prince George—was still in service during the War for Independence. At
more than thirty years old, the Prince George had long exceeded the lifespan of most wooden
vessels of the era.13 At the beginning of the conflict, Patriot rebels had forced its Loyalist
captain, John Lichtenstein, to surrender the aged boat.14 Researcher Gordon Burns Smith has
found that not long thereafter, Captain John Stanhope of the H.M.S. Raven recaptured the vessel
during an engagement with Georgia naval forces.15 Despite this loss, by 1778, Georgia’s Patriot
House of Assembly ordered the state’s commissary general to “make Enquiry whether the Scout
Boat which before the revolution was in the Service of this State (then province) can be got
up...and also the repairs of the said Boat at the public Charge.” While it is not clear if this was
the Prince George or an earlier scout boat, the fact that Georgia officials recognized the utility of
the scout boat service to “this State (then province)” demonstrated an acknowledgement of the
importance of the legacy of provincial navies years into the American Revolutionary War.16
With likely dozens of provincial navy veterans assuming high commands in both the
Continental and state navies, it might be tempting to see provincial naval service as a pipeline
into support for the American cause. The case of the Braddock-Lyford family of Georgia and
South Carolina challenges this simple assumption and demonstrates how family legacies of
provincial naval service had little bearing on one’s allegiance. While John Braddock commanded
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one of the Georgia state navy galleys in 1776, his maternal uncle William Lyford, Jr. was a
Loyalist exile that acted as a pilot for numerous Royal Navy vessels throughout the war. Both
men’s fathers (David Cutler Braddock and William Lyford, Sr.) had been captains in the
provincial navy of South Carolina during the 1740s.17 Even though their fathers fought in the
same fleet against the Spanish, differing political loyalties in the 1770s would tragically drive
these close relatives to join opposing navies.
The legacy of provincial naval service was also evident beyond the Patriot cause. For
example, the governor of Loyalist-aligned East Florida, Patrick Tonyn, faced a traditional
dilemma between 1776 and 1778 when Royal Navy vessels either failed to protect his colony’s
coast, or their vessels were in ill shape to assist him. To defend St. Augustine and the rest of
Britain’s only fully loyal colony south of Nova Scotia, Tonyn created a fleet of privateers,
impressed vessels, and purchased warships that some historians have called the “East Florida
provincial navy.” Despite the absence of the Royal Navy, the Loyalist provincial navy of East
Florida successfully repelled numerous rebel American invasions until the British secured the
province by capturing Savannah, Georgia in 1778. In the end, Tonyn’s “provincial” navy was no
different from historical provincial navies in the now-rebellious colonies, or his opponents’ state
navies.18
Ultimately, while one cannot draw a direct line of continuity between the provincial
navies of prior decades and the American fleets of the Revolutionary War, echoes of the
colonies’ long history of maritime self-defense continued on in some form in the guise of the
Continental and state navies of the 1770s and 1780s. For a long period between 1689 and 1754,

17

J.G. Braddock, “The Plight of a Georgia Loyalist: William Lyford, Jr.” The Georgia Historical
Quarterly 91, no. 3 (2007), pp. 247-265.
18
George E. Buker, and Richard Apley Martin. “Governor Tonyn's Brown-Water Navy: East Florida
during the American Revolution, 1775-1778.” The Florida Historical Quarterly 58, no. 1 (1979): pp.58-71.

213

Anglo-Americans fitted out their own semi-permanent and temporary provincial navies to secure
their coasts from French, Spanish, piratical, and Native American maritime threats with limited
Royal assistance. During the Seven Years War (c. 1754-1763), the Royal Navy finally gained
maritime hegemony in the Western Atlantic world, and made the existence of costly colonial
naval establishments unnecessary. Nevertheless, when the British government used the Royal
Navy to enforce unpopular trade policies in the 1760s, Anglo-American antipathy for the navy’s
heavy-handed impressment policies and enforcement of trade laws coupled with a long legacy of
local naval defense shaped the ways Americans resisted British authorities in the Imperial Crisis.
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